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In three essays, I investigate the antecedents and consequences of the firm-government 
revolving door, a type of employee mobility between firms and their regulators. In 
contrast to previous studies, which categorize the revolving door as a type of corporate 
political strategy, I suggest that both firms and governmental entities actively participate 
in the revolving door for their own strategic purposes. I argue that firms may hire former 
regulators in order to acquire their regulatory expertise, as well as their connections to 
current regulators. On the other hand, governmental entities, such as regulatory bodies, 
may hire individuals with regulated industry experience in order to build industry support 
for regulatory initiatives, as well as to learn how to regulate more effectively. Finally, as 
a consequence of this type of personnel movement, firms may obtain more favorable 
regulatory outcomes due both to the cognitive and regulatory capture of current 
regulators through past or (potential) future employment, respectively. Using a novel 
database containing career histories of all commissioners who served on 17 U.S. 
Independent Regulatory Commissions from 1887-2000, in Chapters II and III, I find 
evidence in support of firms and regulatory bodies both partaking in revolving door for 
their strategic ends. Furthermore, using another unique database of revolving doors 
between the USDA and its regulated agribiotechnology firms, in Chapter IV I find 
 
evidence for the revolving door contributing to more favorable regulatory outcomes for 
firms during the revolving regulators’ tenures. Thus, this project sheds light on the 
antecedents and the consequences of cross-sector mobility. The results of my study 
suggest that firms are able to skew regulatory outcomes in their favor, by using their new 
revolver hires to learn about, and influence the regulatory process. However, any 
negative consequences of such skewness may be at least partially balanced by the 
positive consequences of the regulatory agencies’ learning and support building with 
industry, which may improve regulatory quality.  
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The firm-government revolving door, a type of employee mobility between firms and 
their regulators, is a highly prevalent, hotly debated, and poorly understood practice (Cohen 
1986). In the United States (Coates 2012; Eckert 1981; Etzion and Davis 2008), as well as 
around the world (Braun and Raddatz 2010; Brezis 2012; Horiuchi and Shimizu 2001), 
individuals transition between regulatory and corporate positions with great frequency. This 
cross-sector mobility is often strongly condemned by the general public, the media, as well as 
civil society organizations, as a potential deterrent to fair and equal regulation. The main concern 
is that revolving doors may lead to regulatory capture, whereby individuals in regulatory 
positions would skew regulatory outcomes in the favor of their former or future corporate 
employers (Dal Bó 2006; Stigler 1971). A lively debate on the meaning of the phenomenon 
exists in political science (see, for example, Cohen (1986) and Gormley (1979)), economics (see, 
for example, Dal Bó (2006)), and organizational studies (see Etzion and Davis 2008; Haveman, 
Jia, Shi, and Wang 2014; Hillman, Zardkoohi, and Bierman 1999). Mostly, however, the 
revolving door is treated as an example of corporate political strategy (Hillman and Hitt 1999; 
Hillman, Zardkoohi, and Bierman 1999)—an attempt to influence regulatory outcomes either by 
placing former employees on regulatory bodies (POGO 2013), or by hiring former regulators 
(Dal Bó 2006). Although studies have documented a number of important consequences of the 
revolving door on regulatory outcomes (deHaan, Kedia, Koh, and Rajgopal 2011; Gormley 
1979; Grace and Phillips 2008; Katic and Kim 2014), and indirectly, on firm performance 
(Haveman, Jia, Shi and Wang 2014; Hillman 2005; Hillman, Zardkoohi, and Bierman 1999), 
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antecedents of the phenomenon remain scarcely understood. In this dissertation, in addition to 
documenting the consequences, I importantly refocus attention on the antecedents of the firm-
government revolving door. I do this in order to show that this type of cross-sector employee 
mobility does not only represent corporate attempts at influence seeking, as previous literature 
would suggest, but a more complex process, involving multiple actors with different motivations.    
 In this dissertation, I argue that the process through which revolving door mobility occurs 
may be better understood as interorganizational network formation. Despite the common 
emphasis on the firm as the driver of revolving doors, both firms and governmental entities 
participate in revolving door. I suggest that both firms and regulatory bodies may actively take 
part in the revolving door for their own, strategic purposes. This fact is best understood by 
observing the locus of hiring decision-making power across the two directions of the revolving 
door. Figure 1 shows the two directions of the revolving door graphically.  
Insert Figure 1 about here 
In the entry (or firm-to-government) direction, individuals transition from corporate to regulatory 
positions. There, the locus of hiring arguably rests with the governmental entity. In the exit (or 
government-to-firm) direction of the revolving door, it is the firm that makes the decision to hire 
a former regulator. Therefore, in order to understand revolving door formation, it is crucial to 
examine the possible motives of both firms and governmental entities in the process.  
Across the chapters of this dissertation, I shed light on both the firms’ and the regulatory 
agencies’ motivations in hiring revolvers (i.e. individuals who switch from regulatory to 
corporate positions, and vice versa), as well as the firms’ regulatory outcomes received as a 
consequence of this hiring practice. In Chapter II, I focus on the firm as the driver of exit 
revolving doors, while in Chapter III, I turn my attention to governmental entities and their role 
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in the formation of the entry revolving door. Specifically, in Chapter II, I argue that regulated 
firms may hire former regulators both for their expertise and connectedness to other regulators 
remaining in power. In other words, the exit revolving door presents these firms with the 
potential to exchange expertise, as well as to seek influence from regulatory bodies. In particular, 
I suggest that firms with high regulatory burdens may have a higher need for regulatory expertise 
in their revolver hires, whereas firms with low public scrutiny of their employee movement will 
be better able to take advantage of the connectedness of their hires, in order to achieve more 
favorable outcomes for their clients, directly regulated firms. In Chapter III, I argue that 
regulatory bodies hire individuals with regulated industry experience in attempts to build 
industry support, as well as to learn how to regulate effectively. I suggest that, although 
regulatory bodies possess coercive power (DiMaggio and Powell 1983), they also need to ensure 
their stakeholders’ support in order to maintain their legitimacy (Hiatt and Park 2013). 
Furthermore, regulatory bodies often rely on firms’ voluntary participation in the regulatory 
process, particularly when they are resource constrained (Gupta and Lad 1983). They also may 
rely on learning-by-hiring in order to design and implement more effective regulation. Thus, in 
Chapter III, I suggest that in the conditions where support-building and learning motives are 
more important, hiring individuals with regulated industry backgrounds will be more prevalent.  
Finally, in Chapter IV, I turn to examining the consequences of the revolving door 
phenomenon for regulated firms. In particular, I empirically investigate whether entry and exit 
revolving doors contribute to more favorable regulatory outcomes. This is a way of testing 
whether the firms’ strategic employment of former and future regulators may, in fact, be 
effective as a corporate political strategy. I suggest that firms may benefit from both directions of 
the revolving door. In the firm-to-government (entry) direction of the revolving door, revolving 
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regulators may be cognitively captured by their former employers (Rajan 2010). In the 
government-to-firm direction of the revolving door, I suggest that the benefits that accrue to 
firms are due to regulatory capture through the offer of future employment given to regulators 
(Dal Bó 2006; Stigler 1971). Thus, while the mechanisms for influencing regulatory outcomes 
are different across the two directions, I argue that the effect is the same: more favorable 
outcomes are received by connected firms.   
 In Chapters II and III, I use a unique new database, containing career histories for all 
individuals who served as commissioners on 17 U.S. Independent Regulatory Commissions 
(IRCs) from 1887-2000 (Nixon 2005) to conduct two empirical studies of the antecedents of the 
revolving door between IRCs and regulated firms. I find support for the idea that both firms and 
governments participate in the revolving door for their own, strategic purposes. While regulated 
firms may hire former regulators in order to learn from their regulatory expertise, as well as to 
influence their colleagues remaining in power, regulatory bodies may hire from regulated firms 
in order to become more effective in regulatory efforts, as well as to manage their relationships 
with the regulated industry. Thus, it is clear that revolving door formation process is a much 
more complex process than the existing literature has made it out to be. In order to fully 
understand it, I suggest that we must examine antecedents from both sides of the phenomenon: 
the corporate, as well as the governmental side.  
 Then, in Chapter IV, I employ another unique database, which contains information on 
the revolving door movements of USDA regulators, as well as on the regulatory outcomes of 
agribiotechnology firms, from 1995-2010. I find that agribiotech producers indeed benefit from 
their revolving door ties, but only while the regulator is still tenured at the USDA. After the 
regulator transitions to the firm from the USDA, the improved regulatory outcomes disappear, 
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suggesting that directly regulated firms may not, in fact, benefit from the expertise of their hires, 
but only from their influence wielded during regulatory tenure. Furthermore, I also find that there 
is a selection effect, such that firms with historically worse regulatory performance tend to be 
more likely to form revolving door ties. This further confirms that the revolving door is used 
strategically by firms to manage their performance in the regulatory arena.   
 This dissertation makes several theoretical contributions to the studies of the revolving 
door. First, it develops and tests a theoretical model that disentangles the effects of individual 
regulators’ regulatory expertise and connectedness as drivers of the revolving door. By doing 
this, Chapter II allows us a better understanding of what it is that firms are obtaining through the 
exit revolving door. Second, Chapter III illuminates the regulatory bodies’ motivations for 
participating in the entry revolving door. In doing so, it supplements the commonly-held notion 
of the revolving door as corporate political strategy by shedding light on the oft-disregarded 
agentic role of governmental entities in revolving door formation. Third, Chapter IV empirically 
shows that both directions of the revolving doors, in fact, contribute to more favorable outcomes 
for regulated firms who employ them. Finally, and most importantly, the chapters taken together 
reconcile the roles of regulated firms and regulatory bodies as jointly shaping cross-sector 
employee mobility. I conclude that any accounts of the revolving door phenomenon must include 
both types of organizations that participate in it.  
Methodologically, this dissertation uses two unique databases that allow me to shed light 
on the revolving door phenomenon. One is the most comprehensive available database, spanning 
industry sectors, different regulatory agencies, and historical time (1887-2000) (Nixon 2005). As 
such, it provides an unprecedented look at this phenomenon, which has often been studied within 
the context of single industries, or a few agencies at a single point in time. Of course, the primary 
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reason for this has been the sparse data availability on individual career histories. The IRC 
database resolves this issue, and allows an in-depth empirical study of the antecedents of the 
revolving door, which I conduct both on the level of the individual, and on the level of the 
commission. The second database is also hand-assembled, and contains detailed data on both 
regulatory outcomes and the revolving door movements of key USDA regulators from 1995-
2010. This allows me to study the effect of the revolving door on the speed of regulatory 
approvals of the GMO seeds, while controlling for firm characteristics, GMO crop qualities, and 
the regulatory environment. The narrowing of the empirical setting from the 17 regulatory 
agencies across a large swath of historical time in Chapters II and III, to a single agency in a 
recent period in Chapter IV, is a necessary step, as regulatory procedures and the types of 
regulatory outcomes vary widely across different agencies and time. While the wide coverage of 
the IRC database provides an ideal setting for studying the revolving door antecedents, shedding 
a light on the consequences of the revolving door required the deep and narrow focus provided 
by the database of USDA revolving doors.  
Overall, then, this dissertation provides novel theoretical and empirical insights on a 
socioeconomic phenomenon with important consequences for individual regulators, firms, and 
regulatory bodies alike. 
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Despite the high prevalence and the important potential consequences of the revolving 
door, a type of employee mobility between firms and their regulators, there is no clarity 
in terms of the antecedents of this practice. In this chapter, I ask: What individual 
characteristics of regulators make them more likely to be hired away by regulated firms? 
Using a unique new dataset, containing career histories of regulators from 17 U.S. 
Independent Regulatory Commissions from 1887-2000, I find that both expertise and 
connectedness increase the likelihood of private sector employment post-tenure. In 
particular, expertise increases the likelihood of transitioning to high regulatory burden 
firms, including directly regulated, law and consulting firms, whereas connectedness 
increases the likelihood of transitioning to the low public scrutiny firms, including law 
and consulting firms. The results of this study suggest that ex-regulators present their new 
corporate employers with the potential for expertise exchange with the government, as 




















Organizational hiring decisions happen behind closed doors, and represent black boxes, 
in which the decision-making regarding job candidates is visible only to select few 
organizational members. While organizational scholars have shed light on the role of job 
seekers’ individual characteristics, particularly in terms of their human and social capital (Bills 
1988; Bills 1992; Erickson 2001; Granovetter 1995; Rivera 2012) in securing private sector jobs, 
employee mobility between sectors has largely been unexplained. In this chapter, I open the 
black box of employee mobility between the public and private sectors by studying its individual 
level antecedents. In particular, I focus on the firm-government revolving door, defined as the 
movement of personnel between regulated firms and their regulatory agencies (Cohen 1986)1. 
Even more specifically, this chapter investigates the exit, or government-to-firm direction of the 
revolving door, zeroing in on the regulators who revolve from their regulatory appointments to 
regulated firm employment.  
The revolving door is a highly prevalent practice, both in the United States (Coates 2012; 
Eckert 1981; Etzion and Davis 2008) and globally (Braun and Raddatz 2010; Brezis 2012; 
Horiuchi and Shimizu 2001). Despite its prevalence and potential consequences for regulatory 
outcomes (deHaan, Kedia, Koh, and Rajgopal 2011; Gormley 1979; Grace and Phillips 2008; 
Katic and Kim 2014) and firm performance (Haveman, Jia, Shi and Wang 2014; Hillman 2005; 
Hillman, Zardkoohi, and Bierman 1999), there is a notable lack of attention to the antecedents of 
this practice. As such, a question of large theoretical and practical importance has gone 
unanswered. Namely, what are the characteristics that make individual regulators more likely to 
                                                        
1 The revolving door may also be defined more broadly, as an exchange of employees between firms and the 
government, or across the private and the public sectors. Previous literature has employed different 
conceptualizations, and given the relative scarcity of the literature, I report findings across definitions both broad 




have a revolving door with (directly or indirectly) regulated firms? In this chapter, I explore the 
effects of expertise and connectedness of individual regulators on their likelihood of being hired 
away from their regulatory posts and into private sector employment. 
Two main views exist regarding the firm-government employee exchange: one, that the 
revolving door is a form of corporate political strategy (Hillman and Hitt 1999; Hillman, 
Zardkoohi, and Bierman 1999), which, if successful, may result in regulatory capture of the state 
by corporate actors (Dal Bó 2006; Stigler 1971), and another, that it is a simple exchange of 
expertise between the private and the public sectors (Braun and Raddatz 2010; Che 1995). While 
a firm’s motivation for hiring an individual may be unobservable, due to the implausibility of 
peeking inside the black box of organizational hiring, examining the individual characteristics of 
revolving commissioners may illuminate what the firms are obtaining through the revolving 
door. The individual characteristics of the regulators who get hired away by firms are indicative 
of what it is that the firms are gaining through the revolving door practice: expertise, 
connections, both, or neither. Hiring regulators for their expertise exclusively would be 
consistent with a pure expertise exchange between the public and the private sectors, while 
hiring based on connectedness only would support the regulatory capture view. By examining 
the revolving door’s antecedents, then, this chapter makes a theoretical contribution to our 
understanding of the phenomenon as a whole, and the role it may play within corporate political 
strategy. More broadly, this study contributes to the literature on hiring and employee mobility 
by separately illuminating the roles of social and human capital in these processes.  
In addition, I propose and test a theoretical framework that explains the differential 
effects of individual expertise and connectedness on the regulators’ likelihood of being hired 




directly and indirectly regulated firms. In this dissertation, I refer to directly regulated firms as 
those that exchange employees with the specific regulatory body that has regulatory jurisdiction 
over their activity. In contrast, law, consulting and lobbying firms do not fall under that same 
regulatory jurisdiction. While the clients of law, consulting, and lobbying firms may be directly 
regulated, these three types of firms are not subject to direct oversight themselves, and I refer to 
them as indirectly regulated.  
In my theoretical framework, I differentiate between these various firms on two key 
dimensions: regulatory burden and public scrutiny. I suggest that the firms high in regulatory 
burden, including directly regulated firms as well as law and consulting firms, will particularly 
value the regulatory expertise of their revolver hires (i.e. individuals who participate in the 
revolving door), who help these firms to manage their complex and economically costly 
regulatory processes. I further argue that, in contrast to directly regulated and lobbying firms, 
firms with low public scrutiny of their personnel movement, such as law and consulting firms, 
will be able to extract more value from the connectedness of their revolver hires, providing these 
firms with an avenue to influence current regulators to act in favor of their clients. In other 
words, I suggest that regulatory expertise will predict the likelihood of regulators being hired by 
directly regulated firms, as well as law and consulting firms, whereas connectedness will predict 
the likelihood of being hired by law and consulting firms. 
In order to study the revolving door and its individual-level antecedents, this chapter 
draws on a novel database of career histories for commissioners from 17 U.S. Independent 
Regulatory Commissions (IRCs), from 1887-2000 (Nixon 2005). Methodologically, this 
database allows for the first examination of the revolving door across various industry sectors, 




prevalent among the IRCs—as 12 percent of all regulators take their first job post-tenure in 
directly regulated firms, 19 percent take jobs in law or consulting firms, and another seven 
percent exit directly to lobbying firms. Figures 1 and 2 show the prevalence of the exit revolving 
door across various IRCs, as well as across different time periods.  
                                                         Insert Figures 1-2 about here 
 In a logistic regression, designed to explore the roles of expertise and connectedness in 
the government-to-firm revolving door, I find that the regulatory expertise of former regulators 
increases their likelihood of transitioning to high regulatory burden firms, including directly 
regulated firms, as well as law and consulting firms. I also find that connectedness significantly 
increases the likelihood of transitioning to low public scrutiny firms, including law and 
consulting firms. Thus, my results suggest that firms may use the exit revolving door as a way to 
obtain regulatory expertise, as well as an avenue to seek influence with the government.  
THE ROLE OF EXPERTISE AND CONNECTEDNESS IN THE EXIT REVOLVING DOOR 
   
In general, a job candidate’s expertise and connectedness improve her odds of securing 
private sector employment. Individuals of relatively higher human capital, particularly those that 
are more knowledgeable, are arguably more likely to be viewed as desired candidates by firms. 
Importantly, firms place a premium on expertise, as they are able to extract value from hiring 
experts. Employee mobility increases knowledge transfers to the focal organization, and 
consequently, its performance, as well (Almeida and Kogut 1999; Argote and Ingram 2000; 
Song, Almeida, and Wu 2003). In particular, individuals bring knowledge accrued in their 
previous positions to their new employers (Baty, Evan and Rothermel 1971; Boeker 1997). 
Inflows of experts to the firm have also been linked to increased creativity and innovation within 




In addition to expertise, the job seekers’ social capital plays an important role in the 
hiring process. The reason for the role of social connectedness in the hiring process is twofold. 
Firstly, a job seeker’s social capital may provide easier access to a job (Fernandez, Castilla, and 
Moore 2000; Granovetter 1973). Secondly, firms may also view the social capital of their job 
candidates as an important job qualification and may therefore be more likely to hire well-
connected candidates (Erickson 2001). As with expertise, employees’ social capital brings 
benefits to the hiring firm. Incoming hires may bring their client relationships with them upon 
joining a new firm (Broschak 2004; Somaya, Williamson, and Lorinkova 2008; Wezel, Cattani, 
and Pennings 2006). Furthermore, new hires may use their social ties in order to access their 
former employer’s reservoirs of knowledge, thereby increasing knowledge transfers to their new 
employer. In other words, former regulators may use their brokerage positions (Burt 1992), 
spanning the regulatory commissions and private sector firms, in order to obtain information and 
influence within the commissions for the benefit of their new employers. A new hire’s ties may 
also increase her new employer’s influence in the industry (Dokko and Rosenkopf 2010).  
However, while the value of new hires’ expertise and connectedness has been well-
documented in the private sector in general, there is less clarity when it comes to the 
government-to-firm revolving door hires. In particular, we lack the crucial understanding of the 
relative values of expertise and connectedness in revolving door formation. Lester et al. (2008) 
found that the joint measure of former government officials’ human and social capital 
significantly increased the likelihood of them becoming board directors to private companies 
subsequently. However, that particular study does not disentangle the effects of expertise and 
connectedness on the private sector employment of former regulators. In order to understand 




expertise, connections, both or neither—it is critical to theorize and model the relative values of 
expertise and connectedness separately. Here, I develop separate theoretical arguments for 
expertise and connectedness. Moreover, unlike Lester et al. (2008), this chapter provides an 
empirical test of these arguments in the context of firm employment, rather than board 
memberships.  
 My theoretical framework proposes two main dimensions along which firms may differ 
in terms of their need for regulatory expertise, as well as their ability to take advantage of 
connectedness. In short, I suggest that firms that have high regulatory burdens will be more 
likely to hire regulators for their regulatory expertise. On the other hand, I suggest that firms that 
have low public scrutiny will be well positioned to use their new revolving hires’ connectedness, 
and will therefore be more likely to hire for it. Figure 3 summarizes my theoretical predictions, 
and I elaborate on them below. 
                                                           Insert Figure 3 about here 
Regulatory Burden 
 
 Regulatory burden is the first firm dimension, which may affect a firm’s likelihood of 
hiring former regulators for their expertise. I refer to regulatory burden as the difficulties and 
costs that the regulatory process imposes on regulated firms. Directly regulated firms (i.e. those 
that are under the direct regulatory jurisdiction of the 17 IRCs in my data) are heavily involved 
in the regulatory process. They have to abide by the rules and regulations administered by the 
IRCs. Moreover, directly regulated firms often rely on regulatory approval for their actions, and 
may be monitored for transgressions against the regulatory codes. Law and consulting firms may 
do the same—however, their participation in the regulatory process is typically done on behalf of 




burdens—including directly regulated firms, as well as law and consulting firms, may have great 
needs for regulatory expertise. For both directly regulated firms, as well as law and consulting 
firms, having employees with significant regulatory expertise may make the regulatory process 
easier to navigate, as well as less costly. Anecdotally, firms extol the value of expertise that 
former commissioners bring with them. For example, a press release following the hire of a 
former FEC Commissioner by a political data-mining company emphasized the importance of 
“[the former commissioner’s] successful management of complex legislative, budgetary and 
compliance initiatives” (PR Newswire 2010). As such, I suggest that the firms with a high 
regulatory burden will be likely to hire former regulators for their expertise. In other words, I 
suggest the following:  
Hypothesis 1: Expertise of individual regulators will increase their likelihood of post-tenure 
employment in a high regulatory burden firm.  
When it comes to lobbying firms, I argue that these firms are low on the regulatory 
burden dimension. Namely, lobbying firms do not participate in regulatory affairs to the same 
extent as directly regulated firms, as well as law and consulting firms. They tend to engage with 
policy makers on larger issues, rather than the minutiae of the regulatory efforts of their clients. 
As such, they are not grouped with the high regulatory burden firms in the analysis.  
Public Scrutiny 
The second key dimension I propose is public scrutiny. Here, public scrutiny refers to the 
extent to which the revolving door may receive attention (and consequently, disapproval) from 
the general public, as well as from the regulatory body itself. The general public often perceives 
the firm-government revolving door to be highly problematic due to its potential to skew 




Bó 2006; Stigler 1971). This is particularly the case for the movement of regulators to and from 
directly regulated firms, as well as lobbying firms. The interests of the regulated industry and 
those that may lobby on its behalf are often considered to be orthogonal to those of the 
regulatory agencies. As a result of this perception of revolving door’s impropriety by the public, 
U.S. regulatory bodies have had legal limitations imposed on the movement of personnel to and 
from regulated industry and lobbying (White House 2009). Due to the high amount of scrutiny 
they face, I suggest that directly regulated and lobbying firms may encounter difficulties in their 
potential attempts to influence regulation through revolving door hires. In particular, any 
attempts to hire regulators will be monitored by the regulatory commissions themselves, as well 
as by the general public. As such, it may be difficult to obtain any benefits from the 
connectedness of their new revolver hires. I therefore suggest that, due to their high public and 
regulatory scrutiny, directly regulated and lobbying firms will be likely to outsource their 
influence attempts to law and consulting firms. These firms do not undergo the same amount of 
scrutiny, and may be able to successfully hire, and extract benefits from the connectedness of 
their hires in order to exercise influence on current commissioners. Thus, I suggest that 
individuals higher in connectedness will be seen as more attractive candidates by law and 
consulting firms, for their potential ability to help with influence-seeking on behalf of these 
firms’ clients. Put differently, I predict the following:  
Hypothesis 2: Connectedness of individual regulators will increase their likelihood of post-
tenure employment in a low public scrutiny firm. 
EMPIRICAL CONTEXT 
 
 A number of U.S. Independent Regulatory Commissions, those included in the IRC 




status as part of the executive branch of the U.S. government, IRCs are designed to create and 
enforce regulation that is free of political influence. IRCs “exercise control over commerce and 
business necessary to the orderly conduct of the Nation’s economic life” (The President’s 
Committee on Administrative Management 1937: 36). As for the IRCs’ mandate, these 
commissions “have been given broad powers to explore, formulate, and administer policies of 
regulation; they have been given the task of investigating and prosecuting business misconduct; 
they have been given powers, similar to those exercised by courts of law, to pass in concrete 
cases upon the rights and liabilities of individuals under the statutes” (The President’s 
Committee on Administrative Management 1937: 36). Each independent regulatory commission 
is set up to deal with a specific sector, such as railroad transportation, banking or radio.  
Moreover, each commission consists of a small number (typically around five) of 
presidentially-nominated, Senate-confirmed experts. IRCs are designed to promote 
bipartisanship, and as such, numbers of Republican and Democratic members are generally 
balanced on commissions. Additionally, each commission has a hierarchical structure: it is 
presided over by a Chair (either elected by commissioners or nominated by the President of the 
United States) and has supporting staff.   
The criteria for including specific IRCs in the IRC database are multifold. Selected 
commissions engage in important decision-making. Additionally, they were chosen to present 
variation in terms of commission characteristics (Nixon 2000). In particular, selected 
commissions show variation in founding dates (ranging from 1887 to 1977), size, amounts of 
institutional change experienced, partisan membership restrictions, agency clientele, as well as 




The IRCs included in this study are: Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) (1938-19842), 
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) (1972-2000), Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) (1965-2000), Federal Communications Commission (FCC) (1934-2000) 
and its predecessor Federal Radio Commission (FRC) (1926-1934), Federal Election 
Commission (FEC) (1975-2000), Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) (1977-2000) 
and its predecessor Federal Power Commission (FPC) (1930-1977), Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve (BGF) (1935-2000) and its predecessor, Federal Reserve Board (FED) (1913-
1935), Federal Trade Commission (FTC) (1914-2000), Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) 
(1887-1995), National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) (1935-2000), National Transportation 
Safety Board (NTSB) (1967-2000), Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) (1974-2000) and its 
predecessor Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) (1946-1974), and Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) (1934-2000). These commissions regulate private activity in a range of 
fields, including labor (NLRB, EEOC), election financing (FEC), transportation by rail, truck, 
pipeline, ship or airplane (CAB, ICC, NTSB), credit, banking (FED/BGF), securities on and off 
exchanges (SEC), trade practices (FTC) and consumer safety (CPSC), communications such as 
radio, television, telegraph, and telephone (FCC/FRC), as well the development, sale and 
distribution of electric and nuclear power (FERC/FPC, NRC/AEC) (The Commission on 
Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government 1949). Table 1 shows the structure of 
the data by commission.  
                                                         Insert Table 1 about here 
 
 
                                                        
2 The years in parentheses denote the period of observation for each commission. For each commission, the period 
of observation starts with the commission’s founding, and ends either with the commission’s dissolution, or the year 




DATA AND METHODS 
 
The IRC database is the primary source of data for this chapter. In addition to the data 
collected and entered by Nixon (2005), I used the primary sources attached to the database, as 
well as the webpages of various commissions, in order to create additional variables (such as 
chairmanship or educational variables), as well as to fill in missing data, where possible. The 
IRC database contains information on each individual who served as a commissioner of any of 
the 17 Independent Regulatory Commissions (including AEC, BGF, CAB, CPSC, EEOC, FCC, 
FEC, FERC, FED, FPC, FRC, FTC, ICC, NLRB, NTSB, NRC, and SEC) from the 
commission’s founding to either year 2000, or the commission’s dissolution. For commissions 
that were dissolved before 2000, including the AEC, FED, FPC, and FRC, their successor 
commissions are included in the data. To be included in the database, a commissioner has to 
have been appointed before December 31, 20003. For each individual commissioner, the IRC 
database provides the following: 
1) Career history, including four positions held before the regulatory position, and four held 
after. Each of these positions is assigned a numerical code for the type of employment activity. 
Employment activity types include: direct employment by regulated industry, indirect 
employment by regulated industry (such as consulting or legal representation4), public interest 
employment, commission staff, other federal agency staff, state agency staff, congressional staff, 
academia/think tank, unrelated private sector, unrelated public sector, state elective office, 
federal elective office, appointive state commissioner/agency head, appointive federal 
                                                        
3 The original database makes an exception to this rule by also including 12 individuals who were nominated in 
2001, and began serving after the cut-off date. I retain them in my analysis.   
4 I refine this category by recoding it into law/consulting and lobbying firms. To identify lobbying firms (as opposed 




commissioner/agency head, state judicial, federal judicial, farmer, related military service, 
related public sector, and ambassadorial and international commission.    
2) Biographical information, including date of birth, sex, race, universities attended5, highest 
educational degree attained, state of residence and political party affiliation.  
3) Regulatory appointment circumstances, including dates of appointment, exit circumstances 
(such as death in office, resignation, expiration of term, not confirmed by Senate, transfer to a 
new seat, impeachment, or seat abolishment), chairmanship6, whether the appointment was a 
holdover from the previous term (i.e. whether a regulator had to fill his spot until a replacement 
has been found, after his or her expiration date), recess appointment (i.e. whether the President 
granted an appointment while Congress was in recess).   
Using data on career histories, appointments, as well as personal characteristics of the 
755 regulators from 17 Independent Regulatory Commissions, I examine what characteristics 
make regulators more likely to enter the private sector upon leaving their regulatory positions. In 
addition to the IRC database, in supplemental analyses, I also use historical data on the 
regulatory environment (Federal Register 2015), as well as the political ideologies of Congress 
(Ornstein, Mann, Malbin, and Rugg 2013; Poole and Rosenthal 2015). In addition, I used 
Compustat to collect firm revenues to calculate the Herfindahl-Hirchman Index, a measure of 
industry concentration, for regulated industries in my sample. Finally, I also employed the 
regulatory agencies’ categorization scheme used by Dudley and Warren (2003).  
 
 
                                                        
5 Data on the educational background of regulators were included in the supplementary files provided to me by 
David Nixon, the author of the IRC database. I coded and entered the data for use in this project. 
6 The original IRC database did not include data on chairmanships. I collected that variable manually, relying on 





The dependent variables in the main analysis reflect the first job held upon a 
commissioner’s exit from an IRC. In order to test Hypothesis 1, I use a 0/1 dummy for the 
regulatory burden of the commissioner’s first employer post-tenure.  The first job post-tenure in 
this classification may be with a high regulatory burden firm (1), such as a directly regulated 
firm, as well as a law or consulting firm, or it may be with any other employer (0), including 
various other private and public sector employment.  
In order to test Hypothesis 2, I use a 0/1 dummy for the public scrutiny of the 
commissioner’s first employer post-tenure. In particular, this variable takes the value of 1, if the 
commissioner transitioned to a low public scrutiny firm, such as a law or consulting firm. For 
any other type of employment, including others in the public and private sectors, the variable 
takes the value of 0.  
Independent Variables  
 I operationalize regulatory expertise as the duration of the commissioner’s IRC tenure (in 
years). Connectedness is operationalized as the number of commissioners (remaining in office at 
the time of the focal commissioner’s departure) with whom a focal commissioner has a tie. A tie 
is defined as having served together on a commission for a period longer than a year7.  
Control Variables 
For each commissioner, I also include a number of control variables. In particular, I 
include controls for the commissioners’ sex, race (1 if white, 0 if non-white), age (at the time of 
departure from the regulatory commission), a 0/1 dummy for DC-area residence (1 if residence 
                                                        
7 As some commissioners in the IRC database have tenures overlapping with others not captured in the database 
(due to the fact that their tenure began after the data collection cutoff in 2000), for the calculation of this variable, I 
collected additional data on all commissioners who have ever served on the 17 commissions to the present date 





in Washington, DC, Virginia or Maryland, 0 otherwise), party affiliation (1 if Republican, 0 
otherwise), whether the commissioner held the chairmanship of the commission during her 
regulatory tenure (1 if the commissioner held the chairmanship during her regulatory tenure, and 
0 otherwise), as well as whether she resigned her regulatory appointment early (1 if the 
appointment was left before its expiration, and 0 otherwise). In addition, to control for any time 
effects related to the time of departure from the commission, I include the commissioner’s 
departure year from the IRC. Moreover, I also control for educational and professional expertise. 
Educational expertise is operationalized as the highest degree of education attained by the 
individual. This variable ranges from 1 (high school degree) to 4 (PhD or equivalent doctoral 
degree). In addition, I include a 0/1 dummy for the individual holding a law degree. Professional 
expertise is operationalized as a 0/1 dummy for the commissioner having relevant private sector 
experience (in the four jobs held prior to regulatory tenure), defined as having had previous work 
experience in the directly regulated industry, law/consulting, and lobbying. Finally, regulatory 
expertise serves as a control in the models testing the public scrutiny hypothesis (H2), and 
connectedness serves as a control in the models testing the regulatory burden hypothesis (H1). 
Analysis  
 
At the end of her regulatory tenure, an individual commissioner faces a choice for future 
professional activity that ranges between no employment and various types of private and public 
sector jobs. I adopt a logistic regression to reflect the competition between different employment 
alternatives, viewed in terms of the employers’ regulatory burden and public scrutiny. 
Observations are on the level of the individual, with commission fixed effects.  
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2. Individuals who died during their 




market post-tenure. I also drop individuals who did not pursue further employment options (i.e. 
those who retired after their tenure). Moreover, 14 individuals had missing data and were also 
dropped from the analysis. Further, some variables also had missing values on a few 
observations, resulting in a total sample, which includes 585 commissioners who served from 
1887-2012.  




 = αi + Xβ,  
where αi represents the IRC fixed effect, X represents independent and control variables, and β 
stands for regression coefficients.  
RESULTS 
Models testing Hypotheses 1 and 2 are presented in Table 3. In Table 3, Model 1 refers to 
the baseline specification of the logit regression testing Hypothesis 1, including the control 
variables: age, race, sex, political affiliation, chairmanship, Washington DC-area residence 
dummy, an early resignation dummy, departure year, educational and professional expertise, a 
law degree dummy, and connectedness. Similarly, Model 3 is the baseline specification of the 
logit regression testing Hypothesis 2, including the same set of controls (while replacing 
connectedness with regulatory expertise). Thus, Model 2 additionally includes regulatory 
expertise as the independent variable, whereas Model 4 adds connectedness. Due to the small 
size of the dataset, I report coefficients significant at p<0.1, as well.    
                                                            Insert Table 3 about here 
Control Variables’ Effects 
 
   In Table 3, Model 1 reports the effects of control variables for the likelihood of a 




having directly regulated firm experience (p<0.001), as well as law/consulting experience 
(p<0.001), all significantly increase the likelihood of high regulatory burden firm employment. 
On the other hand, having a law degree significantly decreases the likelihood of post-tenure 
employment in a high regulatory burden firm (p<0.05). Connectedness also significantly 
increases the likelihood of high regulatory burden firm employment, although this relationship 
becomes only marginally significant at p<0.1 in Model 2.  
  Model 3 in Table 3 shows the effects of control variables on the likelihood of post-tenure 
employment in a low public scrutiny firm. Having had resigned before the end of term decreases 
the likelihood of employment in a low public scrutiny firm (p<0.01), as do (historically) more 
recent years of departure from a commission (p<0.01). Educational expertise (p<0.05), directly 
regulated firm experience (p<0.05), as well as law/consulting firm experience (p<0.001), all 
increase the likelihood of low public scrutiny employment. Interestingly, regulatory expertise 
does not have a significant relationship with the likelihood of low public scrutiny employment 
post-tenure. 
Effects of Expertise and Connectedness on Private Sector Employment 
 
 Model 2 tests Hypothesis 1, while Model 4 tests Hypothesis 2, in order to assess whether 
the likelihood of former regulators’ private sector employment post-tenure varies by the 
regulatory burden and public scrutiny of the hiring firms.  
 Regulatory expertise, as operationalized by the regulators’ tenure, significantly increases 
the likelihood of post-tenure employment in a high regulatory burden firm (p<0.05). This finding 
lends support to Hypothesis 1. For firms with high regulatory burdens, then, the regulatory 




 Connectedness of regulators also seems to play a role in the hiring process. In fact, 
connectedness significantly (p<0.05) increases the likelihood of transitioning to law or 
consulting employment, supporting Hypothesis 2. In other words, former regulators’ 
connectedness to other remaining regulators plays a role in transitioning to law and consulting 
firms, which I suggest bear low public scrutiny when they engage in the revolving door. 
Robustness Checks 
 Next, I run several tests to confirm the robustness of my main results. Descriptive 
statistics for the variables included in robustness checks, as well as in supplementary analysis, 
are available in Table A1 in the Appendix.  
Commission Operationalization 
 Firstly, I check that the operationalization of commissions themselves does not affect my 
results. While in my main analysis, I treat each of the 17 IRCs in the data as separate entities, 
here I group successor commissions (NRC, BGF, FERC, and FCC) with their predecessors 
(AEC, FED, FPC and FRC, respectively), resulting in a total of 13 IRCs. This different IRC 
grouping does not affect my main results, as can be seen in Table 4. However, using this 
commission operationalization, connectedness also becomes a significant predictor of transitions 
to high regulatory burden firms (p<0.05). 
                                                         Insert Table 4 about here 
Connectedness Operationalization  
 The other factor I consider is the operationalization of connectedness. In my main 
analysis, I operationalize connectedness as the number of remaining commissioners, with whom 
a focal commissioner has served on the focal IRC for at least a year. I require individuals to 




post-commission life as a potential source of first-hand information and influence. The reasoning 
here is that relationships between coworkers take some time to develop, and to become close 
enough for individuals to be willing to exchange favors. In Table 5, I use different lengths of 
time for the operationalization of commissioner overlap, including 30, 90, 180 and 1095 days. I 
also include the results using the original operationalization of 365 days from Model 4 for 
comparison.  
                                                         Insert Table 5 about here 
 The results from Models 4b-4e show some differences to my main model, Model 4. In 
particular, the effect of connectedness operationalized as overlap of at least 30, 90 and 1095 days 
is not significant, albeit still positive. As an explanation of this discrepancy, I suggest that 
serving together for a period less than 180 days does not necessarily build the kind of strong tie 
required for a commissioner to be open to attempts at influence by a former colleague. On the 
other hand, individuals who have served with a revolving commissioner for at least three years 
(or 1095 days) are likely to be outgoing in the near term, which would make them less valuable 
as a source of influence. As such, it appears that the length of the co-working relationship 
matters for the potential value of connectedness.   
Multiple Imputation 
As a robustness check, I also ran a multiple imputation of the missing data using the mi 
impute option in Stata. Table 6 shows the results of Models 3 and 4 run on the imputed data, and 
the results are identical to those in the main analysis (run on the non-imputed sample). As such, I 
conclude that data missingness does not bias my results either.  





Supplemental Analysis  
 In this section, I seek to illuminate the government-to-firm revolving door further by 
examining some contingencies. Here I examine the factors, which may moderate the influence 
that regulatory expertise and connectedness may have on post-tenure employment. First, in Table 
7, I consider how the effect of regulatory expertise on the likelihood of high regulatory burden 
employment differs by the regulatory intensity of the government, the type of commission, as 
well as by the ideology of the present government, the commissioner herself, as well as of that of 
the IRC’s founding Congress. Second, in Table 8 I focus on the factors that may moderate the 
effect of connectedness on the likelihood of low public scrutiny employment, such as regulated 
industry competition, as well as the ideologies of the present government, the commissioner, and 
the IRC’s founding Congress.   
                                                         Insert Tables 7-8 about here 
The Relationship between Regulatory Expertise and High Regulatory Burden Employment 
Regulatory Intensity 
 Table 7 shows the subsample analysis that explores the relationship between regulatory 
expertise and high regulatory burden firm employment. First I consider the moderating effect of 
regulatory intensity on this relationship. In times of high regulatory intensity, regulatory burdens 
may be even higher for directly regulated firms, as well as for law and consulting firms. 
Additionally, when regulatory intensity decreases, regulatory expertise may become less 
necessary for firms.  
I use a common operationalization of regulatory intensity: the number of pages of the 
Federal Register, a compilation of all rules and regulations promulgated by the U.S. federal 




intensity as decreasing (when the change in the number of pages of the Federal Register, relative 
to the previous year, is negative), and increasing (when the change is positive, compared to the 
previous year’s edition of the Federal Register). Model 3b in Table 7 presents the results for the 
subsample where regulatory intensity decreased relative to the previous year, and Model 3c 
presents the results of the subsample where regulatory intensity increased relative to the previous 
year.  
The results run counter to my prediction. In the subsample where regulatory intensity 
decreased (Model 3b), regulatory expertise has a positive and significant effect (p<0.05) on the 
likelihood of transitioning to a firm with a high regulatory burden. On the other hand, in the 
subsample where regulatory intensity increased (Model 3c), regulatory expertise does not have a 
significant effect on the likelihood of transitioning to a high regulatory burden firm. This finding 
suggests that in the years when relatively fewer regulations are being promulgated in general, the 
expertise of former regulators may be a sufficient qualification for employment in a high 
regulatory burden firm. However, when regulatory intensity increases, the content of rules and 
regulations affecting regulated firms may also be changing, which would render the regulatory 
expertise of former commissioners no longer helpful in navigating the high regulatory burdens of 
these firms.  
Commission Type 
 Here I consider whether regulatory expertise acquired by being on a specific type of 
commission differentially influences the likelihood of post-tenure employment. Specifically, I 
consider two commission characteristics that may moderate this relationship. Firstly, in models 
3d and 3e, I subsample commissions based on whether they regulate single industries, or are 




be more useful to prospective employers who have a high regulatory burden. Individuals who 
serve on commissions such as the CPSC or the FTC, which regulate across sectors, may not 
posses as deep a knowledge of the rules and regulations affecting a specific prospective 
employer’s activity. The empirical results support this idea of differential usefulness of 
regulatory expertise: in the subsample of single sector IRCs, regulatory expertise is a significant 
(p<0.05) and positive predictor of transitioning to a high regulatory burden firm, while the 
coefficient becomes insignificant in the subsample of cross-sectoral IRCs.  
 Secondly, in models 3f and 3g, I consider whether the type of regulation promulgated by 
the commission moderates the effect of regulatory expertise. Following Dudley and Warren 
(2003), here I use the categorization of commissions into those that primarily produce either 
social or economic regulation. Economic regulation may be more technical, and less subject to 
interpretation by individual regulators than social regulation. As such, firms with a high 
regulatory burden may find the regulatory expertise of commissioners coming from economic 
regulatory bodies particularly useful. This is, in fact, what I find: in the subsample of economic 
regulatory commissions, the regulatory expertise of commissioners significantly (p<0.05) 
increases the likelihood of transitioning to high regulatory burden firms, and the effect loses its 
significance in the subsample of social regulatory commissions.  
Ideology  
 Finally, I also examine how ideology may moderate the effect of regulatory expertise. I 
consider three distinct effects of ideology. First, I conduct an analysis of the moderating effect of 
the Senate’s prevailing ideology at the time of a commissioner’s departure from the IRC.  
Second, I consider the moderating effect of a commissioner’s personal politics. Third, I 




I first subsample by the control of the U.S. Senate in the departure year of the 
commissioner. As the prevailing ideology of Congress may affect the regulatory environment, 
making it more (in the case of Democrats) or less pro-regulation (in the case of Republicans), it 
might also affect the usefulness of regulatory expertise. I therefore suggest that regulatory 
expertise would be particularly important when Congress is more Democratic in its political 
leaning.  
In Table 7, Model 3h is run on the Democratic Senate subsample at the time of the 
commissioner’s departure, and Model 3i is run on the Republican Senate subsample at the time 
of departure. I use Poole and Rosenthal’s (2015) NOMINATE scores, based on roll call voting 
patterns, to classify the Senate as Democratic or Republican in a particular year. Here I find that, 
when the Senate is Republican-leaning in its voting at the time of a commissioner’s exit, 
regulatory expertise is positively related to the likelihood of post-tenure employment in a high 
regulatory burden firm (p<0.001). On the other hand, when Senate is more liberal, expertise has 
a non-significant negative coefficient. One potential explanation for these findings may be that, 
because Democrats may promulgate more complex and burdensome regulation, any existing 
regulatory expertise of former commissioners may be rendered obsolete by new rules and 
regulation. This would also be consistent with the findings from Models 3b and 3c, which 
suggest that regulatory expertise does not have a significant effect on the likelihood of a high 
regulatory burden job, when regulatory intensity increases.  
Next, I run a subsample analysis that separates commissioners by their personal politics. 
In Table 7, Model 3j is run on the subsample of Democratic commissioners, and Model 3k is run 
on the subsample of Republican commissioners. Employers may perceive the qualities of 




perceived as being pro-regulation, and as such, they may also be assumed to have particularly 
deep knowledge of the regulatory process. I do, in fact, find that for Democratic commissioners, 
regulatory expertise is a positive and significant predictor of transitioning to high regulatory 
burden firms (p<0.05), but the same is true for Republican commissioners, albeit to a lower 
significance level (p<0.1). In other words, there are no notable differences between the two 
subsamples in terms of the importance of regulatory expertise—it matters for both Republican 
and Democratic commissioners. This would suggest that perceptions of regulatory expertise may 
not be affected by the personal ideology of the commissioners.    
 Lastly, I consider the possibility that a commission may be imprinted with the ideological 
values of the Congress that created it, and that this imprinting may affect revolving door 
formation. Organizational theory recognizes that an organization’s early post-founding period is 
a crucial one, when organizations may be imprinted by the external environment in which they 
were created (Stinchcombe 1965). Table 7 presents Models 3l and 3m, which are run on two 
subsamples of IRCs: commissions founded by a Democratic Congress, and those founded by a 
Republican Congress. Most commissions in the IRC database are founded by a Democratic 
Congress, which is consistent with the widely-held idea of the Democratic party being more pro-
regulation than the Republican party. Only several IRCs were founded by a Republican 
Congress, including the FRC, the FPC, and the ICC. At the time of their founding, these three 
commissions may have been imbued with the values of the Republican Party that created it. In 
particular, Democratic-imprinted commissions may promulgate more regulations of higher 
complexity. This would render regulatory expertise of former commissioners from these 
commissions particularly necessary for firms in their jurisdiction, who need to navigate their 




significant and positive in the subsample of Democratic-imprinted IRCs, and has no significant 
effect in the subsample containing Republican-imprinted IRCs. 
The Relationship between Connectedness and Low Public Scrutiny Employment 
 In this section, I turn to examining how industry concentration, as well as the three types 
of ideology (that of Congress at the time of a commissioner’s departure, the commissioner’s own 
personal ideology, and that of Congress at IRC’s founding) affect the relationship between 
connectedness and low public scrutiny firm employment.  
Industry Concentration  
  First, I look at the moderating role of industry concentration. Industries that are more 
concentrated generally have lower levels of competition, as market power is held by several 
large companies, rather than shared among many smaller ones (Shughart 2008). I suggest that the 
connectedness of former commissioners may be highly valued by their employers in highly 
concentrated industries, as a way to obtain influence over the regulatory process. The impact of 
the regulatory process may be particularly strongly felt by the companies in highly concentrated 
industries, due to their large size. As such, connectedness may play a particularly important role 
in concentrated industries.   
In order to obtain the measure of industry concentration by IRC, I first determine what 
industries each IRC regulates. Then, using firm revenue data from Compustat, I calculate the 
Hershfindhal-Hirschman index (HHI) for all the firms in the industry regulated by a specific 
IRC. For those IRCs, which regulate several specific industries, I calculate the HHI for the IRC 
as an average of the HHI for the industries it regulates. Finally, for those IRCs that are truly 
cross-sectoral in that they could regulate any sector of the economy with regard to a specific 




analysis, I divide IRCs into those that regulate highly concentrated industries (HHI ≥ 1800) and 
all others (HHI< 1800).  
 Connectedness does, in fact, have a large and significant effect (p<0.05) on the likelihood 
of transitioning to low public scrutiny firms in the high industry concentration subsample. It has 
a non-significant negative effect in the other subsample. This finding suggests that 
connectedness of former commissioners might be an especially important trait in a new hire, 
when the regulated industry is dominated by a few market-dominating companies.  
Ideology 
As in the subsample analysis of the effects of regulatory expertise, here I also consider 
how the ideologies of Congress (both in the year of a commissioner’s departure from the IRC, as 
well as at the time of a commission’s founding), and the personal ideology of the commissioner 
herself, may moderate the effect of connectedness. Each of the variables is operationalized in the 
same way as described in the previous section above.  
First, I consider how the politics of Congress at the time of a commissioner’s departure 
may moderate the relationship between connectedness and transitioning to a low public scrutiny 
firm. Connectedness may become more important when Congress is dominated by Republicans, 
who may create a less intense regulatory environment. In such a regulatory environment, the 
level of scrutiny for the revolving door participants may be lower, too. As such, connectedness 
may become a more useful (and less monitored against) tool to obtain influence through. I do in 
fact find that in the subsample where the Senate leans more Republican, connectedness is 
significant (p<0.01) and positive as a predictor of transitions to low public scrutiny firms. The 




 I also investigate whether the personal politics of the commissioners make them more 
likely to be hired for their connectedness by the low public scrutiny firms. As suggested before, 
commissioners may be perceived differently according to their politics. Republican 
commissioners may be assumed to be pro-business, and as such, they may be considered more 
open to using their connectedness with former colleagues to influence the regulatory process on 
behalf of their new employers. Consistent with that idea, I find that in the subsample of 
Republican commissioners, connectedness does have a positive and significant (p<0.05) effect 
on the likelihood of transition to low public scrutiny firms. There is no significant effect for 
connectedness in the subsample containing Democratic commissioners.   
Finally, I consider the moderating impact of the potential imprinting by the Congress that 
created each commission. Here I suggest that Republican-imprinted commissions may be imbued 
with pro-business values at their founding. This may make the commissioners who serve on 
these commissions potentially more receptive to being influenced by their former colleagues to 
shift regulatory outcomes in favor of the regulated industry. Empirically, however, I find that in 
the subsample of commissions founded by a Democratic Congress, connectedness has a 
significantly positive effect on being hired by low public scrutiny firms, while the same is not 
true for Republican-imprinted commissions. A potential explanation for this may be that, due to 
its potential for shifting regulatory outcomes, connectedness may play a more important role 
when the IRC is imbued with pro-regulation values of the Democrats that founded it.  
Overall, this subsample analysis reveals variation in the effects of connectedness and 
regulatory expertise by a number of important factors, including regulatory environment, 
ideology and regulated industry concentration. This variation is significant, in that it deepens our 




that regulatory expertise is linked to the hiring firms’ need to respond to costly regulatory 
demands, whereas connectedness is related to the firms’ opportunities for influencing current 
regulators.   
DISCUSSION  
Accounts of the revolving door between firms and the government often emphasize the 
possibility of regulatory capture through the mobility of employees between sectors. In a 
regulatory capture scenario, a firm may hire an individual due to her ability to contribute to 
better regulatory outcomes for the firm. This perspective stands sharply in contrast to the 
exchange of employees between sectors as a form of learning, or exchanging expertise. In this 
chapter, I focused on establishing the relative importance of expertise and connectedness as 
drivers of private sector employment for former regulators. By theorizing and empirically 
modeling the roles of expertise and connectedness separately, I am able to answer the question of 
what it is that firms obtain through this type of revolving door. In other words, do firms hire 
former regulators in order to access their regulatory expertise or their connections? My analysis 
thus helps us distinguish between two scenarios: revolving door as expertise exchange, and 
revolving door as influence seeking. I find evidence for both scenarios, in that a revolver’s 
regulatory expertise increases the likelihood of high regulatory burden firm employment, 
whereas her connectedness to remaining regulators increases the likelihood of low public 
scrutiny firm employment.  
Importantly, the effects of expertise and connectedness are sizeable. Holding all other 
variables constant at their means, increasing IRC tenure from 1 (minimum) to 34 years 
(maximum) would result in an increase of 49 percent in the predicted probability of high 




from 1 to 10 results in a 30 percent increase of predicted probability of low public scrutiny firm 
employment. Clearly, expertise and connectedness both have significant effects on the likelihood 
of securing distinct types of lucrative private sector employment for former regulators.  
This study makes a threefold contribution to the revolving door literature. First, it taps 
into the (previously unmeasured) motivation for firms to participate in the exit revolving door, 
by studying its antecedents. Through understanding what it is that firms gain through this type of 
employee mobility, we begin to understand the phenomenon as a whole, and the place it holds in 
the corporate political strategy repertoire. Second, this chapter provides a new theoretical 
framework to explain the variation in the antecedents of the revolving doors across different 
types of firms. Rather than considering all types of firms together, I differentiate between firms 
according to their regulatory burden and public scrutiny, allowing for a more nuanced view of 
the revolving door phenomenon. Third, this chapter uses a large archival dataset, which allows 
an unprecedented look at the revolving door across time, sectors and agencies. Thus, the 
contributions made by this study are theoretical, as well as empirical.  
It is also worth noting that regulatory expertise and connectedness, as defined in this 
study, are exogenous. That is, individuals have little control over their tenure and the other 
remaining commissioners’ career paths. Given the potential for being replaced by incoming 
presidential administrations, commissioners may not have the ability to influence the length of 
their tenure. Furthermore, commissioners certainly do not have the ability to influence the tenure 
of other colleagues, with whom they may be competing for prestigious corporate jobs. Moreover, 
revolving commissioners are just as unable to influence which of their colleagues might remain 
in place after they transition to a corporate position. As such, I argue that the act of hiring 




may, however, attempt a different look at the data by matching regulators who are similar on 
other dimensions, excluding expertise and connectedness. Such a project would have to use a 
larger database of revolving regulators in order for the matching procedure to work, but it may 
be able to establish causality more firmly by seeing which individuals get hired when firms are 
confronted with a choice of regulators who are similar in all other respects.      
Another point deserves additional clarification. Previous professional experience in the 
private sector contributes to the likelihood of returning to the private sector. However, that does 
not mean that commissioners revolve in circles, from firms to regulatory positions, and back to 
the same firms. Raw archival data from this study confirms that regulators do not necessarily go 
back to the same employer after their IRC tenures. Moreover, in the case of low scrutiny law and 
consulting firms, both experiences in law/consulting and in directly regulated firms increase the 
likelihood of employment. While these two facts support the idea of non-specific private sector 
experience being considered valuable in the hiring process, further research may be better able to 
establish the significance of prior professional experience through interviews with firms and 
regulators alike. 
Another fruitful question for future research may be: how does hierarchy affect revolving 
door formation? More specifically, are individuals who are elected chairmen more likely to 
participate in the revolving door between firms and their regulators? The results of this study do 
not suggest any significant differences for the likelihood of chairmen being recruited away by the 
private sector. In fact, though the coefficients on chairmanship do not reach significance, they 
are all negative. It may be that the IRC chair positions do not hold particular advantage—after 
all, about 40 percent of the sample holds the position at one point in their tenure. It could also be 




idea may call for a future study—which could examine whether there are differences in hiring 
patterns according to the levels of organizational hierarchy. For example, all IRCs have staff 
members, who are far more numerous and arguably more involved in the day-to-day regulatory 
process than the commissioners are. IRC staff also may have important connections to each 
other, as well as to IRC commissioners. As such, future work might include these individuals in 
the data, in order to examine how different the hiring patterns may be for staff compared to 
commissioners.    
Interestingly, I also find that the year of departure has a significant negative effect on the 
exits to law and consulting firms. The significance of the time trend suggests that the low 
scrutiny firms hiring regulators may be responding to the changes in their regulatory 
environment. For example, to the extent that the firm-regulator revolving door is used as a type 
of corporate political strategy, we might expect to see more hiring from the public sector by 
these firms in response to expanding regulatory activity. Moreover, the scrutiny surrounding 
revolving doors may also be increasing with time, due to expanded awareness of the 
phenomenon by the general public and the media. Future research may look into the time trend 
in more detail, to establish whether it is tied to regulatory shocks, such as introduction of new 
legislation, or increased media and general public attention.  
What are the implications of this study for firms, as well as for regulatory bodies? 
Regulatory bodies, and the public sector in general, compete with firms for employees. Firms 
hiring individuals with professional expertise away from regulatory bodies may result in 
commissions being staffed by professional public servants only, potentially over time leading to 
less effective regulation by those without previous work experience in the sector. On the other 




attracts high quality regulators to the public sector in the first place, despite meager pay (Che 
1995; Salant 1995). Thus, before any policy recommendations can be made regarding the 
revolving door, a clearer understanding of both directions of the phenomenon must be achieved. 
Moreover, given the mixed evidence from the studies on the revolving door’s consequences, 
finding positive (Gormley 1979; Grace and Phillips 2008; Haveman, Jia, Shi and Wang 2014; 
Hillman 2005; Hillman, Zardkoohi, and Bierman 1999), negative (deHaan, Kedia, Koh, and 
Rajgopal 2011; Quirk 1981) and mixed (Cohen 1986) effects for connected firms, researchers 
should also devote their efforts to providing a clear answer on how the exchange of employees 
actually affects regulation. Due to the high importance of the revolving door for firms and 
regulators alike, future research in the area is direly needed. 
 In conclusion, in this chapter, I sought to examine the black box of corporate hiring from 
regulatory agencies. In particular, I focused on the roles of expertise and connectedness in the 
likelihood of regulators being hired away to the private sector, whether directly or indirectly 
regulated. Both expertise and connectedness increase the chances of a regulator being hired away 
by the private sector, but I also find variation across types of firms according to their regulatory 
burden and public scrutiny. This chapter provides a look at the revolving door phenomenon 
across 17 regulatory agencies, from 1887-2000, and it represents the first step towards a fuller 
understanding of revolving door’s antecedents. My empirical results point to the need for future 
research to illuminate the phenomenon further, particularly in terms of its consequences for 



















Commission Regulatory Mandate Number of Commissioners Percent Years
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) atomic science and technology 36 4.77 1946-1974
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (BGF) credit and banking 59 7.81 1935-2000
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) airplane transport 45 5.96 1938-1984
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC ) consumer safety 21 2.78 1972-2000
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) labor 33 4.37 1965-2000
Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
communications such as radio, 
television, telegraph, and telephone 74 9.8 1934-2000
Federal Election Commission (FEC) election financing 18 2.38 1975-2000
Federal Reserve Board (FED) credit and banking 21 2.78 1913-1935
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) electric power 24 3.18 1977-2000
Federal Power Commission (FPC) electric power 41 5.43 1930-1977
Federal Radio Commission (FRC)
communications such as radio, 
television, telegraph, and telephone 12 1.59 1926-1934
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) trade practices 75 9.93 1914-2000
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) rail transport 103 13.64 1887-1995
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) labor 54 7.15 1935-2000
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) nuclear power 25 3.31 1974-2000
National Transport Safety Board (NTSB)
transportation by rail, truck, pipeline, 
ship or airplane 31 4.11 1967-2000
Securities and Exchange Comission (SEC) securities on and off exchanges 83 10.99 1934-2000
























Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
(1) regulatory burden 0.31 0.46 0 1
(2) public scrutiny 0.19 0.39 0 1 0.73
(3) age (years) 53.60 10.52 29.41 87 -0.07 -0.01
(4) race 0.91 0.29 0 1 0.07 0.05 0.14
(5) female 0.12 0.33 0 1 -0.03 -0.06 -0.15 -0.16
(6) Republican 0.48 0.50 0 1 -0.01 0.00 0.03 0.12 0.01
(7) Chair 0.39 0.49 0 1 -0.01 0.02 0.15 0.06 -0.07 0.06
(8) DC, VA or MD residence 0.16 0.37 0 1 -0.04 -0.05 -0.12 -0.03 0.08 0.00 0.00
(9) early resignation 0.48 0.50 0 1 -0.04 -0.11 -0.08 0.00 -0.08 0.03 0.11 -0.08
(10) departure year 1969.28 24.04 1889 2012 0.00 -0.06 -0.10 -0.23 0.32 0.06 -0.01 0.21 -0.20
(11) highest degree of education 2.87 0.71 1 4 0.03 0.09 -0.15 -0.10 -0.01 -0.04 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.26
(12) law degree 0.54 0.50 0 1 0.02 0.08 -0.19 -0.08 -0.05 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.01 0.12 0.20
(13) dir. regulated firm experience 0.17 0.37 0 1 0.10 -0.02 0.08 0.06 -0.08 -0.03 -0.07 -0.05 -0.02 -0.09 -0.20 -0.22
(14) law/consulting experience 0.51 0.50 0 1 0.10 0.18 -0.09 -0.09 -0.04 -0.01 0.15 -0.03 0.01 0.00 0.19 0.62 -0.27
(15) lobbying experience 0.05 0.23 0 1 0.06 0.05 -0.16 -0.19 0.05 -0.05 -0.04 0.05 0.00 0.20 0.07 0.16 -0.02 0.01
(16) IRC tenure (years) 5.93 5.06 0.20 34.78 0.00 0.03 0.55 0.06 -0.02 -0.02 0.19 -0.01 -0.14 0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 -0.08






Table 3. Results of the Main Logit Analysis   
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Variables DV: Regulatory burden Regulatory burden Public scrutiny Public scrutiny
Controls age (low-high) 0.000 -0.014 0.011 0.011
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
race (1= white, 0= non-white) 0.827* 0.810* 0.822+ 0.792+
(0.39) (0.39) (0.48) (0.48)
female (1 if female, 0 otherwise) -0.068 -0.104 -0.300 -0.208
(0.31) (0.32) (0.39) (0.40)
Republican (1 if Republican, 0 otherwise) 0.048 0.069 0.158 0.134
(0.19) (0.19) (0.22) (0.22)
Chair (1 if Chair, 0 otherwise) -0.098 -0.184 -0.193 -0.177
(0.21) (0.21) (0.24) (0.25)
DC area residence (1 if DC-area residence, 0 otherwise) -0.214 -0.236 -0.393 -0.435
(0.26) (0.27) (0.32) (0.33)
early resignation (1 if resigned early, 0 otherwise) -0.307 -0.265 -0.786** -0.814***
(0.20) (0.20) (0.24) (0.24)
departure year (low-high) 0.001 -0.001 -0.016** -0.015*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
highest degree of education (1=HS, 2=college, 3=masters, 4=PhD) 0.048 0.045 0.406* 0.390*
(0.15) (0.16) (0.19) (0.19)
law degree (1 if law degree holder, 0 otherwise) -0.529* -0.510+ -0.374 -0.442
(0.27) (0.27) (0.30) (0.31)
dir. regulated firm experience (1 if any, 0 otherwise) 0.956*** 1.017*** 0.666* 0.661*
(0.27) (0.28) (0.34) (0.34)
law/consulting experience (1 if any, 0 otherwise) 1.006*** 1.007*** 1.262*** 1.296***
(0.27) (0.27) (0.31) (0.31)
lobbying experience (1 if any, 0 otherwise) 0.432 0.432 0.656 0.717
(0.40) (0.40) (0.45) (0.45)
Regulatory expertise IRC tenure (low-high) 0.065* 0.045 0.042
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Connectedness overlap with remaining Commissioners (low-high) 0.138* 0.127+ 0.186*
(0.07) (0.07) (0.09)
constant -4.504 -1.157 27.610* 24.270+
(10.65)       (10.84)       (12.04)     (12.42)
N 585 585 585 585
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.14





Table 4.  Robustness Check Using Alternative Commission Operationalization 
 
 
Model 3a Model 4a
Variables DV: Regulatory burden Public scrutiny
Controls age (low-high) -0.016 0.009
(0.01) (0.01)
race (1= white, 0= non-white) 0.828* 0.825+
(0.39) (0.48)
female (1 if female, 0 otherwise) -0.082 -0.228
(0.31) (0.40)
Republican (1 if Republican, 0 otherwise) 0.055 0.119
(0.19) (0.22)
Chair (1 if Chair, 0 otherwise) -0.129 -0.177
(0.20) (0.24)
DC area residence (1 if DC-area residence, 0 otherwise) -0.225 -0.436
(0.26) (0.32)
early resignation (1 if resigned early, 0 otherwise) -0.278 -0.801***
(0.20) (0.24)
departure year (low-high) 0.002 -0.012*
(0.00) (0.01)
highest degree of education (1=HS, 2=college, 3=masters, 4=PhD) 0.059 0.413*
(0.15) (0.19)
law degree (1 if law degree holder, 0 otherwise) -0.574* -0.483
(0.27) (0.30)
dir. regulated firm experience (1 if any, 0 otherwise) 1.077*** 0.680*
(0.27) (0.33)
law/consulting experience (1 if any, 0 otherwise) 0.998*** 1.293***
(0.27) (0.31)
lobbying experience (1 if any, 0 otherwise) 0.512 0.755+
(0.40) (0.45)
Regulatory expertise IRC tenure (low-high) 0.061* 0.041
(0.03) (0.03)





Pseudo R2 0.09 0.13
Fixed effects 13 IRC dummies 13 IRC dummies






Table 5.  Robustness Check Using Alternative Connectedness Operationalization 
 
Model 4b Model 4c Model 4d Model 4 Model 4e
Variables DV:
Controls age (low-high) 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
race (1= white, 0= non-white) 0.847+ 0.829+ 0.826+ 0.792+ 0.822+
(0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48)
female (1 if female, 0 otherwise) -0.241 -0.245 -0.221 -0.208 -0.296
(0.40) (0.39) (0.40) (0.40) (0.39)
Republican (1 if Republican, 0 otherwise) 0.162 0.163 0.158 0.134 0.157
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22)
Chair (1 if Chair, 0 otherwise) -0.173 -0.177 -0.180 -0.177 -0.193
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.24)
DC area residence (1 if DC-area residence, 0 otherwise) -0.417 -0.420 -0.420 -0.435 -0.393
(0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.33) (0.32)
early resignation (1 if resigned early, 0 otherwise) -0.811*** -0.807*** -0.806*** -0.814*** -0.785**
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
departure year (low-high) -0.015* -0.015* -0.015* -0.015* -0.016**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
highest degree of education (1=HS, 2=college, 3=masters, 4=PhD) 0.393* 0.394* 0.388* 0.390* 0.406*
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
law degree (1 if law degree holder, 0 otherwise) -0.443 -0.442 -0.443 -0.442 -0.377
(0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.30)
dir. regulated firm experience (1 if any, 0 otherwise) 0.647+ 0.646+ 0.650+ 0.661* 0.666*
(0.33) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34)
law/consulting experience (1 if any, 0 otherwise) 1.296*** 1.296*** 1.315*** 1.296*** 1.261***
(0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31)
lobbying experience (1 if any, 0 otherwise) 0.735 0.728 0.731 0.717 0.658
(0.45) (0.45) (0.45) (0.45) (0.45)
Regulatory expertise IRC tenure (low-high) 0.044 0.043 0.043 0.042 0.045
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
overlap with remaining Commissioners (low-high)  (30 days min) 0.144
(0.09)
overlap with remaining Commissioners (low-high)  (90 days min) 0.126
(0.09)
overlap with remaining Commissioners (low-high)  (180 days min) 0.152+
(0.08)
overlap with remaining Commissioners (low-high)  (365 days min) 0.186*
(0.09)
overlap with remaining Commissioners (low-high)  (1095 days min) 0.010
(0.08)
constant 23.992+ 24.247+ 24.284* 24.270+ 27.513*
(12.44) (12.41) (12.39) (12.42) (12.07)
N 585 585 585 585 585
Pseudo R2 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.13








TABLE 6. Main Model Using Imputed Data 
 
 
Model 3 mi Model 4 mi
Variables DV: Regulatory burden Public scrutiny
Controls age (low-high) -0.014 0.011
(0.01) (0.01)
race (1= white, 0= non-white) 0.812* 0.779
(0.39) (0.48)
female (1 if female, 0 otherwise) -0.100 -0.214
(0.32) (0.39)
Republican (1 if Republican, 0 otherwise) 0.097 0.187
(0.19) (0.22)
Chair (1 if Chair, 0 otherwise) -0.185 -0.193
(0.21) (0.24)
DC area residence (1 if DC-area residence, 0 otherwise) -0.181 -0.323
(0.26) (0.31)
early resignation (1 if resigned early, 0 otherwise) -0.291 -0.844**
(0.20) (0.24)
departure year (low-high) -0.002 -0.016*
(0.01) (0.01)
highest degree of education (1=HS, 2=college, 3=masters, 4=PhD) 0.060 0.418*
(0.15) (0.19)
law degree (1 if law degree holder, 0 otherwise) -0.532* -0.464
(0.27) (0.31)
dir. regulated firm experience (1 if any, 0 otherwise) 1.020*** 0.649+
(0.28) (0.33)
law/consulting experience (1 if any, 0 otherwise) 1.048*** 1.319***
(0.27) (0.31)
lobbying experience (1 if any, 0 otherwise) 0.416 0.679
(0.40) (0.45)
Regulatory expertise IRC tenure (low-high) 0.064* 0.042
(0.03) (0.03)























Model 3b Model 3c Model 3d Model 3e Model 3f Model 3g Model 3h Model 3i Model 3j Model 3k Model 3l Model 3m
Variables DV:
Controls age (low-high) -0.017 0.010 -0.021 0.036 -0.026+ 0.025 0.008 -0.023 -0.006 -0.029 -0.011 -0.016
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03)
race (1= white, 0= non-white) 0.752 1.392* 1.041* 0.381 1.128* 0.350 2.060** 0.142 1.338** -0.487 0.709+ 0.000
(0.59) (0.57) (0.51) (0.68) (0.54) (0.64) (0.79) (0.50) (0.51) (0.86) (0.40) (.)
female (1 if female, 0 otherwise) -0.065 -0.308 0.038 -0.169 -0.108 0.132 -0.474 -0.014 -0.246 0.333 -0.010 -2.071
(0.49) (0.47) (0.38) (0.66) (0.40) (0.56) (0.51) (0.44) (0.45) (0.51) (0.33) (1.42)
Republican (1 if Republican, 0 otherwise) -0.327 0.005 0.037 0.012 0.181 -0.110 -0.045 0.105 0.000 0.000 0.047 0.516
(0.34) (0.30) (0.22) (0.45) (0.23) (0.41) (0.32) (0.27) (.) (.) (0.21) (0.52)
Chair (1 if Chair, 0 otherwise) -0.485 -0.370 -0.170 -0.712 -0.071 -0.636 0.284 -0.455 -0.316 -0.115 -0.418+ 1.013+
(0.37) (0.33) (0.25) (0.49) (0.25) (0.44) (0.35) (0.29) (0.32) (0.32) (0.24) (0.58)
DC area residence (1 if DC-area residence, 0 otherwise) 0.268 -0.737+ -0.193 -0.248 -0.279 0.251 -0.150 -0.288 -0.154 -0.781+ -0.414 0.920
(0.41) (0.42) (0.32) (0.54) (0.35) (0.45) (0.42) (0.39) (0.38) (0.44) (0.29) (0.87)
early resignation (1 if resigned early, 0 otherwise) 0.077 -0.574+ -0.162 -0.584 -0.135 -0.905+ -0.018 -0.327 -0.601* 0.151 -0.270 -0.420
(0.35) (0.32) (0.24) (0.43) (0.24) (0.46) (0.34) (0.29) (0.30) (0.33) (0.23) (0.52)
departure year (low-high) -0.007 -0.002 0.008 -0.032** -0.000 -0.011 0.010 -0.006 -0.000 0.001 -0.004 0.008
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
highest degree of education (1=HS, 2=college, 3=masters, 4=PhD) 0.166 0.096 -0.056 0.346 0.031 -0.011 0.171 0.002 0.145 0.076 -0.043 0.189
(0.29) (0.25) (0.18) (0.37) (0.19) (0.30) (0.29) (0.21) (0.22) (0.26) (0.17) (0.39)
law degree (1 if law degree holder, 0 otherwise) -0.039 -0.769+ -0.446 -0.318 -0.522 -0.326 -0.870+ -0.165 -0.832* 0.129 -0.581* -0.395
(0.43) (0.42) (0.31) (0.63) (0.32) (0.58) (0.49) (0.36) (0.37) (0.46) (0.29) (0.87)
dir. regulated firm experience (1 if any, 0 otherwise) 0.948* 1.114* 1.015*** 1.445 1.029** 0.874 1.410** 0.872* 1.257** 1.067* 1.048*** 1.127
(0.46) (0.45) (0.30) (0.91) (0.34) (0.54) (0.48) (0.38) (0.42) (0.43) (0.30) (0.85)
law/consulting experience (1 if any, 0 otherwise) 0.604 1.314** 1.092*** 0.781 1.341*** 0.260 0.772+ 1.151** 0.820* 1.268** 1.188*** 0.734
(0.45) (0.43) (0.30) (0.68) (0.32) (0.58) (0.47) (0.38) (0.40) (0.40) (0.30) (0.89)
lobbying experience (1 if any, 0 otherwise) 0.392 0.643 0.434 0.694 0.582 0.067 0.971 -0.019 0.845 0.268 0.371 0.000
(0.57) (0.64) (0.46) (0.96) (0.47) (0.97) (0.70) (0.54) (0.54) (0.71) (0.42) (.)
Regulatory expertise IRC tenure (low-high) 0.088* 0.065 0.069* 0.103 0.066* 0.076 -0.054 0.118*** 0.095* 0.073+ 0.072* 0.041
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06)
Connectedness overlap with remaining Commissioners (low-high) 0.150 0.088 0.148* 0.587* 0.146+ 0.030 -0.072 0.249* 0.058 0.225+ 0.110 0.123
(0.12) (0.13) (0.08) (0.27) (0.08) (0.22) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.10) (0.13)
constant 12.485 -0.501 -17.653 58.404* -1.336 17.628 -24.715 9.401 -3.541 -2.274 6.508 -18.616
(23.99) (20.62) (13.41) (23.91) (12.23) (32.64) (20.93) (15.07) (15.42) (17.30) (12.99) (26.64)
N 223 279 446 139 425 160 249 316 311 271 483 97
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.16 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.10 0.19













Model 4f Model 4g Model 4h Model 4i Model 4j Model 4k Model 4l Model 4m
Variables DV:
Controls age (low-high) 0.065* 0.003 0.029 0.007 0.003 0.016 0.015 0.002
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
race (1= white, 0= non-white) 1.107 1.015+ 2.150* -0.080 0.866 0.074 0.708 0.000
(1.00) (0.62) (0.97) (0.61) (0.58) (1.07) (0.49) (.)
female (1 if female, 0 otherwise) 0.426 -0.592 -0.323 -0.461 -0.259 0.192 -0.054 0.000
(0.76) (0.53) (0.61) (0.59) (0.55) (0.65) (0.41) (.)
Republican (1 if Republican, 0 otherwise) 0.039 0.152 0.186 0.042 0.000 0.000 0.127 -0.168
(0.48) (0.27) (0.38) (0.32) (.) (.) (0.25) (0.58)
Chair (1 if Chair, 0 otherwise) -0.139 -0.276 0.083 -0.289 0.020 -0.265 -0.328 0.315
(0.54) (0.30) (0.42) (0.35) (0.36) (0.38) (0.27) (0.67)
DC area residence (1 if DC-area residence, 0 otherwise) 0.457 -0.684+ -0.259 -0.530 -0.757 -0.440 -0.497 -1.187
(0.64) (0.41) (0.53) (0.48) (0.47) (0.53) (0.35) (1.24)
early resignation (1 if resigned early, 0 otherwise) -1.426** -0.689* -0.817* -0.855* -1.130** -0.385 -0.784** -1.221+
(0.53) (0.30) (0.40) (0.36) (0.36) (0.39) (0.27) (0.64)
departure year (low-high) -0.089* -0.013+ -0.009 -0.018* -0.013 -0.021* -0.019* 0.001
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
highest degree of education (1=HS, 2=college, 3=masters, 4=PhD) 1.116* 0.214 0.747* 0.283 0.276 0.581+ 0.427+ 0.292
(0.46) (0.23) (0.38) (0.25) (0.25) (0.35) (0.22) (0.44)
law degree (1 if law degree holder, 0 otherwise) -0.098 -0.843* -0.450 -0.477 -0.656 -0.260 -0.414 -1.070
(0.62) (0.40) (0.58) (0.42) (0.42) (0.54) (0.34) (0.94)
dir. regulated firm experience (1 if any, 0 otherwise) 1.271* 0.566 1.013+ 0.512 0.577 0.971+ 0.759* 0.352
(0.62) (0.45) (0.59) (0.47) (0.48) (0.54) (0.37) (0.95)
law/consulting experience (1 if any, 0 otherwise) 1.075+ 1.897*** 1.236* 1.569*** 0.982* 1.858*** 1.372*** 1.604
(0.60) (0.44) (0.57) (0.46) (0.46) (0.50) (0.35) (1.00)
lobbying experience (1 if any, 0 otherwise) 2.442** 0.262 1.947* -0.359 0.594 1.383+ 0.610 0.000
(0.94) (0.62) (0.76) (0.74) (0.60) (0.82) (0.48) (.)
Regulatory expertise IRC tenure (low-high) -0.026 0.059+ -0.104 0.099** 0.067 0.048 0.039 0.092
(0.07) (0.03) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06)
Connectedness overlap with remaining Commissioners (low-high) -0.150 0.259* -0.033 0.341** 0.120 0.372* 0.290* -0.003
(0.22) (0.11) (0.14) (0.13) (0.12) (0.15) (0.12) (0.14)
constant 165.258* 22.104 10.154 31.001+ 21.029 36.702+ 30.947* -5.504
(68.46) (14.26) (23.41) (17.46) (17.49) (20.65) (14.89) (30.97)
N 185 392 249 316 311 259 483 91
Pseudo R2 0.23 0.16 0.19 0.20 0.13 0.22 0.14 0.20



































































































































N.B. Not all of these variables were used in the same analysis. As can be seen from the correlation matrix, when the sample is limited 
to the non-missing observations for all the variables, cross-sectoral IRC dummy does not show any variation and the correlation with 
other variables cannot be calculated.  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26)
(1) regulatory burden 703 0.304 0.460 0 1
(2) public scrutiny 703 0.189 0.392 0 1 0.68
(3) age (years) 699 53.581 10.491 29.41 87 -0.12 -0.01
(4) race 703 0.908 0.290 0 1 0.06 0.03 0.10
(5) female 703 0.119 0.325 0 1 0.05 0.01 -0.19 -0.09
(6) Republican 703 0.477 0.500 0 1 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.17 0.03
(7) Chair 703 0.387 0.487 0 1 0.00 0.02 0.16 0.12 -0.10 0.09
(8) DC, VA or MD residence 703 0.169 0.375 0 1 -0.03 -0.03 -0.11 -0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.01
(9) early resignation 703 0.475 0.500 0 1 -0.04 -0.13 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 0.07 0.12 -0.07
(10) departure year 703 1969.337 24.010 1889 2012 0.09 -0.04 -0.17 -0.17 0.31 0.09 -0.10 0.19 -0.13
(11) highest degree of education 696 2.871 0.704 1 4 0.05 0.07 -0.13 -0.09 0.01 -0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.18
(12) law degree 697 0.541 0.499 0 1 0.09 0.15 -0.23 -0.05 -0.08 -0.05 0.15 0.02 0.08 -0.06 0.14
(13) dir. regulated firm experience 702 0.167 0.373 0 1 0.10 0.01 0.15 0.04 -0.09 -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 -0.04 0.06 -0.17 -0.19
(14) law/consulting experience 702 0.509 0.500 0 1 0.14 0.20 -0.19 -0.06 -0.06 -0.03 0.19 0.01 0.06 -0.04 0.11 0.62 -0.27
(15) lobbying experience 702 0.056 0.229 0 1 0.10 0.10 -0.22 -0.21 0.09 -0.09 -0.08 0.08 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.22 -0.04 0.01
(16) IRC tenure (years) 703 5.907 5.027 0.20 34.78 -0.03 0.02 0.60 0.08 -0.08 -0.04 0.19 -0.05 -0.10 -0.16 -0.10 -0.03 0.05 -0.07 -0.12
(17) overlap with remaining Commissioners (30 days) 703 4.300 1.957 0 10 0.10 0.09 0.22 0.05 -0.15 -0.04 0.11 -0.09 0.10 -0.38 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.03 -0.03 0.33
(18) overlap with remaining Commissioners (90 days) 703 4.189 1.979 0 10 0.10 0.10 0.22 0.05 -0.15 -0.05 0.09 -0.09 0.09 -0.36 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.03 -0.04 0.32 0.98
(19) overlap with remaining Commissioners (180 days) 703 4.021 1.969 0 10 0.11 0.12 0.22 0.05 -0.16 -0.04 0.09 -0.08 0.07 -0.35 0.03 0.10 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.32 0.95 0.97
(20) overlap with remaining Commissioners (365 days) 703 3.651 1.941 0 10 0.12 0.13 0.21 0.07 -0.14 -0.01 0.12 -0.07 0.06 -0.32 -0.01 0.13 -0.01 0.04 0.00 0.31 0.91 0.92 0.95
(21) overlap with remaining Commissioners (1095 days) 703 2.378 1.856 0 9 0.06 0.05 0.17 0.05 -0.11 -0.07 0.14 -0.11 0.03 -0.31 -0.05 0.13 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.30 0.79 0.80 0.82 0.84
(22) regulatory intensity increase 622 0.539 0.499 0 1 0.07 0.12 0.03 -0.03 -0.07 0.02 -0.03 -0.04 0.07 -0.18 -0.02 0.11 -0.13 0.13 0.02 -0.05 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.01
(23) cross-sectoral IRC 703 0.246 0.431 0 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(24) social regulatory IRC 703 0.272 0.445 0 1 -0.06 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.06 0.21 -0.13 0.08 0.09 -0.24 0.09 -0.17 -0.05 -0.14 -0.25 -0.23 -0.22 -0.24 -0.30 -0.03 .
(25) Senate political leaning 703 -0.001 0.063 -0.16 0.16 0.08 0.11 0.01 -0.08 0.08 -0.11 -0.04 0.01 -0.15 -0.06 -0.05 -0.13 0.05 -0.11 0.04 0.06 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.05 0.00 -0.18 . -0.03
(26) Senate control at IRC founding 703 0.186 0.390 0 1 -0.06 -0.03 0.07 0.03 -0.05 0.01 0.16 -0.05 -0.09 -0.15 -0.06 0.14 -0.13 0.11 -0.09 0.21 0.38 0.36 0.34 0.33 0.34 -0.01 . -0.27 0.01
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CHAPTER III  
 
Bringing the Regulatory Commission Back In:  







Revolving door, a type of employee mobility between firms and their regulators, has 
generally been viewed as a corporate political strategy. Here I suggest that the firm-to-
government revolving door (i.e. the movement of employees from firms to regulatory 
agencies) may serve the strategic purposes of governmental entities, as well. In particular, 
I argue that regulatory agencies use hiring from regulated industry to learn from it, as 
well as to build industry support for regulatory initiatives. I find supportive evidence for 
this in that the firm-to-government revolving door is more likely to occur in the 
conditions where learning and support-building through hiring are more important, while 
it is less likely when these factors are less important. Regulatory agencies are more likely 
to hire from regulated industry when regulatory staff numbers are low, and they are less 
likely to hire from it when regulatory workloads are low, and there are regulated-industry 
hires already on board. Future work is needed to examine directly how successful 
governmental entities are in using the firm-to-government revolving door for their 























 The interdisciplinary debate surrounding the firm-government revolving door, defined as 
employee mobility between regulated firms and their regulators, has generally emphasized the 
potential of this hiring practice to skew regulatory outcomes through the capture of regulators 
(Cohen 1986; Dal Bó 2006; Stigler 1971). Revolving door has been viewed as a type of 
corporate political strategy, a form of strategic firm behavior, which attempts to produce more 
favorable conditions for firms through political means (Hillman 2005; Hillman and Hitt 1999; 
Hillman, Zardkoohi, and Bierman 1999; Walker and Rea 2014). However, focusing on the 
regulated firms as the sole driver of the revolving door disregards the agentic role that 
governments may play in the process. Much like firms, governmental entities also act in self-
interested ways (North 1990; Skocpol 1985) and need to actively manage their relationships with 
various stakeholders (Hiatt and Park 2013).  
 In attempts to disentangle agentic behavior of firms and governments in the formation of 
firm-government revolving doors, it is important to consider where the locus of hiring power 
rests for each of the two directions in employee mobility. For the entry (firm-to-government) 
revolving door, governmental entities hire former corporate executives from regulated firms, 
whereas in the case of the exit (government-to-firm) revolving door, corporate decision makers 
hire former regulators. The different locus of hiring power across the two directions means that, 
while firms may be able to recruit regulators with a view to furthering favorable outcomes for 
themselves, they may arguably be less able to place former employees on governmental entities 
on demand. This is particularly true of high-level political appointees for regulatory positions, 
which are the subject of this study. These positions require presidential nominations, as well as 




confirmation process without a minimum of conflict” (Cohen 1985:63). Therefore, interest group 
attempts to place industry supporters may be curbed by the thorough vetting process of the 
nominees for regulatory commissioners (Maranto 2005). In this chapter, I argue that 
governmental entities are in the position to exercise agency over the appointments to regulatory 
agencies (Graham and Kramer 1976), and that they may participate in the revolving door for 
their own strategic purposes.    
Revolving door provides regulatory agencies with an important mechanism for managing 
the relationship with one of their key stakeholders, regulated firms. First, despite their coercive 
power (DiMaggio and Powell 1983), regulatory agencies often operate with limited resources 
and may rely on regulated firms’ cooperation, particularly with voluntary regulatory efforts 
(Gupta and Lad 1983; MacLauchlan 1977; McConnell and American Farm Bureau Federation 
1953). Moreover, withdrawal of support from the regulated industry may jeopardize an agency’s 
key resource—legitimacy perceptions of other stakeholders (Carpenter 2004; Hiatt and Park 
2013). Regulators with regulated industry experience may therefore allow agencies to engage 
industry members in support-building for regulatory initiatives. Second, employee mobility 
increases interorganizational knowledge transfers (Almeida and Kogut 1999; Argote and Ingram 
2000; Song, Almeida, and Wu 2003). On the exit side of the revolving door, firms value public 
policy expertise in their new ex-government hires (Hillman, Cannella, and Paetzold 2000; Lester, 
Hillman, Zardkoohi, and Cannella 2008). On the entry side of the revolving door, staffing 
regulatory entities with individuals from the regulated industry may also contribute to an easier 
flow of information across organizational boundaries. Overall, employee mobility from firms to 




firms’ compliance (and punish transgression against regulations), as well as to get industry 
support for regulation.  
In this chapter, I focus on the regulatory agencies’ support-building, as well as learning 
efforts, through hiring regulators with regulated firm experience. Thus, unlike in Chapter II, 
which focuses on the firms’ needs in hiring from regulatory agencies, here I shift to studying the 
regulatory agencies’ hiring patterns from regulated firms. In particular, I examine the conditions 
under which regulatory agencies are more likely to engage in hiring from regulated firms. First, 
this allows me to show that the conditions under which governments appoint individuals with 
previous regulated firm experience to regulatory commissions are consistent with a learning and 
support-building role of the entry revolving door. Second, this approach solves the empirical 
problem of the unknown risk set of all firm employees who may possibly be nominated for 
regulatory positions. Contrary to the full risk set of exit revolvers, utilized in Chapter II, here the 
available data necessitate an analysis that focuses on the conditions of the transitioning process, 
rather than on the individuals who transition.  
Specifically, I ask: When are regulatory agencies more or less likely to hire individuals 
from regulated firms? I suggest that a number of conditions are associated with an increased 
likelihood of hiring from a regulated firm, including agency newness, increased agency 
workload, and decreased resources. On the other hand, I also suggest that existing regulators 
with regulated industry backgrounds will decrease the likelihood of additional hires from 
regulated industry. I test my theoretical propositions using a novel dataset, based on Nixon’s 
(2005) database of 17 U.S. Independent Regulatory Commissions (IRCs), observed from their 
founding to year 2000 (or the commission’s dissolution, in the case of several IRCs in the data). I 




importance of support-building and learning from industry is relatively high—namely, when 
agency resources are low. Conversely, they are less likely to participate in the revolving door 
when support-building and learning from industry are less urgent: when they already have a 
regulated industry revolver on board, and when their workloads are low.  
The contribution of this chapter is twofold. First, it provides a novel perspective on an 
important social phenomenon, the revolving door, which is the subject of interest and lively 
debate by economists (see, for example, Dal Bó (2006)), political scientists (see, for example, 
Cohen (1986) and Gormley (1979)) and organizational scholars alike (see Etzion and Davis 
2008; Haveman, Jia, Shi, and Wang 2014; Hillman, Zardkoohi, and Bierman 1999). By focusing 
on the other central actor in the revolving door—the government, or more narrowly, the 
regulatory commission, this study sheds light on the full complexity of the phenomenon. 
Acknowledging the regulatory commission, and its support-building and learning motives, as 
another driving force in revolving door participation, importantly supplements the commonly 
held view of the regulated firms’ capture motives as the primary driver of the phenomenon. 
Second, and even more significantly, this research recognizes the proactive, and often neglected 
role of the government in firm-government relations. While organizational studies of firms’ 
actions in managing the non-market environment abound (for a review, see Hillman, Keim, and 
Schuler (2004)), scant attention is paid to the government’s attempts to manage corporations, 
which represent one of its primary stakeholders (Hiatt and Park 2013; Holburn and Vanden 
Bergh 2002). In an attempt to remedy the relative neglect8 of public organizations in 
                                                        
8 While the state is often included as an actor in organizational theory, Kelman (2007) laments the separation that 
occurred between public management research and mainstream organization studies in the past decades, and the 




contemporary organizational theory (Kelman 2007), this chapter invites further scholarly 
attention to the government’s actions in the non-market arena.   
FIRM-TO-GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE MOBILITY AS SUPPORT-BUILDING AND 
LEARNING  
As noted, extant research on revolving door exclusively focuses on the agentic role of the 
firm. The non-market strategy literature primarily emphasizes the hiring of former regulators and 
government employees as a corporate political strategy (Cohen 1986). In this scenario, firms 
offer jobs to these individuals as a form of “covert bribe” (Dal Bó 2006: 214) and in exchange, 
they may receive more favorable outcomes (Grace and Phillips 2008; Haveman, Jia, Shi, and 
Wang 2014; Hillman 2005). Additionally, even in the other, firm-to-government direction of the 
revolving door, it has been argued that firms may try to place their former employees on 
regulatory bodies in order to ensure more favorable regulation (Cohen 1986; Project on 
Government Oversight (POGO) 2013). In all these accounts, regulated firms are viewed as the 
driving force behind the formation of the revolving door, and employee mobility between the 
public and the private sectors is portrayed as being in the service of the regulated private sector. 
In order to truly understand the drivers and the consequences of the revolving door, however, it 
is crucial to also recognize the agentic role of the government in this process. Governmental 
entities, such as regulatory agencies, may pursue their own interests, rather than act strictly in the 
interest of the public (North 1990; Skocpol 1985). Prior work has shown that regulatory agencies 
may try to increase their budgets (Niskanen 1971), as well as their staff numbers (Weatherby 
1971). In this chapter, I argue that governmental hiring of regulated firm executives serves a 




agencies may learn how to regulate more effectively, as well as how to manage relationships 
with the regulated firms in their jurisdiction.  
The Relationship between Regulators and the Regulated  
Organizational scholars widely acknowledge the existence of a resource dependence 
relationship between firms and the government (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Most studies, 
however, emphasize the firms’ attempts to manage this resource dependence with the 
government through corporate political strategy, but governments, too, have to actively manage 
this relationship. Despite the well-documented coercive power that the state has at its disposal 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983), much like other organizations, governmental entities depend on 
their stakeholders for support. In the case of regulatory agencies, some of the key stakeholders 
include regulated firms, colleges and universities, the media, consumer groups, social 
movements, and the general public. Regulatory agencies may act in strategic ways to maintain 
their legitimacy, and to ensure their stakeholders’ support (Hiatt and Park 2013).  
Support-Building 
Hiring well-connected individuals from a regulated industry is one way to achieve 
support for regulatory efforts among the key constituents. For example, in his historical account 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s founding, McCraw (1984) detailed how the 
commission hired a former banker to enlist the support of his industry colleagues for major 
banking regulation. In general, social ties acquired during an individual’s career history are an 
important source of that individual’s value to a new employer (Dokko and Rosenkopf 2010; 
Godart, Shipilov, and Claes 2014; Somaya, Williamson, and Lorinkova 2008). Much like private 
organizations, governmental entities may rely on their new hires’ ties to former corporate 




Despite their ability to apply coercive power, agencies often attempt to develop 
cooperative relationships with the firms they regulate. Having a cooperative relationship with 
regulated firms not only allows regulatory agencies to maintain their perceived legitimacy in the 
eyes of their various stakeholders, but it also allows for an easier regulatory process in the face of 
limited agency budgets. Regulatory agencies often have limited resources with which to execute 
their tasks of creating and enforcing anti-trust, economic and social regulation (Hillman, 
Zardkoohi, and Bierman 1999), and as such, they may rely on firms to self-regulate (Gupta and 
Lad 1983). For example, despite its legal authority in setting financial reporting standards, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has historically relied on industry bodies, including 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board, to accomplish this task (Gupta and Lad 1983). Similarly, agencies often rely on regulated 
firms to voluntarily provide them with technical information (MacLauchlan 1977). Regulated 
industry may even be consulted in the process of policy crafting and implementation, such as in 
the example of the United States Department of Agriculture reliance on farm organizations to 
interpret New Deal provisions for agriculture (McConnell and American Farm Bureau 
Federation. 1953). Given the limited resources with which regulatory agencies have to execute 
their missions, the support of regulated industry enables a variety of regulatory mechanisms, 
such as self-regulation, which are crucial to the agencies’ functioning more efficiently.  
Learning  
 In addition to ensuring support from regulated firms, as well as their cooperation with 
various regulatory initiatives, regulatory agencies need to learn how to create and enforce 
regulation effectively. Reducing information asymmetry between firms and their regulators 




order to reduce the asymmetry, regulatory agencies must acquire knowledge about their 
regulated industries. Having individuals with regulated industry experience serve on regulatory 
commissions is one way to acquire the relevant knowledge. Employee mobility is, of course, 
recognized as an important mechanism in increasing knowledge transfers across organizations 
(Almeida and Kogut 1997; Argote and Ingram 2000; Song, Almeida, and Wu 2003). Industry 
professionals bring a wealth of expertise about the industry’s inner workings, which is 
particularly helpful for monitoring against any otherwise concealed wrongdoing (Masters 2012). 
In the words of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the former banker Joseph Kennedy was tapped for 
the SEC because the president thought it best to “set a thief to catch a thief” (Moe 2013:78).  
Of course, regulatory agencies have a variety of ways to learn about the regulated 
industry. However, a number of these learning efforts are external to the organization, in that 
they require interacting with the regulated industry. In general, knowledge internal to an 
organization is relatively easy to access and use (Cyert and March 1963), and managers prefer to 
use readily-available, local knowledge  (Neale 1984; Tversky and Kahneman 1973). An internal 
source of industry knowledge, such as a regulator with previous regulated industry experience, 
could act as a substitute for other learning mechanisms that are more external in nature. For 
example, rather than having to rely on extensive meetings with industry representatives to learn 
about the industry in order to determine how to best implement regulations, an agency could tap 
its revolver’s knowledge of existing industry practices in order to define the most effective 
regulatory solutions. Moreover, even in the cases where revolvers do not have access to specific 
requisite industry information, they may be able to reach out to their social networks within the 
regulated industry in order to locate it. Furthermore, much like with support-building, the 




resources, such as budgets and staff, are limited. Under resource constraints, regulatory agencies’ 
attempts to acquire industry information may have to shift from the costly and time-consuming 
interactions with the regulated industry in favor of utilizing the revolving regulators’ knowledge, 
which comes at no additional cost beyond the regulators’ wages. 
Finally, learning by hiring is certainly acknowledged as an important mechanism in the 
government-to-firm direction of the revolving door. Hillman, Cannella, and Paetzold (2000) 
argued that former government officials are an important source of intimate knowledge about 
public policy to their new corporate employers. Empirically, Lester, Hillman, Zardkoohi, and 
Cannella (2008) found that a joint measure of a former government official’s human and social 
capital is predictive of the likelihood of becoming a corporate board member. Chapter II of this 
dissertation investigated regulatory commissioners transitioning to the private sector, and found 
that the former commissioners’ regulatory expertise is a significant predictor of the likelihood of 
getting hired by law and consulting firms. In this chapter, I suggest that learning by hiring may 
also be at work in the firm-to-government direction of the revolving door. In the next section, I 
outline my specific hypotheses.  
Hypotheses 
 As argued above, having individuals with prior regulated sector experience on board of 
regulatory agencies facilitates support-building with the regulated industry, as well as learning 
from it. The suggested support-building and learning motives may be particularly powerful under 
a set of organizational conditions, which I identify below.  
 Firstly, I consider agency newness. In a study of regulatory agencies’ life cycles, 
Bernstein (1955:79) found that in their earliest gestation stage, agencies “lack administrative 




and untested, and [their] relations with Congress are uncertain.”  In the early period, regulatory 
agencies may therefore have low legitimacy with their stakeholders. The lack of legitimacy  
that organizations experience in their early life may expose them to increased risk of adverse 
consequences, including failure (Freeman, Carroll, and Hannan 1983). As such, obtaining the 
support of the regulated industry may be particularly important in order to avoid the “liability of 
newness” while agencies are in their infancy (Stinchcombe 1965). Moreover, young 
organizations may have an increased need for learning through hiring. Previous research 
documented the importance of learning through employee mobility for early stage start-ups 
(Almeida, Dokko, and Rosenkopf 2003) and other nascent organizations. Thus, in order to 
address the issues of low legitimacy and lacking industry knowledge, I suggest that, while they 
are in their early post-founding stages, commissions will be more likely to hire from regulated 
industry. In other words, I make the following prediction:  
Hypothesis 1: Regulatory agency newness will have a positive effect on the likelihood of hiring a 
regulator with regulated industry experience.  
Secondly, the workload of a regulatory agency may also impact appointment patterns. 
Although higher workloads generally may increase hiring, hiring decisions in regulatory 
commissions are subject to more constraints than those in private corporations. In particular, 
IRCs have fixed numbers of commissioners over time, and so for them, the hiring decision is a 
question of whom, rather than how many individuals to hire. Moreover, I argue that the reason 
why we might see increased hiring of individuals with industry experience has to do with 
learning and industry-support motives.  
Increased regulatory activity may meet with resistance from regulated industry, which 




even more important. Further, as regulatory activity increases, internal knowledge about the 
industry may also become more valuable. For example, following the introduction of new 
legislation regarding an industry, a regulatory agency has to interpret the new legislation in order 
to develop rules. An internal source of knowledge, in the form of an ex-industry regulator, may 
play a very helpful role in the process of determining how best to craft rules. Given that agency 
workload may impact both the agency’s need for industry support, as well as its need for 
industry-specific knowledge, I predict the following:  
Hypothesis 2: Regulatory agency workload will have a positive effect on the likelihood of hiring 
a regulator with regulated industry experience.  
Thirdly, agency resources may influence both the commissions’ needs for industry 
support, as well as their learning needs. When a commission is allocated a relatively low budget 
and/or a low staff count, it becomes resource constrained and may not be able to fulfill all its 
regulatory duties. Rather than being self-reliant in their regulatory efforts, IRCs may have to rely 
more on regulated industries to volunteer technical information (MacLauchlan 1977), as well as 
to self-regulate (Gupta and Lad 1983). In other words, the support of industry becomes 
especially important under resource constraints due to the increased reliance on industry 
cooperation. Similarly, a low budget and/or staff count may prompt commissions to use learning-
by-hiring of regulators with regulated industry experience as a substitute for other kinds of 
learning through direct, but more costly interactions with the industry. Such interactions may 
include sending out IRC staff to gather information about regulated firms and their actions, in 
order to design more effective regulation and monitor against misconduct. In the absence of 




knowledge possessed by its own commissioners and staff. Having commissioners with previous 
experience in the regulated industry may be a cost-effective way of learning about the industry.  
I therefore make the following hypothesis:      
Hypothesis 3: Regulatory agency resources will have a negative effect on the likelihood of hiring 
a regulator with regulated industry experience. 
Finally, I suggest that the present need for industry knowledge may be influenced by 
previously acquired industry knowledge. In other words, having regulators with regulated 
industry experience (i.e. revolvers) on board should reduce the likelihood of hiring more such 
individuals in the future. I argue that the goal of learning about the regulated industry may be 
achieved with a single revolver, and that adding more revolvers would provide redundant 
knowledge, as well as redundant ties to industry. In other words, ex-industry regulators may be 
considered structural equivalents (Burt 1992), and as such, any additional ex-industry hires may 
not provide advantages over those afforded by such existing hires. Previous research has shown 
that knowledge transfers are more likely to occur following the hiring of individuals with non-
redundant backgrounds to that of the hiring firm (Corredoira and Rosenkopf 2010). Therefore, it 
stands to reason that redundant hires would not increase knowledge flows to regulatory agencies. 
Studies of employee mobility confirm that redundant hires have diminishing marginal 
utility. Dokko and Rosenkopf (2010) found that tie redundancy negatively moderated the 
relationship between hiring new personnel and the firm’s social capital. It then stands to reason 
that increasing ex-industry presence on regulatory agencies’ boards would not necessarily 
expand the reach of the agencies’ social capital, and it would therefore not allow agencies further 
support-building efforts among regulated firms. Even if agencies were able to get additional 




regulated firm in the industry, those marginal benefits would have to be weighed against the 
reputational damage of being perceived as captured by the industry. Namely, having multiple 
revolvers on a regulatory commission may attract scrutiny and disapproval from other 
stakeholders, such as the general public, thereby risking damage to organizational legitimacy. As 
such, I suggest that commissions do not hire multiple revolvers in order to maximize the reach of 
their support building campaign. In sum, I predict the following:   
Hypothesis 4: Revolver redundancy will have a negative effect on the likelihood of hiring an 
(additional) regulator with regulated industry experience.  
EMPIRICAL CONTEXT 
 As in Chapter II, 17 U.S. Independent Regulatory Commissions (IRCs) represent the 
empirical context for this study, including the AEC, BGF, CAB, CPSC, EEOC, FCC, FEC, FED, 
FERC, FPC, FRC, FTC, ICC, NLRB, NTSB, NRC, and SEC. Further background information 
on these commissions is available in Chapter II. 
 Unlike in the previous chapter, which considers firms hiring former regulators, the focus 
of this study is on the appointments to IRCs. As noted, in order to become commissioners, 
individuals have to be nominated by the President, and confirmed by Congress—a potentially 
political process that includes a number of interested parties. In their analysis of the appointment 
process at the FCC and the FTC, Graham and Kramer (1976: 378) identified the stakeholders in 
the process as “the regulated industries and their spokesmen, the Congress, the party structure, 
the chairman of the particular agency, and of course, the President’s advisers.” Generally, 
individuals interested in agency positions come forward themselves, and may be quite aggressive 
in campaigning for positions (Cohen 1985; Graham and Kramer 1976; Maranto 2005). A 




industry may later express support or opposition to a specific candidate (Graham and Kramer 
1976). The most crucial actors in the nomination process are Congress, the White House, as well 
as the agency itself (Graham and Kramer 1976). Presidents often wield influence over the 
nomination, and Congress members may sponsor individuals for the regulatory posts, as well. 
Agencies participate in the process through their Chairman, who advocates for the agency’s 
needs.  
 Controversial nominations are, by and large, avoided. Graham and Kramer (1976) 
suggest that the appointment of a regulator who is friendly to industry, rather than from the 
industry, may be a more effective way to achieve industry-favoring regulation. Arguably, if the 
regulated industry attempted to actively place individuals on board of IRCs, it may be easier to 
escape detection or lengthy investigations of the potential candidate, by avoiding ex-industry 
individuals in favor of those that may simply hold pro-industry views on regulation. This would 
suggest that any instances of the firm-to-government revolving door may, in fact, be driven by 
government, rather than by industry. Although the influence of other interest groups cannot be 
ruled out entirely (and needs to be accounted for empirically), governmental entities, including 
the regulatory agencies themselves, do play a major role in IRC appointments. As such, they are 
able to pursue these appointments with their own strategic goals in mind, suggesting that the 
revolving door is not simply a reflection of corporate political strategy.   
DATA AND METHODS 
The IRC database is used as the primary source of the data here, as well as in Chapter II 
(Nixon 2005). This database compiles information on each individual who served on 17 U.S. 
Independent Regulatory Commissions, including AEC, BGF, CAB, CPSC, EEOC, FCC, FEC, 




information on each commissioner’s career history, biographical information, as well as on the 
circumstances of regulatory appointment. In this chapter, I rely on the information about 
regulatory appointments. In particular, I use the commissioners’ nomination and departure dates 
from their regulatory appointments, their career histories, as well as their educational 
backgrounds. However, the original variables from the IRC database are recoded from the 
individual commissioner’s level (as they originally appear in the IRC database) to commission 
level, for the needs of this chapter. These commission-level data cover the period from each 
commission’s founding to its dissolution, or year 2000, which is the end of data coverage for the 
IRC database. For commissions that were dissolved before 2000, including the AEC, FED, FPC, 
and FRC, their successor commissions are included in the data.  
Further, I also collected information on major legislative acts and commission rules 
affecting the 17 IRCs, using the commissions’ websites and their histories. These sources readily 
identify, and label as such, the key pieces of legislation passed by Congress, as well as the major 
rules passed by the commissions themselves. Table 1 shows a comprehensive list of legislation 
and rules compiled due to their importance for the IRCs’ functioning, as well as the years when 
they were passed.  
Insert Table 1 about here 
  In addition, I use several publicly available sources of historical data. Information on 
national gross domestic product (GDP) growth is included from the U.S. Department of 
Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analysis, which compiles and publishes annual GDP statistics 
(Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 2015). I also include the government share of GDP 
(Teorell, Charron, Dahlberg, Holmberg, Rothstein, Sundin, and Svensson 2013), as well as 




(Weidenbaum Center et al. 2015). Finally, I use historical data on the political leanings of 
Congress and (Poole and Rosenthal 2015), as well as on the Presidents’ ideology (The White 
House 2015). Compustat data on firm revenues were also used in the calculation of the 
Herfindahl-Hirchman Index (HHI) by IRC. Lastly, I used the typology of regulatory agencies 
from Dudley and Warren (2003).  
Dependent Variable  
The dependent variable is directly regulated firm hire, a 0/1 dummy, where 1 denotes that 
in a given year, a given commission nominated a commissioner with previous work experience 
in a directly regulated firm, and 0 otherwise. In the original IRC database (Nixon 2005), which 
represents the basis of the data used here, an individual is coded as having previous work 
experience in a directly regulated firm if one (or more) of his four positions held immediately 
prior to the regulatory position were with a directly regulated firm. For each commission, a 
directly regulated firm is one whose activity is under the regulatory jurisdiction of the 
commission. 
Independent Variables 
In order to operationalize regulatory agency newness (H1), I include a continuous 
measure of the IRC age in years.  
In order to test the workload hypothesis (H2), I include lagged major legislation, which is 
a 0/1 dummy variable with the value of 1 when major legislation was passed in the previous 
year, and 0 otherwise. This variable is lagged to account for the delay in the IRC’s 
implementation of the legislation or rule. The median delay in the promulgation of regulation by 




 In a test of H3, I include a measure of IRC staff, operationalized as the yearly count of 
staff members employed by each IRC. IRC budget (in millions of constant 2009 dollars) is also 
available as an alternative operationalization of IRC resources. As the two measures are highly 
correlated, I proceed with the staff count, as it is a theoretically superior measure of IRC 
resources, specifically in terms of manpower available to each IRC.  
For the redundancy hypothesis (H4), I include a measure of previously hired individuals 
with directly regulated firm experience. More specifically, lagged revolvers on board captures 
the count of individuals with directly regulated firm experience who were on board of an IRC on 
December 31st of the year prior.  
Control Variables 
In order to control for the technical expertise needs of the regulatory commissions, I 
include PhD count, which is the number of individuals with Ph.D. degrees nominated for the 
focal commission in a given year.  
Furthermore, controlling for any firm efforts at strategically placing individuals on 
commissions is very important for the soundness of the analysis. However, accounting for such 
covert firm behavior is also challenging, as it is “difficult to pinpoint the role of the regulatory 
industry in the [commissioner] selection process” (Graham and Kramer 1976:378). Here, I 
employ the count of regulator exits directly to the regulated industry in a given year as a measure 
of industry attempts at regulatory capture. Namely, regulated firms’ hiring of former regulators 
may be considered a proxy for corporate political activity through hiring: to the extent that firms 
are participating in the exit revolving door by hiring former regulators, they may also be actively 




year, I include exit to directly regulated firm, as the count of regulators who took their first post-
IRC job within the directly regulated industry.  
Importantly, in the main analysis, I include IRC and year fixed effects, which preclude 
the inclusion of variables that vary only by commission or only by year. However, in a subset of 
the analyses, I drop the year fixed effects, in order to include control variables that vary only by 
year, and not by IRC. Specifically, I include GDP percent change, government share of GDP, 
Senate ideological leaning, ideological leaning of the House of Representatives and presidential 
ideology, which are all measured on the national level for the United States, and would therefore 
be collinear with the year dummies. GDP percent change represents the annual U.S. economic 
growth (in percentage). Government share of GDP measures government spending per year, 
expressed as a function of the total size of the U.S. economy. Congressional ideology variables 
are variables from the NOMINATE data by Poole and Rosenthal (2015), which have negative 
values if the Senate or the House average voting pattern was liberal/Democratic, and positive 
values if the Senate or the House had conservative/Republican voting pattern in a given year. 
Finally, presidential ideology is captured by the presidency variable (1 if the president is 
Republican in a given year, 0 otherwise).  
Analysis 
Given the binary nature of the dependent variable, I adopt a logit model for my main 
analysis here. Observations are on the level of the IRC-year. To account for the unobserved 
heterogeneity across IRCs, as well as across time, the model includes IRC and year fixed effects. 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2.  









 = αi + αt + Xβ,  
where αi represents the IRC fixed effect, αt represents the year fixed effect, X refers to the matrix 
of independent and control variables, and β is the matrix of regression coefficients. As 
mentioned, a subset of the analyses drops the year fixed effects.  
RESULTS 
 Table 3 presents the results of the main analysis. Model 1 includes control variables, as 
well as IRC and year fixed effects. Model 2 additionally includes three of my four independent 
variables: newness, workload and revolver redundancy. In the subsequent models, I show the 
results of Model 2 in two subsamples: before (Model 2a) and after 1970 (Model 2b). Finally, I 
include the fourth independent variable, IRC resources: operationalized as IRC staff in Model 3, 
and IRC budget in Model 3b. Including the fourth variable, IRC resources, results in a much 
smaller number of observations, so I show the results for the first three separately in Models 
2/2a/2b, and then Model 3 uses all four independent variables together. Given the small size of 
the dataset, I report statistically significant findings, as well as those that are marginally 
significant (p<0.1). 
Insert Table 3 about here 
Control Variables’ Effects 
Model 1 in Table 3 reports the effects of control variables on the likelihood of an IRC 
nominating an individual from the directly regulated industry in a given year. In this particular 
model, exits to directly regulated industry in the same year are not significantly related to the 
dependent variable. However, the effect is positive, and reaches significance (p<0.05 or p<0.1) 




regulated firms’ hiring of former regulators may be related to the regulatory commissions’ 
appointing of former industry executives, suggesting that both the hiring of former regulators and 
placing former employees on regulatory boards may be examples of corporate political strategy.  
Furthermore, the count of nominated Ph.D. holders in a year is positive albeit not 
significantly associated with the likelihood of hiring a revolver. In other words, I do not find 
statistical support for the idea that technical expertise (as operationalized by PhD-holding 
nominees) and professional expertise (as operationalized by the dependent variable, directly 
regulated firm hires) may act as complements in the nomination process.  
Independent Variables’ Effects 
 Model 2 introduces three independent variables: newness, workload and revolver 
redundancy, testing Hypotheses 1, 2, and 4. IRC age is not significantly associated with the 
likelihood of hiring an industry revolver, indicating a lack of support for H1.  
 Next, contrary to H2, I find that major legislation or rule passed in the previous year 
significantly (p<0.05) decreases the likelihood of hiring an individual from the regulated industry 
in a given year. However, this surprising finding may be explained by the differential content of 
these acts. Namely, legislation acts and commission rules do not always increase regulatory 
burdens on firms. In fact, acts or rules may be deregulatory in nature, such as the Railroad 
Revitalization and Reform Act in 1976, which started the deregulation of railroad transportation 
(Peoples 1998). Therefore, in order to better specify the effect of agency workloads, I account for 
the different regulatory eras by modeling the deregulatory movement, which started in the 1970s 
in the United States (Crain 2007). I run Model 2 on two subsamples: one before 1970 (Model 
2a), and one after (Model 2b). Here I find that major legislative acts or rules have a non-




after 1970. In other words, after 1970, when regulatory workloads are decreasing due to 
deregulation, major acts and rules do have a negative effect on the likelihood of hiring industry 
revolvers, but the same is not true when regulatory workloads are being increased by legislative 
acts and rules. Viewed this way, these results may offer partial support for Hypothesis 3.   
 As predicted in H4, revolver redundancy has a significant negative effect on the 
likelihood of hiring an industry revolver in Model 2. In other words, the count of industry 
revolvers at the close of the previous year significantly (p<0.05) reduces the likelihood of hiring 
additional revolvers in the current year. This finding supports the idea that additional hires from 
the regulated industry are redundant, and do not bring additional opportunities for the regulatory 
agency to engage in support-building or learning from industry.  
 Finally, Model 3 includes the fourth independent variable, IRC resources, operationalized 
as IRC staff number. Here I find that the greater an IRC’s staff is in a given year, the less likely 
the IRC is to hire an industry revolver, as suggested by H3. This result, however, is significant 
only at the p<0.1 level. Furthermore, in the alternative specification of IRC resources as the 
commission’s budget, the coefficient is not significant, albeit negative. This suggests that, when 
agency staff numbers are constrained, but not when agency budgets are low, hiring individuals 
with regulated firm experience may become a valuable substitute for external learning and 
support building initiatives involving the regulated industry.  
Robustness Checks 
 I also conduct a number of different robustness checks for my main analysis. Descriptive 
statistics for robustness checks and supplementary analyses are available in Table A1 in the 




dropping year fixed effects in order to avoid collinearity. Table 4 presents Model 3 for 
comparison purposes, along with Model 4, which includes additional controls.   
Insert Table 4 about here 
The new set of control variables includes GDP growth, government share of GDP, Senate 
and House of Representatives political leaning, as well as presidential ideology. I include these 
variables as they may influence commissions’ hiring patterns. However, I find that none of these 
additional variables are significant. Thus, these additional controls do not add much information 
to the main analysis. Moreover, Model 4, including these control variables, has a much worse fit 
relative to Model 3, which has year fixed effects instead. As such, I proceed with Models 1-3 as 
my main results.   
Second, in Table 5, I show a variety of models, which test the robustness of my main 
analysis. Again, Model 3 is shown for comparison purposes.  
Insert Table 5 about here 
Model 5 uses a different dependent variable. Instead of using a dummy variable for the 
IRC hiring an industry revolver, it uses a count of industry revolvers hired by an IRC in a given 
year. Due to the different dependent variable, I adopt OLS regression as my method of analysis 
in this model. This approach allows me to check whether model specification affects my results. 
I find that model specification does not influence the results greatly, although in this 
specification, I do find support for the effect of IRC age being negatively related to the 
likelihood of nominating an industry revolver to an IRC. Also, the effect of staff number 
becomes non-significant in this specification. However, all the results remain directionally the 




Model 6 also uses a different operationalization of the dependent variable. Rather than 
using an individual’s four jobs held before the regulatory appointment, here I use just the first 
job before regulatory appointment to define directly regulated firm hires, first order. Similar to 
directly regulated firm hire used in the main analysis, this dummy variable has the value of 1 if, 
in a given year, an IRC hired an individual whose last job before the regulatory appointment was 
in the regulated industry. In this model, I also use a lagged measure of the first order (lagged) 
revolver count (instead of the lagged measure of the revolver count of individuals who had held 
at least one of their four previous jobs in the regulated industry). Here I test the idea that 
different processes may be driving the hiring of an individual with industry experience in general 
and the hiring of someone transitioning immediately from the industry. From the perspective of a 
governmental entity, the goals of industry support-building and learning may be achieved by 
hiring an individual with industry experience in general. In fact, individuals transitioning straight 
from industry jobs may be met with controversy by the general public. On the other hand, if a 
firm were interested in placing an individual on a regulatory body for strategic purposes, it may 
be easier to incentivize a current employee (relative to a former one) to transition to public 
service (POGO 2013).  
In Model 6, I find that the two types of hires (including those with regulated firm 
experience, and those coming directly from a regulated firm) may work very similarly. In fact, 
the effects of the variables that tap into the learning and support-building motivations for hiring 
(including workload, redundancy, and resources) show the same patterns of significance and 
direction. This finding further strengthens the idea that hiring of individuals with regulated firm 
experience is not driven by the firms themselves, somehow placing their former employees into 




transitioning from an industry job immediately before, as they would be potentially easier to 
incentivize, via accelerated stock option vesting, to participate in such a corporate political 
strategy (POGO 2013). The lack of differences between the Models 3 and 6, then, supports the 
idea of this direction of the revolving door being driven by governmental entities.  
 In Model 7, I restrict my analysis only to the years where at least one nomination actually 
occurred for the focal IRC. While individuals may hypothetically be nominated in any year 
(whether because there is a vacancy on the IRC board, or because the President has the power to 
replace regulators), here I check whether restricting my sample to just the nomination years 
affects my results. Although all the relevant coefficients for workload, redundancy and resources 
maintain their direction, I do find that redundancy and resources lose their statistical 
significance. Given that the results remain directionally the same, I consider that the lack of 
significance may be due to the large drop in the number of observations, rather than the sample 
restriction per se.   
Finally, in order to check that data missingness does not affect my results, I also impute 
variables with missing observations. I use Stata’s mi impute routine, which utilizes variables 
with full observation sets to generate missing values. Model 8 is run on imputed data, raising the 
number of observations to 560, as some observations are dropped in the analysis. I find a 
significant and negative effect of lagged major legislation (p<0.05), and a marginally significant 
negative effect of the lagged count of revolvers on board (p<0.05). However, the effect for IRC 
staff count becomes non-significant. 
Thus, I conclude that the effects of agencies’ workload and revolver redundancy find 
generally robust support across models, while the significance of the effect for the agencies’ 





 Next I conduct a supplementary analysis, in which I investigate whether the learning and 
support-building motives are affected by regulatory commission type, industry concentration and 
the political ideology of Congress and the President. Similar to the supplementary analysis in 
Chapter II, here I also compare the effects of independent variables found in different 
subsamples, in order to improve our understanding of the main effects and the mechanisms 
driving them. Table 6 below shows the results of the supplementary analysis.  
Insert Table 6 about here 
Commission Type 
First, I consider two important commission characteristics: whether the IRC is a single-
industry regulator, or a cross-sectoral one, and whether the regulation it creates is primarily 
economic or social in nature. I suggest that the dependence of an IRC on one of its main 
stakeholders, the regulated firms, may be greater if those firms are all concentrated in a single 
industry. That would increase the importance of generating industry support for regulatory 
initiatives. In fact, what I find in Model 9, conducted on the single-industry IRCs, is that the 
effects of several of my independent variables, including workload and redundancy, increase 
both in terms of statistical significance and effect sizes, compared to Model 3. Interestingly, 
however, the count of IRC staff changes sign and becomes significant and positive, suggesting 
that commission manpower may be a complement, rather than a substitute for revolver hires, for 
these single-industry IRCs. Given the low number of observations in the other subsample of the 
analysis, and the fact that some of the variables are omitted, and most are not significant, I do not 




Next, I consider the type of regulation created by a commission. Here I consider IRCs 
that produce economic (in Model 11) vs. those that produce social regulation (in Model 12). 
Economic regulation may arguably be more technical, and may require a deeper knowledge of 
the regulated industries to craft. As such, I would expect the effects of learning to be stronger in 
Model 11. The results generally follow that expectation, in that the coefficients on workload and 
redundancy are both greater in size than in Model 3, and also reach higher significance than 
those in Model 11, conducted on the social regulatory IRCs. The effect of staff, however, is 
positive and marginally significant for the economic regulatory IRCs, which may mean that the 
learning motive is so important for these commissions, that staff simply cannot act as a substitute 
for revolvers, and both internal and external learning tactics are employed. 
Industry Concentration 
As mentioned before, when industry concentration is high, market power is consolidated 
by a few large firms. As such, high industry concentration may increase the need for building 
industry support via hiring revolvers. Thus, here I conduct my subsample analysis to see whether 
the main effects of workload, resources, and redundancy are stronger for IRCs that regulate 
highly concentrated industries (HHI ≥ 1800, in Model 14) compared to those that regulate less 
concentrated ones (HHI< 1800, in Model 13). That is exactly what I find—the coefficients for 
those three variables in Model 14 are larger and mostly reach greater statistical significance. 
Interestingly, while the effect of staff numbers is highly significant (p<0.001) and negative in 
Model 14, it is positive and significant (p<0.05) in Model 13. A possible explanation might lie in 
the redundancy mechanism. When firms in the regulated industry are less consolidated, it is 




from which to learn and with whom to network, the redundancy effect may be reversed in order 
to fulfill those needs through any capacities possible.  
Congressional and Presidential Ideology 
 Finally, I examine whether Congressional and Presidential ideologies moderate the main 
effects of this study. As Congress and the President may affect the nomination process itself 
(Graham and Kramer 1976), their political leanings may be expressed through the process. 
Moreover, the political ideology of Congress and the President may affect the workload and 
resources assigned to the IRCs, which would in turn affect whom the IRCs wish to hire. In 
general, when Congress and the President are Republican, we might expect a constriction of 
government spending, as well as of regulatory activity. The opposite might be true in times of 
Democratic Congress and Presidency. In other words, the coefficients on major legislation and 
staff should be more negative when government leans Republican. While I find support for a 
more negative effect of major legislation when the Senate is more Republican in its voting 
preferences, and when the President is Republican, I do not find any differences when it comes 
to the effect of staff across subsamples.  
 Overall, I do find that commission type, industry concentration and Congressional and 
Presidential ideologies moderate the effects of workload, redundancy and resources. Generally, 
when learning and industry support-building become more pressing, the results become 
statistically stronger and often amplified in their magnitude. Future research should investigate 
these moderators in greater detail, in order to better understand the mechanisms of the 
relationship between the IRCs’ learning and support-building motives and their participation in 




separate the two motives, in order to understand when learning from industry becomes more 
important, compared to support-building, and vice versa. 
DISCUSSION 
 What factors drive the hiring of former regulated industry employees for regulatory 
commissioners? Here, I suggest that, much like firms use the revolving door for their own 
corporate political agenda, regulatory agencies use it in order to gain the support of regulated 
industry, as well as to learn how to regulate effectively. In particular, I investigate the conditions 
under which 17 U.S. Independent Regulatory Commissions are more or less likely to hire 
individuals with regulated firm experience, and I find evidence that suggests hiring may 
represent IRCs’ attempts at support-building and learning. Regulatory agencies are less likely to 
hire regulated industry revolvers when their regulatory workloads are low (although they are not 
significantly more likely to hire them when the workloads are high), when there are industry 
revolvers on board already, and when IRC staff counts are low.    
 Moreover, these effects are of a sizeable magnitude. Having five revolvers on board 
reduces the likelihood of hiring another one by 12 percent. After 1970, when the deregulatory era 
begins, the occurrence of major legislative acts or rules decreases the likelihood of hiring a 
revolver by eleven percent. Finally, increasing the IRC staff from its minimum occurring in the 
sample (35) to close to its maximum (3000) by one standard deviation decreases the likelihood 
of hiring a revolver by 21 percent. Thus, revolver redundancy, as well as agency budgets and 
workloads, importantly affect the regulatory agencies’ hiring patterns.  
In contrast to the widely assumed role of the revolving door in corporate political 
strategy, here I shed light on the conditions under which governments may be more or less likely 




door as a non-market strategy—but one that may serve both types of participants in it: firms, as 
well as governmental entities. Consequently, I bring governmental entities, such as regulatory 
agencies, back to center stage. Despite their importance, regulatory agencies are relatively 
neglected in organizational scholarship (Hiatt and Park 2013). This study seeks to correct some 
of that oversight, as well as to improve our understanding of the agentic, self-interested role 
governments may play in the non-market arena, more generally.   
 While the evidence here is suggestive of the role of the entry revolving door in support-
building and learning efforts of the regulatory agencies, this study does not directly show the 
effect of the revolving door on industry support enjoyed by the agencies, or the industry 
knowledge accumulated through this type of employee mobility. Future work might gather direct 
measures of success for the entry revolving door, in terms of strategic outcomes it helps 
regulatory agencies achieve. One such study could examine the effects of hiring industry 
revolvers on regulatory speed, quality, or volume, as well as on the relationship between 
regulatory firms and IRCs. Research in this vein would deepen our understanding of how 
regulatory agencies may be able to use hiring from regulated industry as their own strategy.  
 Further, studies may also probe the role of regulated firms in the entry revolving door. It 
has been previously suggested that regulated firms may try to place their former employees on 
regulatory commissions, in order to have them advocate for more favorable outcomes for the 
firms (Cohen 1986; POGO 2013). In my analysis, the variable representing the regulated 
industry’s use of exit revolving doors, arguably a corporate political strategy, has a positive 
although not consistently significant effect across models. This finding suggests that the role of 
the firm in the entry revolving door may be limited. Moreover, the commissioner nomination 




than firms (Graham and Kramer 1976). However, future work may delve into the pre-nomination 
process, and examine how the odds of securing a nomination are affected by having regulated 
industry support. Such a study would, of course, require complete rosters of individuals put 
forward for commissioner positions in the early stages of the pre-nomination process, but would 
allow us to have a more definitive answer regarding the role of the regulated firms in the entry 
revolving door.  
 As I have argued here, revolving door formation is shaped by firms (primarily in the exit 
direction) and governmental agencies (in the entry direction). Another interesting and important 
aspect of this employee mobility regards the employees themselves. On the individual level, little 
is known about the motivations of individuals who participate in the revolving door. While on 
the exit side of the revolving door, individual regulators may be drawn to the private sector due 
to the more lucrative pay (Cohen 1986), the entry side of the revolving door is less well 
explained. Suggestions have been made of possible financial incentives, such as accelerated 
vesting of firm stock options upon transition to high-level governmental positions, which firms 
may use to incentivize these transitions. For our complete understanding of the revolving door 
phenomenon, it is crucial to shed light on how the motivations of the different actors, on 
different levels of observation, add up to create the phenomenon. As such, future studies might 
examine whether financial incentives are the reason why individuals transition from the 
regulated private to the public sector. For example, one could use the introduction of restrictions 
on revolving doors, particularly those introducing limitations on stock options from the regulated 
industry. As the regulations surrounding the revolving door tightened over time, it would be 




regulators may also be helpful in determining the individual level motivations for participation in 
the revolving door.  
  As for the practical implications of this study, my results indicate that governmental 
agencies may use the hiring of regulated industry professionals as a way to learn and build 
support with the industry. This finding casts a positive light on the entry direction of the 
revolving door phenomenon. However, any positive effects need to be balanced with the 
potential negative consequences. Namely, even putting aside any regulators potentially placed on 
regulatory commissions by their former employers, revolvers may exhibit a bias towards their 
former employers due to cognitive capture (Rajan 2010). The fact that individuals may have 
positive affect and loyalty towards former employers, as well as sympathy for their regulatory 
issues (Makkai and Braithwaite 1992), may cause differential regulatory outcomes for these 
specific firms, and may even bias a regulator’s stance towards an entire industry. Regulation 
prohibiting individuals from working on issues related to former employers specifically may 
alleviate this problem, but the issue of being pro-industry in general may remain. However, 
much like commissions are designed to be bipartisan, they could also be designed to have a split 
of individuals with industry experience, career bureaucrats, as well as consumer group 
representatives. Given that revolving door regulations’ provisions are often difficult to monitor 
and effectively enforce, and prohibiting the revolving door outright might lower the quality of 
regulators, ensuring that commission design gives voice to multiple interested parties may be a 
more effective way to safeguard against one interest group prevailing against others on 
regulatory commissions.  
 In conclusion, this chapter provides a novel perspective on the revolving door by 




strategic goals. I find that regulatory agencies are more likely to hire individuals from regulated 
industry in times when learning and support-building with industry are particularly important, 
such as when their staff numbers are low. Regulatory agencies are less likely to hire these 
industry revolvers when learning and support-building motives are less prevalent, such as when 
the regulatory workloads are lower, and when such hires would be redundant. Despite the 
controversial role of the revolving door, often perceived to be exclusively a corporate political 
strategy, this exchange of employees may contribute to important governmental goals of learning 
about regulated industries and maintaining cooperative relationships with them. In the words of a 
former senator, commenting on the selection of a former broadcaster to the FCC: “I can’t escape 
the feeling that if I have pneumonia, I want a doctor, and that the person most likely to know 
something about broadcasting is a broadcaster” (Graham and Kramer 1976:399). While this 
chapter sheds some light on the agentic role of governmental entities in the revolving doors, it 
also invites direly needed future inquiry into the phenomenon—and its antecedents and 













TABLES AND FIGURES 
TABLE 1. Major Legislative Acts and Commission Rules 
 
 
IRC Year of enactment Major legislative act or rule affecting the work of IRC
AEC 1946 McMahon/Atomic Energy Act 
AEC 1954 The Atomic Energy Act of 1954
AEC 1969 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
AEC 1974 Energy Reorganization Act of 1974
BGF 1935 Banking Act of 1935
BGF 1946 Employment Act of 1946
BGF 1951 Federal Reserve-Treasury Department Accord of 1951
BGF 1956 Bank Holding Company Act of 1956
BGF 1977 Federal Reserve Reform Act
BGF 1978 International Banking Act
BGF 1978 Full Employment and Balanced Growth (Humphrey Hawkins) Act 
BGF 1980 Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
BGF 1982 Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982
BGF 1989 Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989
BGF 1991 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991
BGF 1994 Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994
BGF 1999 Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act
CAB 1946 Federal Airport Act of 1946
CAB 1958 Federal Aviation Act
CAB 1966 Department of Transport Act of 1966
CAB 1978 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978
CAB 1984 Civil Aeronautics Boards Sunset Act of 1984
CPSC 1970 Poison Prevention Packaging Act
CPSC 1972 Consumer Product Safety Act
CPSC 1972 Refrigerator Safety Act
CPSC 1972 Flammable Fabrics Act
CPSC 1994 Child Safety Protection Act
EEOC 1963 The Equal Pay Act of 1963
EEOC 1964 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
EEOC 1967 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
EEOC 1973 Sections 501 and 505 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
EEOC 1978 The Pregnancy Discrimination Act
EEOC 1990 Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
EEOC 1991 Sections 102 and 103 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
FCC 1934 Communications Act of 1934
FCC 1941 Chain Broadcasting Regulations
FCC 1984 Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984
FCC 1988 Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988
FCC 1990 Children's Television Act of 1990
FCC 1992 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992
FCC 1996 Communications Decency Act of 1996
FCC 1996 Telecommunications Act of 1996
FEC 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
FEC 1974 FECA Amendment
FEC 1976 FECA Amendment
FEC 1979 FECA Amendment
FED 1913 Federal Reserve Act
FED 1927 McFadden Act
FED 1932 Banking Acts of 1932
FED 1933 Glass Steagall Act
FED 1933 Emergency Banking Act
FED 1934 Gold Reserve Act




TABLE 1. Major Legislative Acts and Commission Rules (continued) 
 
 
IRC Year of enactment Major legislative act or rule affecting the work of IRC
FERC 1977 Department of Energy Organization Act in 1977
FERC 1978 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act
FERC 1978 Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978 
FERC 1978 Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978
FERC 1980 Energy Security Act
FERC 1986 Electric Consumers Protection Act
FERC 1989 Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989
FERC 1992 Energy Policy Act of 1992
FPC 1920 Federal Water Power Act
FPC 1935 Federal Power Act of 1935
FPC 1936 Rural Electrification Act
FPC 1938 Natural Gas Act
FPC 1946 Atomic Energy Act
FPC 1974 Energy Reorganization Act of 1974
FPC 1975 Energy Policy and Conservation Act
FPC 1977 Department of Energy Organization Act in 1977
FRC 1927 Radio Act of 1927
FRC 1934 Communications Act of 1934
FTC 1914 The Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914
FTC 1914 The Clayton Antitrust Act
FTC 1917 Trading with the Enemy Act
FTC 1918 Webb-Pomerene Act
FTC 1933 Securities Act of 1933
FTC 1936 Robinson-Patman Act
FTC 1938 Wheeler-Lea Act
FTC 1939 Wool Products Labeling Act
FTC 1950 Celler-Kefauver Act
FTC 1951 Fur Products Labeling Act
FTC 1958 Textile Fiber Products Identification Act
FTC 1970 Fair Credit Reporting Act
FTC 1975 1975 Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act
FTC 1976 1976 Hart-Scott-Rodino Act
FTC 1977 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
FTC 1994 1994 Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act
ICC 1887 Interstate Commerce Act
ICC 1903 Elkins Act
ICC 1906 Hepburn Act
ICC 1910 Mann-Elkins Act
ICC 1920 Esch Cummins Act
ICC 1935 Motor Carrier Act of 1935
ICC 1973 Regional Rail Reorganization Act
ICC 1976 Railroad Revitalization and Reform Act
ICC 1980 Motor Carrier Act 
ICC 1980 Staggers Act of 1980
ICC 1982 Bus Regulatory Reform of 1982
ICC 1986 Surface Freight Forwarder Deregulation Act of 1986
ICC 1993 The Negotiated Rates Act of 1993
ICC 1994 Trucking Industry Regulatory Reform Act of 1994
ICC 1995 ICC Termination Act of 1995
NLRB 1935 National Labor Relations Act
NLRB 1947 Taft-Hartley Act
NLRB 1959 Landrum Griffin Act





TABLE 1. Major Legislative Acts and Commission Rules (continued) 
 
IRC Year of enactment Major legislative act or rule affecting the work of IRC
NRC 1974 Energy Reorganization Act of 1974
NRC 1978 Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978
NRC 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978
NRC 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982
NRC 1985 Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985
NTSB 1926 Air Commerce Act of 1926
NTSB 1974 Independent Safety Board Act of 1974
NTSB 1996 Aviation Disaster Family Assistance Act
SEC 1933 Securities Act of 1933
SEC 1933 Glass Steagall Act
SEC 1934 Securities Exchange Act of 1934
SEC 1935 Public Utility Holding Company Act
SEC 1938 Maloney Act 1938
SEC 1939 Trust Indenture Act of 1939
SEC 1940 Investment Company Act of 1940
SEC 1940 Investment Advisers Act of 1940
SEC 1942 Rule 10b-5
SEC 1951 Arizona Securities Act
SEC 1956 Uniform Securities Act
SEC 1964 Securities Act Amendments
SEC 1970 Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970
SEC 1974 Safe Harbor Rules
SEC 1974 The Employee Retirement Income Security Act
SEC 1975 Securities Acts Amendments
SEC 1976 Sunshine Act
SEC 1977 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
SEC 1978 Rule G-15
SEC 1978 Proposition 13
SEC 1982 Regulation D
SEC 1982 Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act
SEC 1982 Futures Trading Act
SEC 1984 The Insider Trading Sanctions Act
SEC 1985 The Revised Uniform Securities Act
SEC 1986 One Share, One Vote Rule
SEC 1986 The Tax Reform Act of 1986
SEC 1988 Rule 19c-4
SEC 1989 Rule 15c2-12
SEC 1990 Market Reform Act
SEC 1990 Regulation S
SEC 1990 Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990
SEC 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
SEC 1996 National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996
SEC 1996 Rule G-38
SEC 1998 Regulation ATS
SEC 1998 Cracker Barrel Decision
SEC 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
SEC 2000 Regulation FD





TABLE 2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(1) directly regulated firm hire (0/1) 0.118 0.323 0 1
(2) exits to directly regulated firm (count) 0.101 0.322 0 2 0.07
(3) PhD hire (count) 0.146 0.449 0 3 0.07 0.18
(4) IRC age 38.107 24.746 0 108 -0.08 0.08 -0.05
(5) major legislation 0.154 0.362 0 1 -0.06 0.01 0.07 0.12
(6) revolvers on board (count) 0.859 1.028 0 5 0.43 0.11 0.19 0.00 0.05
(7) IRC budget (millions of constant 2009 $) 155.649 160.429 0 967 0.04 0.07 0.10 -0.10 0.05 0.13



































Independent variables DV: Directly regulated firm hire Model 1 Model 2 Model 2a Model 2b Model 3 Model 3b
Controls Exit to directly regulated firm 0.562 0.841* 1.567* 0.767 0.824 0.863
(0.36) (0.40) (0.62) (0.59) (0.57) (0.57)
PhD hire 0.441 0.278 0.982+ -0.212 -0.257 -0.314
(0.29) (0.30) (0.56) (0.46) (0.42) (0.42)
Newness IRC age -0.373 0.408 -0.589 -0.626 -0.618
(0.71) (1.21) (0.73) (0.73) (0.74)
Workload Major legislation (lagged) -1.008* 0.433 -2.261** -1.889** -1.838**
(0.44) (0.72) (0.73) (0.66) (0.66)
Redundancy Revolvers on board (lagged) -0.337* -0.640* -0.250 -0.477* -0.464*
(0.16) (0.30) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21)
Resources (1) IRC staff count -0.001+
(0.00)
Resources (2) IRC budget (2009 constant $) -0.003
(0.00)
Constant -12.419 19.070 -8.870 17.513 34.454 34.616
(955.04) (37.03) (27.21) (760.77) (37.98) (38.26)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IRC fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 576 560 218 297 369 369
Pseudo R2 0.21 0.23 0.27 0.20 0.20 0.20






















Independent variables DV: Directly regulated firm hire Model 3 Model 4
Controls Exit to directly regulated firm 0.824 0.500
(0.57) (0.45)
PhD hire -0.257 -0.103
(0.42) (0.35)
GDP growth (%) 0.152
(0.10)
Government share of GDP 0.405
(0.26)
Senate political leaning 5.098
(6.59)




Newness IRC age -0.626 0.108*
(0.73) (0.05)
Workload Major legislation (lagged) -1.889* -1.332*
(0.66) (0.58)
Redundancy Revolvers on board (lagged) -0.477* -0.400*
(0.21) (0.19)




Year fixed effects Yes No
IRC fixed effects Yes Yes
N 369 437
Pseudo R2 0.20 0.14























Directly regulated firm 
hire, first order (0/1)
Directly regulated 
firm hire (0/1)
Directly regulated firm 
hire (0/1)
Controls Exit to directly regulated firm 0.824 0.090 -0.342 0.738 0.839*
(0.57) (0.07) (1.18) (0.63) (0.40)
PhD hire -0.257 0.009 0.160 -1.343* 0.263
(0.42) (0.05) (0.96) (0.53) (0.31)
Newness IRC age -0.626 -0.007* 0.914 0.237 -0.379
(0.73) (0.00) (1.50) (0.85) (0.71)
Workload Lagged major legislation -1.889* -0.143* -2.946* -1.846*  -1.008*
(0.66) (0.06) (1.40) (0.76) (0.44)
Redundancy Revolvers on board (lagged) -0.477* -0.047+ -0.352  -0.337*
(0.21) (0.03) (0.26) (0.16)
Redundancy Revolvers on board, first order (lagged) -2.115*
(0.73)
Resources IRC staff -0.001+ -0.000 -0.003* -0.001  -0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 34.454 0.944* -36.052 -8.611
(37.98) (0.27) (72.96) (43.99)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IRC fixed effects Yes (17) Yes (17) Yes (17) Yes (17) Yes (17)
Method logit OLS logit logit logit, imputed data
Sample restriction No No No  nomination years No
N 369 465 127 221 560
Pseudo R2/R2 0.20 0.35 0.24 N/A
























Independent variables DV: Directly regulated firm hire Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18
Controls Exit to directly regulated firm 1.996** 0.000 1.786+ 0.938 4.225** -5.113+ 0.163 3.000* 4.100* 0.384
(0.76) (.) (0.95) (1.38) (1.37) (2.65) (0.81) (1.40) (1.66) (0.79)
PhD hire -0.652 0.000 -0.586 2.604* -0.695 0.000 -0.860 0.388 -1.187 0.169
(0.49) (.) (0.57) (1.28) (0.70) (.) (0.60) (0.76) (1.06) (0.53)
Newness IRC age -0.535 -0.338 0.096 1.452 -2.391 -0.871 -1.530 -0.308 -0.521 0.875
(1.82) (1.10) (1.04) (1.85) (2.26) (1.02) (1.56) (0.75) (0.88) (1.40)
Workload Lagged major legislation -2.748** -21.786 -2.488** -3.383+ -3.624** -5.078* -1.933* -4.091* 0.522 -3.851**
(0.84) (780.96) (0.97) (1.79) (1.28) (2.07) (0.87) (1.85) (1.20) (1.20)
Redundancy Revolvers on board (lagged) -0.988** -13.013+ -0.913* -0.672 -1.515** -2.995** -0.924** 0.080 -2.642* -0.482+
(0.30) (7.39) (0.38) (0.49) (0.49) (1.07) (0.31) (0.47) (1.11) (0.28)
Resources IRC staff 0.002* -0.020+ 0.002+ -0.002* 0.005* -0.005*** -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 28.727 72.462 -12.259 -70.472 121.582 66.131 76.818 18.779 34.667 -39.097
(92.08) (78.22) (66.38) (93.34) (114.23) (66.07) (74.19) (48.42) (46.13) (65.54)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IRC fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 247 29 173 81 128 114 197 97 90 212
Pseudo R2 0.28 0.67 0.26 0.25 0.32 0.45 0.20 0.32 0.28 0.27















Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
(1) directly regulated firm hire (0/1) 794 0.134 0.340 0 1
(2) directly regulated firm hire (count) 794 0.160 0.456 0 5 0.93
(3) directly regulated firm hire, first order (0/1) 794 0.052 0.221 0 1 0.64 0.67
(4) exits to directly regulated firm (count) 794 0.088 0.305 0 2 0.06 0.06 0.04
(5) PhD hire (count) 794 0.128 0.412 0 3 0.09 0.12 0.14 0.19
(6) IRC age 794 30.064 23.738 0 108 -0.12 -0.11 -0.03 0.08 -0.06
(7) major legislation 794 0.156 0.363 0 1 -0.08 -0.08 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.16
(8) revolvers on board (count) 794 0.932 1.103 0 5 0.40 0.43 0.27 0.04 0.19 -0.02 0.01
(8) revolvers on board, first order (count) 794 0.276 0.537 0 4 0.27 0.29 0.40 0.00 0.29 0.06 0.07 0.63
(9) IRC budget 467 155.649 160.429 0 967 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.05 0.09 -0.21 0.04 0.09 0.05
(10) IRC staff 469 1369.561 922.311 35 3498 -0.06 -0.08 -0.11 0.09 -0.10 0.08 0.10 -0.08 -0.22 0.76
(11) GDP growth (%) 714 7.473 6.114 -23.1 28.3 0.01 0.05 0.00 -0.05 -0.03 -0.07 0.03 -0.09 -0.16 -0.02 -0.02
(12) government spending (% of GDP) 565 10.280 2.451 6.13 16.09 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.12 -0.05 -0.14 -0.22 -0.10 -0.15 -0.33 -0.24 -0.08
(13) political leaning of the Senate -794 0.003 0.067 -0.21 0.16 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.11 0.07 0.18 0.24 0.25 0.16 -0.28 -0.63
(14) political leaning of the House -794 0.024 0.070 -0.17 0.17 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.07 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.05 0.16 0.23 0.14 -0.51 -0.53 0.77
(15) Republican President (0/1) 794 0.535 0.499 0 1 0.12 0.12 0.08 -0.01 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.22 0.17 -0.05 -0.05 0.00 0.04 0.10 -0.33
(16) cross-sectoral IRC (0/1) 794 0.275 0.447 0 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(17) social regulatory IRC 794 0.278 0.448 0 1 0.12 0.10 0.07 -0.05 0.12 -0.52 -0.15 0.15 0.11 0.45 -0.01 -0.01 -0.13 0.10 0.08 0.02 .
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Caught in the Revolving Door: Firm-government Ties  
as Determinants of Regulatory Outcomes 






How does the revolving door between firms and their regulators affect firm regulatory 
outcomes? Despite extant research on interfirm mobility, as well as on corporate political 
strategies, we know relatively little about how employee movement between firms and their 
regulators affects firm regulatory outcomes. This chapter provides a careful explanation of the 
different theoretical mechanisms, which may lead to improved regulatory outcomes for firms 
with revolving door ties to their regulators. Within the context of the agribiotechnology industry 
and its main regulator, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), we find that firms 
receive better regulatory outcomes during a revolving regulator’s tenure, whether the regulator 
previously worked for a regulated firm, or moved on there after his regulatory tenure. We also 
find that the improved regulatory outcomes only occur during the regulator’s tenure—once the 
regulator transitions to the firm, the firm no longer benefits. Additionally, we find and account 
for the selection effect in terms of which firms have revolving door ties to the USDA. Taken 
together, our results suggest that revolving door ties are an effective business political 
mobilization strategy, undertaken by firms with historically worse regulatory performance in 







Keywords: revolving doors, business political mobilization, regulatory capture, biotechnology 
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INTRODUCTION 
The revolving door between government and firms has long been the subject of 
controversy and debate. For some, individuals moving between regulators and regulated firms 
facilitate communication, as well as the exchange of expertise across the public and the private 
sectors (Che 1995). Critics, however, contend that personnel movement between regulator and 
regulated creates significant conflicts of interest, hampering fair enforcement of regulations 
designed to protect the public interest (U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) 2011). In 
the wake of recent failures in regulation (e.g. Lounsbury and Hirsch (2011)), the revolving door 
has become an important topic in the broader discussion of the rising influence of corporations in 
the political domain (Mizruchi 2013; Perrow 2002; Walker and Rea 2014).  
While the revolving door’s impact on public interest is still heavily debated, both critics 
and defenders implicitly agree that private actors—namely, corporations—benefit from the 
practice. Be it access, information or influence, firms are presumed to gain an advantage when 
they hire former government officials, or have their executives take government positions. 
Despite the intuitive appeal of this assumption, the empirical support for corporate advantage is 
surprisingly limited, and what exists is often contradictory (Carpenter and Moss 2013). Extant 
research points to positive (Gormley 1979; Grace and Phillips 2008; Hillman 2005; Hillman, 
Zardkoohi, and Bierman 1999), negative (deHaan et al. 2011; Quirk 1981) and mixed (Cohen 
1986) outcomes for industries and firms that have a revolving door to their regulators, or the 
government in general.  
The conflicting evidence for revolving door related corporate advantage poses an 
intriguing empirical puzzle to be resolved. Sorting out whether corporations benefit from 
personnel movement not only has important implications for policy and legislation, but should 
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also shed greater light on the tactics firms employ to shape their non-market environments. 
While much work has focused on the effects of lobbying (De Figueiredo and Silverman 2006; 
Hill et al. 2013; Richter, Samphantharak, and Timmons 2009) and Political Action Committee 
(PAC) contributions (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003; De Figueiredo and 
Edwards 2007; Hadani and Schuler 2013; Quinn and Shapiro 1991) on regulatory outcomes or 
firm performance, the revolving door has been mostly ignored by the sociological and 
management literatures (Etzion and Davis 2008). Moreover, extant studies, mostly within 
political science, have focused on industry-level outcomes of firm-government revolving doors 
(Cohen 1986; Gormley 1979; Grace and Phillips 2008; deHaan et al. 2011; Quirk 1981), while 
more recent work in strategy has adopted indirect measures of the firm-level regulatory 
outcomes, such as firm financial performance or valuation (Hillman 2005; Hillman, Zardkoohi, 
and Bierman 1999). As such, despite the high prevalence of the revolving door phenomenon 
(Braun and Raddatz 2010; Coates 2012; Eckert 1981), there is a significant gap in our 
understanding of how the exchange of employees between firms and their regulators may affect 
regulatory outcomes for individual firms.   
But beyond being an understudied topic, the revolving door is a particularly relevant 
phenomenon for organizational scholars in that deep and durable social relationships are forged 
between the firm and government by virtue of individuals moving across boundaries. The 
organization theory and strategy literatures have long recognized that interfirm mobility of 
individuals creates ties between organizations through which valuable knowledge and resources 
flow (Rao and Drazin 2002; Song, Almeida, and Wu 2003; Corredoira and Rosenkopf 2010; 
Godart, Shipilov, and Claes 2014). With growing interest in business mobilization in political 
arenas (Fligstein and McAdam 2012; Walker and Rea 2014), examining the effects of the 
 112
revolving door provides a unique opportunity to deepen our understanding of the social and 
organizational processes underlying government-firm relationships. 
The purpose of this chapter is to conceptualize the movement of individuals through the 
revolving door as the formation of ties between firms and governments, and to identify how 
these ties determine regulatory outcomes for firms. We argue that these links are neither 
coincidental, nor purely transactional in nature; rather, they are the result of, and facilitator of 
complex social and organizational processes that shape both regulator and firms. Focusing on the 
dyadic nature of these ties, we propose a typology of revolving door ties based on the direction 
of flow (i.e., government-to-firm vs. firm-to-government) and the timing of the tie (i.e., pre or 
post regulatory event). This categorization allows us to develop a deeper understanding of the 
social mechanisms involved, and provide greater clarity to the contradictory findings of prior 
work. Our dyadic perspective on the revolving door phenomenon also provides an opportunity to 
address a critical methodological issue plaguing prior research, namely, that a firm’s decision to 
initiate a non-market strategy is correlated with the firm’s regulatory outcome (Bonardi, 
Holburn, and Vanden Bergh 2006). By examining the firm-specific outcomes of revolving door 
ties, one can better account for the selection bias in the adoption of these particular strategies. In 
addition, as firms arguably forge corporate political strategies such as revolving door ties in 
order to shape their individual outcomes (Baysinger 1984), rather than to pursue unified industry 
interests, studying firm-level outcomes of the revolving door ties provides for a more precise 
analysis of the ties’ effectiveness.  
We study revolving door ties in the agribusiness industry as our empirical context due to 
its heavily regulated status, as well as the alleged close ties to government (Ferrara, 1998; 
Mattera 2004; Monsanto 2011). In particular, we focus on the biotechnology segment of this 
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industry by studying the planting approvals of genetically engineered (GE) crops by the US 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) (Hiatt and Park 2013). We collected the career histories of 
all 252 executives of the USDA during the time period of 1995-2010, and linked these 
individuals to firms applying for product approvals. The data set contains information on PAC 
and lobbying expenditures, patent applications, as well as the more general firm characteristics 
for each of the GE crop producers.  
The results of our analysis suggest that firms connected to the USDA via revolving doors 
do indeed benefit from improved regulatory outcomes. Firms whose former employees go on to 
serve at the USDA have faster regulatory approvals for their products during their former 
employees’ regulatory tenure. Moreover, firms that hire former regulators have faster regulatory 
outcomes during the regulators’ tenure, but not when the regulators actually transition to the 
firms’ staff. Importantly, we also find, and account for, the selection bias in terms of which firms 
form revolving doors to the USDA. In particular, firms that have previously had worse 
regulatory outcomes are more likely to form revolving doors to their regulators. Overall, our 
results are consistent with the use of firm-government revolving doors as a type of business 
political mobilization.  
REVOLVING DOORS AND INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL TIE FORMATION 
Interactions with the government are of unique importance to firms. Governments shape 
the competitive environments for firms, and provide access to opportunity sets (Baron 1995). In 
response, firms engage with governmental entities to gain access to and influence over 
government-controlled outcomes. A rich literature in political science, economics, sociology, and 
management have investigated the variety of ways in which firms have attempted to shape the 
political arena (for reviews, see Dal Bó (2006); Hart (2004); Hillman, Keim, and Schuler (2004); 
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Walker and Rea (2014)). In particular, much attention has been given to lobbying (e.g. 
(Baumgartner et al. 2009; Hall and Deardorff 2006; Kerr, Lincoln, and Mishra 2014), political 
campaign contributions (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003; Mizruchi 1989), and 
more recently, grassroots campaigns (McDonnell 2015; Walker and Rea 2014). 
An often overlooked, but important, channel through which corporations and 
governments influence each other is the movement of employees between firms and 
governmental entities (Etzion and Davis 2008). In an early study of three U.S. federal 
commissions, Eckert (1981) found that about 21 percent of commissioners came from the related 
private sector, whereas around 51 percent took related private sector jobs post-tenure. More 
recently, eleven percent of Standard & Poor’s 500 companies’ CEOs sampled by Coates (2012) 
in 2000 went on to hold political office by 2011. Interestingly, the revolving door rates have been 
shown to differ between administrations, such that the Bush administration was much more 
likely to draw officials from a corporate talent pool than the Clinton one (Etzion and Davis 
2008). On the flip side of the phenomenon, former financial regulators were many times more 
likely than citizens to hold board memberships at banks around the world (Braun and Raddatz 
2010). 
Despite the prevalence of personnel migration between government and the private 
sector, studies on the consequences of the practice have been few and far between (Carpenter and 
Moss 2013). Early work focused mostly on federal commissions, and found weak or absent 
evidence that firms benefit from revolving doors. Gormley (1979) studied voting patterns on the 
FCC, and found that commissioners with broadcasting experience do vote somewhat more pro-
industry, although political ideology seemed to have more effect on voting than prior 
employment. Cohen’s (1986) work on the FCC actually found evidence of regulators being less 
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supportive towards the regulated industry before revolving out of their position into an industry 
one. Similarly, Quirk (1981) interviews with 50 high level officials from four US regulatory 
agencies did not demonstrate support for the revolving door leading to capture—quite the 
opposite, as industry career aspirations made regulators more aggressive in their regulation of 
firms. 
Recent studies offer more mixed evidence. Makkai and Braithwaite (1992) found that 
identification with the industry by the inspectors in the revolving door (but not the revolving 
door itself), lead to more favorable ratings. Grace and Phillips (2008) showed weak support for 
the prospective employment influencing regulation in the insurance industry, showing only 
mildly higher prices (by 1.5 percent) for insurance during a regulator’s tenure where the 
regulator then entered the industry post-tenure. Helland and Sykuta (2004) found that when the 
natural gas extraction industry was deregulated in 1986, there was a decrease in the number of 
“political” directors on boards. The presence of political directors on boards was associated with 
a more intense resource-dependence on politicians, and it declined after the issue at hand was 
resolved. Finally, deHaan et al. (2011) found that lawyers at the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) were more aggressive in their enforcement efforts prior to leaving the agency 
to take on jobs at private law firms. 
As most of the prior work is from scholars in political science, the focal actor has been 
the regulatory commission or agency, and not the firm receiving or sending individuals. 
Committee votes, enforcement of regulations, or regulated prices are all important outcomes 
from a policy or social welfare perspective, yet, it sheds little light on how individual firms fare 
when their employees revolve from or into government positions. By focusing on agency 
decisions, prior work implicitly assigns benefits or harm to corporate interests as a single entity, 
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when, in fact, business is becoming ever more fragmented in its efforts to influence politics 
(Mizruchi 2013). In fact, the murky picture regarding corporate benefits of the revolving door 
could be the result of a subset of firms benefiting from revolving door ties, while the majority of 
other firms receiving no advantage or even seeing (relatively) worse outcomes. 
We propose that focusing on the advantages that accrue to specific firms provides a 
clearer understanding of the effects of the revolving door. More specifically, we view revolving 
doors as establishing a tie between firm and government mediated by individual employees. 
Furthermore, we view this as a deliberate strategic action on behalf of the firm to influence the 
state for favorable outcomes. Firms themselves have argued that any overlap of individuals is 
purely coincidental, driven by the fact that both firms and the government seek the best talent.9 
Yet, media accounts of firms wooing top regulators with post-government positions (e.g., Jensen 
and Wald (2014); Taibbi (2012)) paint a more calculated effort by firms to obtain advantages on 
certain regulatory matters. Also, many firms explicitly incentivize top executives to take 
positions in government regulatory agencies or run for public office by accelerating the vesting 
of options or awarding additional stock grants when leaving for public service (Project on 
Government Oversight (POGO) 2013). 
Management scholars have considered such strategic action in the political domain as 
corporate political activity (Hillman and Hitt 1999). While drawing heavily on work in this 
stream, we view the forging of ties through revolving doors as an instance of business political 
mobilization (Walker and Rea 2014: 13.3) to draw attention to “firms’ and industries’ roles as 
political actors that, while linked to their interests in the marketplace, are rooted in social, 
organizational, and cultural processes.” The movement of individuals between governments and 
                                                        
9 For example, the agricultural biotechnology company Monsanto, referred to as the “champion of the revolving 
door” by some critics (Robin 2010) notes on its company blog that “[i]n no way, does Monsanto control the 
government. We simply seem to have a shared goal of hiring good people” (Monsanto 2012). 
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firms is neither driven by market mechanisms of supply and demand, nor is it independent of the 
economic interests of the parties involved. Once a tie is forged, the relationship is influenced not 
only by the bargaining power and interests of the two parties involved, but also by the broader 
field of state and non-state actors seeking to maintain or disrupt institutionalized practices 
(Fligstein and McAdam 2012). 
REVOLVING DOOR TIES AND FIRM REGULATORY OUTCOMES 
A firm-government tie can shape regulatory outcomes for firms through a number of 
different channels, from providing firms with greater expertise (Bertrand, Bombardini, and 
Trebbi 2011), to influencing regulatory judgments via the allure of future employment (Dal Bó 
2006). To better distinguish between these potential mechanisms, we categorize these firm-
government ties along two dimensions. The first is the direction of the tie (i.e., whether an 
individual moves from government to firm, or vice versa). The second is the timing of the tie 
(i.e., whether the movement of the individual happens prior to, or after the regulatory event for a 
focal regulated firm). When the tie precedes regulation, the link acts as a channel or “pipe” 
through which information or influence flows to have a causal effect on regulatory outcomes. In 
contrast, when the tie follows regulation, the relationship can be viewed as an outcome or reward 
for actions that have already influenced regulatory outcomes.  
This leads to four distinct types of revolving door relationships. An individual from the 
firm can take a regulatory position, and the firm subsequently experiences a regulatory event. 
Alternatively, a regulator can take a firm position, with the firm going through the regulatory 
event post-movement. The forming of the tie can also happen after the regulatory event, where a 
regulator moves to a private sector job subsequent to a regulatory event, or an executive moves 
to a regulatory position subsequent to a regulatory event. As executives who transition to 
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regulatory jobs in future periods may arguably not influence regulatory outcomes in the present 
(as their social or human capital related to the USDA regulatory process has not been acquired 
yet), we only focus on the remaining three types of ties, which have clear mechanisms for 
affecting the regulatory process. Figure 1 shows a visual representation of the revolving door 
typologies according to tie direction and timing.        
 Insert Figure 1 about here 
Firm-to-Government Prior to Regulation (Type 1 Revolving Door)  
We first consider revolving door ties where a firm executive takes a government position 
prior to the firm’s product being regulated. Regulators with prior employment in the regulated 
industry may show more support for that industry due to a number of factors. Positive 
experiences in the industry, loyalty to the former employer, and sympathy to the problems the 
industry is facing in meeting standards constitute affect-based reasons why firms would receive 
more favorable outcomes when a firm employee moves from the firm to the government 
(Makkai and Braithwaite 1992). In addition, there are knowledge-based reasons to expect better 
outcomes in this situation, as those individuals may have deep knowledge of the firm’s 
satisfactory records in the regulated domain (such as health or environmental safety) that are 
otherwise unobservable (Makkai and Braithwaite 1992). It is worth noting that this support may 
not stem from attempts at regulatory capture by firms, but may rather be a form of personal bias, 
or “cognitive capture” (Rajan 2010: 180-181) by the regulator recruited from industry.  
Having former employees take on government positions also leads to greater 
connectedness between the two organizations. Even if the regulator is barred from decisions 
related to her former employer, the personal and professional ties she made during her time at the 
regulated firm still exist unsevered, and outside monitoring or regulation of these relationships is 
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virtually impossible. Corredoira and Rosenkopf (2010) found that semiconductor firms losing an 
employee (“outbound mobility”) were more likely to cite the patents of the firms to which their 
employee moved, implying that knowledge and information was flowing back to the sending 
firm via social connections. In a study of fashion houses, Godart, Shipilov and Claes (2014) 
found that the firms’ outward centrality was associated with creative performance, suggesting 
that fashion houses leveraged their former employees long after they moved on to competitors. 
By facilitating communication and access to the regulator and allowing knowledge about 
regulatory matters to flow back to the firm, firm-to-government revolving door individuals (i.e., 
Type 1 revolving door) can improve regulatory performance for firms.  
The fact that some firms actively encourage their employees to pursue jobs in 
government strongly implies that firms believe that there are benefits to having former 
employees in regulatory roles (POGO  2013). Be it affect, knowledge, bias or social networks, 
we expect the presence of a firm-to-government tie prior to regulation should help the focal firm 
obtain better regulatory outcomes. Thus, 
Hypothesis 1: A company with firm-to-government ties prior to regulation will have better 
regulatory outcomes. 
Government-to-Firm Prior to Regulation (Type 2 Revolving Door) 
Firms hiring former regulators also stand to benefit in future instances of regulation. 
There are two potential channels through which having individuals with government experience 
can help the regulatory performance of firms in subsequent regulatory matters. First, individuals 
with careers in government bring expertise regarding the inner-workings of the agency that firms 
must navigate (Lester et al. 2008). Hiring external individuals has long been understood as a way 
to import valuable knowledge and expertise (Almeida, Dokko, and Rosenkopf 2003; Song, 
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Almeida, and Wu 2003). The regulatory process for many products involves numerous 
administrative steps, and more knowledge of the process can be a considerable asset in obtaining 
more favorable outcomes. Former regulators are likely to have intimate knowledge regarding the 
appropriate methods in preparing documents, or strategically positioning products to enhance the 
strengths and cover the weaknesses of firms in the eyes of regulators. Much of the knowledge for 
regulatory success is tacit by nature, and bringing in individuals within the boundary of the firm 
can maximize the acquisition of such valuable knowledge (Song, Almeida and Wu 2003). 
A second mechanism through which government employees’ move to a firm could 
improve regulatory performance is through the social capital individuals bring to the firm, and 
more specifically, the ties to existing regulators these employees possess (Lester et al. 2008). In a 
study of firm influence in wireless standard committees, Dokko and Rosenkopf (2010) found that 
firms hiring individuals with richer social capital ended up with more influence in technical 
standard committees. Having individuals with more connections allows greater knowledge 
gathering and learning, while also facilitating coalition building, which can help in advancing the 
firm’s cause in contentious situations. 
Social capital not only provides informational and political advantages, but also signals 
legitimacy and promotes trust between actors. Studies on strategic alliances have argued that 
homophily is a key driver of alliance formation, and the career affiliations of top managers have 
been shown to be significantly correlated with the alliance formation patterns for firms (Kim and 
Higgins 2007). Having a former regulator on the staff enhances the credibility of the firm in the 
eyes of the regulator, and having the perspective of the regulator can potentially reduce frictions 
that arise between firms and the government. 
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All in all, we expect revolving door ties where former government employees flow to 
corporations to enhance the subsequent regulatory performance of firms. 
Hypothesis 2: A company with government-to-firm ties prior to regulation will have better 
regulatory outcomes. 
Government-to-Firm Post-Regulation (Type 3 Revolving Door) 
While ties formed prior to regulatory events have the most direct impact on firm 
regulatory outcomes, the ties that form following a regulatory event can also be indicative of 
influence. In particular, revolving door ties from government to firm post-regulatory event have 
long been suspected as a means towards regulatory capture (Dal Bó 2006; Stigler 1971). The 
prospect of a future job is argued to be the mechanism that drives the support of regulators for a 
specific industry during their tenure (Cohen 1986; Spiller 1990). A number of studies are in line 
with this regulatory capture view. In the US insurance industry, insurance prices have been 
shown to be higher during a regulator’s tenure if the regulator then entered industry post-tenure 
(Grace and Phillips 2008). Moreover, the deregulation of the natural gas extraction industry in 
1986 was followed by a decrease in the number of former regulators on corporate boards within 
the industry, which may be interpreted as evidence of regulators being hired for political rent-
seeking purposes (Helland and Sykuta 2004). 
 At the same time, regulators who go on to form revolving door ties may have an 
incentive to be harsher to firms in order to enhance their prospective value, which would hurt the 
regulatory performance of firms. The tollbooth view of regulation suggests that regulation is 
captured not by firms, but instead by politicians and bureaucrats who trade their approval for 
campaign contributions, votes, post-tenure positions or even bribes (Shleifer and Vishny 1998).  
In this perspective, it is the regulators who may create red tape, or unnecessarily complicated 
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procedures, in order to increase their own importance in the regulatory process. As a result, 
unlike with the capture view, predictions here are not beneficial for firms: regulators may be 
harsh in order to signal their supreme human capital to firms (Che 1995). Quirk’s (1981) study of 
four US regulatory agencies suggested that industry career aspirations made regulators more 
aggressive in their regulation of firms. In a similar vein, Cohen (1986) found that regulators were 
less supportive towards the regulated industry before revolving out of their position into an 
industry one. Furthermore, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) lawyers taking on 
private sector positions were found to be more enthusiastic in their regulatory enforcement 
efforts (deHaan et al. 2011). 
 The regulatory capture and tollbooth view of regulation offer contradictory predictions 
regarding the association between post-regulation revolving door ties and regulatory 
performance. In both cases, regulatory performance may in fact be driving the formation of 
ties—in other words, favorable regulation may earn the regulator a plum position at the 
beneficiary firm (i.e., regulatory capture), or unfavorable regulation may earn the regulator a 
position because she may stand out as a competent individual (i.e., tollbooth). However, if we 
focus on how ties shape regulatory performance, we argue that the regulatory capture view (i.e., 
favoring the regulator’s future employer) is more likely to apply to situations when (unobserved) 
ties are shaping performance, and expect that once the selection of tie formation is accounted for, 
the net direction of the effect of revolving door ties will be positive. 






Recombinant DNA technique was developed in California in 1973, which enabled 
scientists to extract a specific gene from the DNA of one organism and insert it into another for 
the first time (Cohen et al. 1973). Since then, scientists have applied this technology to bacteria, 
plants and animals. In terms of agricultural applications, genetic engineering has enabled 
scientists to create pest and viral resistant plants, as well as those with herbicide tolerance, 
modified oil structure, reproductive sterility, as well as delayed ripening and softening.  
Due to the desirable properties that GE plants have been engineered for, large numbers of 
farmers have readily adopted them. GE crops adoption rates are very high, particularly for the 
key crops in the Unites States such as corn, soybeans and cotton—ranging from 80 percent for 
corn to 92 percent for soybeans (GAO 2008). However, domestic consumers, organic farmers 
and social movements have expressed concerns over these crops (Hiatt and Park 2013; Schurman 
and Munro 2010). In particular, they worry that the release of GE material might pose 
environmental risks, as well as that ingesting these modified plants might be associated with 
long-term human health risks (GAO, 2002). Overall, proponents and opponents of 
agribiotechnology make passionate arguments about the potential benefits and costs that GE 
foods introduce to social welfare.   
Agribiotechnology Regulation 
Genetically engineered crops go through a number of stages before reaching consumers.  
Firstly, corporate scientific teams develop and patent these new plant varieties. Secondly, federal 
regulators evaluate the crops. The first part of the regulatory process is a phase of field 
experiments, contingent on the approval by the regulatory agencies for planting and 
dissemination on designated plots of land (GAO 2008). The USDA’s Animal and Plant Health 
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Inspection Service (APHIS) has primary responsibility in the field trial process, although the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) must also approve crops engineered to have herbicides 
in them (Heisey and Schimmelpfennig 2006). Since 1986, when the first GE crop was approved 
for planting, around 19,000 crops have been planted in field trials (Biotechnology Regulatory 
Services (BRS) 2014). 
As the second regulatory step following a field trial’s successful demonstration of a 
crop’s desired properties, as well as a lack of any undesired traits, the crop-developing firms may 
petition the USDA to deregulate their GE crops. APHIS decides whether to accept the firms’ 
petitions for non-regulated status of the GE crops, which allows these plants to be grown 
commercially and sold without further monitoring, tracing or labeling. Moreover, firms may 
voluntarily consult the FDA in order to obtain additional safety reports prior to introducing GE 
crops into food or feed supply (GAO 2008). The first GE crop to be sold in supermarkets was 
Calgene’s Flavr Savr tomato in 1994 (Bruening and Lyons 2000). Since then, over 140 GE foods 
have been evaluated for deregulation (BRS 2014).   
  In general, U.S. governmental entities have overlapping jurisdictions in the regulation of 
GE products. The FDA is responsible for GE foods and drugs, the USDA for GE crop plants and 
animals, the EPA for organisms released into the environment for pest control, and even the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) participate in the process by overseeing GE organisms that 
could affect public health (Ferrara 1998). Due to its key role in the regulation of 
agribiotechnological products in particular, in this chapter we focus on the USDA and its alleged 
revolving door to biotech crop companies. Moreover, we study the first stage of regulation, field 
trials, which have less overlap in jurisdiction across agencies. Further research may expand this 
survey to all regulatory bodies that deal with biotechnological products.   
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DATA AND METHODS 
In order to test our theory, we compiled a data set from various sources, all of which are 
described in detail below.   
Dependent Variables 
Regulatory Outcomes  
In terms of regulatory outcomes, two things matter to firms: gaining approval for their 
products and the speed of doing so. Obtaining approval to market its products is crucial for a 
firm’s ability to cash in on its investments in research and development of new products, but the 
duration of the regulatory process itself is highly important, as well.  The significance of the 
duration (or the speed of the regulatory process) lies in waiting costs, which are incurred because 
firms have to delay their releases of new products (Heisey and Schimmelpfennig 2006). Because 
each firm has exclusive rights to their patented GE plant products for a limited time of 20 years 
from the patent filing date, any delay in bringing products to market causes a loss in potential 
revenue to the firm. Hiatt and Park (2013) estimate that each day a Monsanto GE crop spends in 
the regulatory process may cost the firm up to $2 million in foregone revenue. Furthermore, for 
the particular regulatory outcome of planting notifications, most of the GE crop producers (i.e. 
around 96 percent of our sample) eventually obtain the requested planting approval in the period 
from 1998-2006. However, the length of time required to obtain approval varies widely, from 0 
to 452 days for different crops. For descriptive data, see Table 1.  
Following previous studies that show differential outcomes of the regulatory process 
(Carpenter 2002; Hiatt and Park 2013; Kim 2013), we focus on the time to regulatory approval. 
Data on regulatory approval rates for GE crops were obtained from Biotechnology Regulatory 
Services, a part of USDA-APHIS that publishes a database containing dates when planting 
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requests were received and issued (BRS 2014). For each crop, we have a date0 (i.e. date when 
request was received), and for those that are approved, we have date1 (i.e. date when approval 
was issued). The time between date1 and date0 is the duration of the regulatory process. We 
adopt an event history approach for the main part of our analysis in order to model the speed of 
regulatory approval. More specifically, we employ a log-logistic survival model with firm-level 
frailty. Further details on our models are provided in the Analysis section.     
Independent Variables 
Revolving Door Ties  
Our main independent variables are the three distinct types of revolving door ties 
between an agribiotechnology firm and the USDA: firm-to-government ties prior to regulation 
(Type 1), government-to-firm ties prior to regulation (Type 2), and government-to-firm ties post-
regulation (Type 3).  For each firm in a given year, each of these three variables is 
operationalized as a dummy (0/1) for the particular kind of revolving door between the focal 
company and one of the relevant executive USDA positions. We define executive USDA 
positions as all political appointments, as well as relevant APHIS positions (including APHIS 
leadership positions below the Administrator level). As APHIS is the key regulator of 
biotechnology crops, our definition of relevant USDA positions also implies that we consider all 
the positions placed above APHIS in decision-making power. Thus, the USDA executive 
positions we take into account encompass the Office of the Secretary, as well as all 
Undersecretaries, Agency Administrators, as well as APHIS decision-makers. For an 
organizational chart of the USDA, see the USDA 2008 fiscal year report (USDA 2008: 2).   
A revolving tie between a focal firm and the USDA is indicated by an individual 
switching from an executive position at the USDA to one with a manufacturer of GE crops, and 
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vice versa. We consider corporate executive positions including corporate directorships as well 
as executive roles. Throughout, we only consider manufacturers for whom we have regulatory 
activity, and therefore ties to agribiotechnology producers without previous notifications of field 
trials in the period from 1995-2010 are not included. Moreover, we record whether the revolving 
individual held his executive position with the agribiotech firm before (firm-to-government ties 
prior to regulation, or Type 1 revolving door), or after his USDA appointment (government-to-
firm ties post-regulation, or Type 3 revolving door). Finally, for the government-to-firm ties prior 
to regulation, we create a variable called Type 2 revolving door, which is assigned the value of 
one, if the agribiotechnology firm has a former USDA regulator on its staff, and zero otherwise.  
For example, Monsanto has a value of one for the Type 1 revolving door from 2001-
2004, when Ann Veneman, a former executive of a Monsanto-acquired firm Calgene, served as 
USDA Secretary. Conversely, Monsanto has a value of one for the Type 3 revolving door 
variable in 1995, as Michael Taylor, then Food Safety and Inspection Service Administrator, 
took a position as a Monsanto Vice President for Public Policy after his USDA tenure. Finally, 
Monsanto has a Type 2 revolving door to the USDA between 1996 and 2000, when Michael 
Taylor was on its staff.  
In order to collect revolving door data, we first lodged a Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) request with the USDA. Once we received a roster of political nominations from the 
USDA for the period from 2000-present, we supplemented it through additional research. A 
combination of USDA newsletters, Legislative Calendar from the Congress, Congressional 
Directory, as well as the United States Government Printing Office documents were searched to 
populate the previously defined set of USDA positions from 1995-2010. Next, we established 
which USDA executives had ties to industry as described above. For this task we used CapitalIQ, 
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LinkedIn, as well as revolving door data from OpenSecrets.org. When necessary, further 
information was found on each person by conducting thorough online searches. Importantly, a tie 
was not inferred unless at least two sources could corroborate it. Our cautious approach ensures 
the accuracy of all inferred firm-government ties. Of 252 individuals10 in executive USDA 
positions accounted for in the period from 1995-2010, we found that seven regulators had 
revolving door ties to agribiotechnology firms (of those, three were firm-to-government, and four 
were government-to-firm).  
Control Variables 
Firm-Level Controls 
Certain firm characteristics, such as firm size, knowledge base and innovativeness are 
thought to be important for firm regulatory outcomes (Kim 2013; Olson 1997). In particular, firm 
size and research and development intensity act as signals of the quality of firms’ products and 
may therefore lead to shorter regulatory review times. For each firm within a given year we 
include total assets (in USD thousands), as well as R&D expenditures (in USD thousands) from 
Compustat. An additional variable for firm size, used in a subset of our models, is employee 
number (in thousands) from Compustat.       
Furthermore, a firm’s research intensity may also be operationalized by the number of 
approved patents granted to the firm. We include a count of plant patents by firm by year. Plant 
patent counts are available from the United States Patents and Trademark Office (USPTO), 
which published a report covering all organizational patentees with five or more patent 
applications accepted between 1986-2010 (USPTO 2011). Additionally, we used utility patent 
                                                        
10
 The actual number of appointments made during this time is larger at 292, but given the fact that some individuals 
are appointed several times to different positions, the number of unique individuals filling those positions is smaller.  
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data in a subset of our models. NBER utility patent data were obtained from Bronwyn Hall’s 
website, which covers all applications up to 2006 (Hall 2011). 
We also control for firm lobbying and PAC contributions, as they have been shown to 
influence firm outcomes (Quinn and Shapiro 1991; Richter, Samphantharak, and Timmons 
2009). From the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP 2011), we include a measure of lobbying 
expenditures (in USD million) for each company within a given year from 199811-2010, a well as 
PAC donations (in USD thousands). 
 Finally, as firm origin has been shown to impact regulatory success for GE crops (Hiatt 
and Park, 2013), we also control for the GE crop producer’s nationality. Firms are assigned a 
value of one for the foreign dummy if they are of non-US origin, and zero otherwise. 
Crop-Level Controls  
The area on which GE crops are planted may impact the risk of spreading for the GE 
crop. We therefore include the variable acreage from the BRS (2014) data. Furthermore, not all 
GE crops are of the same economic significance. Corn, soybean and cotton are key crops grown 
in the United States. Due to their high agricultural significance, as well as high GE adoption 
rates, we consider whether corn, soybeans and cotton may have a somewhat altered regulatory 
time than other less important crops. We use the data from the Biotechnology Regulatory 
Services (BRS, 2014), which reports the type of crop that each field trial application was 
submitted for, in order to create (0/1) dummy indicators for corn, soybean and cotton crops.    
Due to the fact that GE plants with plant incorporated protectants (PIPs) are also 
monitored by the EPA, and may therefore have a slightly different regulatory process, we follow 
Hiatt and Park (2013) in including binary dummies (PIPs) for such crops (1 if the crop contains 
                                                        
11 Lobbying data is not available prior to 1998. 
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PIPs, and 0 otherwise). Similarly, we control for the number of phenotype traits that have been 
altered in a given crop with the variable called phenotype variety.  
Regulatory Environment Controls 
Government ideology may influence regulatory environments (Carpenter, 2002), as 
administrations may have their specific views about particular issues, such as biotechnology. We 
therefore include a dummy for the ideology of the United States President (1 if liberal 
(Democrat), 0 otherwise). Dummies for the House of Representatives, as well as for the Senate 
were not included due to lack of variation during the period of our study.  
Another important aspect of the regulatory environment is the amount of regulator 
workload at a given time. A large number of regulatory approval applications being processed 
around the same time may create a traffic jam, slowing the speed of approval (Hiatt and Park, 
2013). We therefore control for the possibility of a traffic jam, by including a measure of the 
number of concurrent applications in our models.    
Lastly, there are two tracks in the regulatory approval process for field trials of GE crops. 
We control for whether the crop was submitted to the more streamlined notification process, as 
opposed to the longer permit process with the dummy variable called process type (1 if the 
process is streamlined, and 0 otherwise).   
Analysis 
Since our dependent variable is operationalized as the speed of regulatory approval, we 
use an event history approach. In our analysis, we estimate a log-logistic accelerated failure time 
(AFT) model with frailty, due to its favorable fit compared to other semi-parametric and 
parametric models, including Cox and piecewise exponential models. Figures A1-A5 in the 
Appendix show the plots of the Cox-Snell residuals from Model 4 run with various different 
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specifications. Good fit is indicated by residuals falling close to the 45-degree line, and as such, 
the semi-parametric Cox and the log-logistic AFT survival models provide the best fit. However, 
since the proportional hazard assumption is violated, an AFT model is more suitable than the 
Cox model. Our results are perfectly robust to using the Cox model, as well (see Table A1 in the 
Appendix).  
Further, firms that succeed in either placing their former executives on a governmental 
regulatory body, or those that are able to recruit new employees from a regulatory body, may not 
be randomly selected. The importance of accounting for any potential selection bias is 
highlighted by Bonardi, Holburn and Vanden Bergh (2006), who showed that a firm’s decision 
to initiate a non-market strategy is positively correlated with the performance of the nonmarket 
strategy. In our context, there may be either positive or negative selection bias when it comes to 
revolving door formation. The firms that establish firm-government revolving door ties may be 
the firms that would, due to some unobserved heterogeneity (such as having solid safety records, 
producing high quality GE crops or being a producer with high status or legitimacy), be more 
likely to have a speedy approval in any case. Conversely, firms that have particular difficulties 
with the regulatory process may also seek out ways to influence it through forming revolving 
door ties. Following Bonardi, Holburn, and Vanden Bergh (2006) in order to eliminate such 
possible endogeneity issues, we employ a selection model and incorporate it into the main 
survival models. In the first stage of our 2-stage Heckman analysis, we run a probit for the 
effects of firm characteristics on the chance of having a firm-USDA revolving door in a given 
year:  
Firm-USDA revolving doorit = F(δ’Wit + uit), 
 132
where F(.) represents the cumulative density function inverted, Firm-USDA revolving doorit is 
the Type 1, Type 2 or Type 3 revolving door dummy respectively (1 when there is a revolving 
door between a given firm and the USDA, 0 otherwise), and Wit is the matrix of independent and 
control variables including firm size (operationalized as employee number), utility patent count, 
and lobbying expenditures for firm i. In addition, Wit includes lagged duration, which is the 
average duration of the regulatory process for the firm’s crops for all years prior. This variable 
represents the exclusion restriction for our Heckman models, and is not a significant predictor in 
the second stage survival model including control variables. The three probit models are used to 
form the inverse Mills ratios, (λ = 
 (’)
 (’)
 ) for the formation of revolving door ties (whether 
Type 1, Type 2 or Type 3), which are then introduced into our second stage survival models, 
allowing us to control for any possible selection bias in those models (Heckman, 1979). In the 
final model, Model 4, all three tie types and consequently, all three IMRs are included12.  
We then estimate the following second stage survival model:  
Sij(t | ξij) = 

∗
 ,  
where  = exp(β0 + Xijβ + ξi). In other words, S is the survival of GE crop j for company i in the 
regulatory process (or the time until the crop gets approved), X refers to explanatory variables 
(such as firm and crop characteristics, regulatory environment controls and revolving door 
dummies, as well as the appropriate inverse Mills ratios), β are regression parameters to be 
estimated, and γ is the shape parameter for the log-logistic distribution. As our observations are 
on the level of the crop, we also include firm frailty (or random effect), ξi, which accounts for the 
correlation of regulatory outcomes for crops produced by the same firm. The subscript t for the 
given year is suppressed for notational convenience. In this AFT model, the dependent variable 
                                                        
12 For examples of multiple selection treatment, see Krishnan (1990) and Muller and Riedl (2002). 
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is interpreted as the survival time (i.e. how long a GE crop stays in the sample until it is 
approved)—with negative coefficients indicating a faster approval, and positive coefficients 
indicating a slower regulatory process.      
RESULTS 
Our data contains observations on 4,60313 applications for planting of GE crops between 
1998-2006. Although 20 companies are included in our analysis, Monsanto’s applications 
represent 78 percent of the sample. Monsanto’s dominance in our sample is reflective of their 
overall market position: 90 percent of U.S. soybean crop, and 80 percent of the corn and cotton 
crops are grown using Monsanto seeds (Langreth and Herper, 2009). In a supplemental analysis 
(not shown), we include a dummy for a crop being produced by Monsanto (1 if Monsanto crop, 0 
otherwise), which does not affect our results. We also run our analyses on two stratified 
subsamples, containing Monsanto and non-Monsanto crops. While the subsamples do not 
contain all the possible tie directions and timings, the results from these models are consistent 
with our unified sample results. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for our sample, and Table 
2 provides the breakdown of applications by company.                                     
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here 
We first examine results from the probit models on the likelihood of firms having 
different kinds of revolving doors to the USDA. As the dependent variable, Probit model 1 uses 
the Type 1 revolving door dummy, Probit model 2 uses the Type 2 revolving door dummy, and 
Probit model 3 uses the Type 3 revolving door dummy. The results of these three models are 
presented below.  
   Insert Table 3 about here  
                                                        
13 Two observations are dropped in the analysis because their time to approval was 0 days (i.e. they were approved 
on the first day of the regulatory process).  
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What can we tell about companies that have revolving door ties? Across the three 
models, lagged regulatory process duration has a strong positive effect (p<0.001), indicating that 
companies that had previously experienced longer waiting for a regulatory approval are more 
likely to form revolving doors. Moreover, more research-intense companies (i.e. those that have 
more utility patents) are significantly more likely to have any type of revolving door to the 
USDA. On the other hand, company size (as indicated by employee numbers) and political 
involvement (as indicated by lobbying expenditures) did not seem to have robust effects across 
the different types of revolving doors. While larger companies are more likely to have Type 3 
ties, they are less likely to have Type 1 ties. Companies that had higher lobbying expenditures 
were more likely to form Type 1 ties, and less likely to have Type 2 and Type 3 ties.  
We next examine the effects of firm-government ties on the duration of the regulatory 
process. Our log-logistic AFT models with frailty are presented below. In Table 4, Model 0 
represents our baseline model, containing only control variables: total firm asset size and R&D 
expenditures, firm lobbying and PAC contributions, count of firm plant patents, foreign firm 
dummy, GE crop acreage, dummies for corn, soybean and cotton, dummy for PIPs, GE 
phenotype variety, liberal President dummy, measure of USDA traffic jam and a dummy for the 
regulatory process type. Model 1 additionally includes the Type 1 tie dummy, while Model 1b 
also includes IMRtype1, the inverse Mills ratio from Probit model 1. In Model 2, in addition to 
the baseline control variables, we include Type 2 ties. Model 2b then includes IMRtype2, the 
inverse Mills ratio from Probit model 2. Model 3 includes the baseline control variables, as well 
as the Type 3 dummy, while Model 3b also includes IMRtype3. Finally, Model 4 includes all 
three types of revolving door dummies, as well as all their respective IMRs.  
 Insert Table 4 about here 
 135
 Our baseline model, Model 0, shows the effects of control variables. Larger firms (i.e. 
those with greater total assets) receive a significantly faster approval for their GE crop planting 
applications, although it may be noted that this effect does not persist across all models. R&D 
intensity, as operationalized by R&D expenditures and plant patent count, does not have a 
significant effect. Further, while greater lobbying expenditures increase the speed of approvals 
for biotechnology producers (p<0.001), their PAC contributions do not have a significant effect. 
Whether a crop producer is foreign does not have a significant effect, and neither does the 
proposed surface area for GE crop planting. Strategically important plants for US agriculture, 
corn, soybean and cotton, all appear to take longer to be reviewed (p<0.001 for all three). These 
important GE crops are not rushed through the planting application process—in fact, quite the 
opposite is true. More varied phenotypes also take longer to approve, although GE crops 
including plant incorporated protectants (PIPs) take less time (p<0.001 for both). As for 
ideological variables, liberal Presidency speeds up crop review times at the USDA (p<0.001). 
Finally, the number of concurrent GE crop planting requests lengthens the wait for regulatory 
approval (p<0.001), and a submission to the more streamlined regulatory process shortens it 
(p<0.001).   
Selection Bias 
Inverse Mills Ratios created from our probit models help us determine whether selection 
bias exists. In other words, significant coefficients of the IMRs indicate that the formation of a 
revolving door between a given firm and the USDA is also correlated with the firm’s regulatory 
outcome. Models 1b, 2b, and 3b in Table 4 show that selection bias occurs for all three types of 
revolving door ties, as IMRtype1, IMRtype2 and IMRtype3 all have significant coefficients.  
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Firm-to-USDA Pre-Regulation Ties (i.e.Type 1) (H1) 
  Type 1 revolving doors significantly increase the speed of the regulatory process, 
whether selection bias is accounted for (in Model 1b) or not (Models 1 and 4). In other words, 
firms that have former employees who become regulators have better outcomes during the 
former employees’ regulatory tenure. 
USDA-to-Firm Pre-Regulation Ties (i.e. Type 2) (H2) 
Type 2 revolving doors significantly decrease the speed of regulatory approvals. The 
effect of these ties, however, is not highly significant in Model 2b (p<0.05), which controls for 
the selection bias, and it becomes insignificant in Model 4. We thus conclude that firms that have 
former regulators on their staff do not experience better regulatory outcomes.  
USDA-to-Firm Post-Regulation Ties (i.e. Type 3) (H3) 
Finally, Type 3 revolving doors also significantly increase the speed of regulatory 
approvals. Interestingly, however, not accounting for selection bias here would alter our findings, 
making the coefficient not significant in Model 3. However, in Models 3b and 4, we see that 
firms that hire regulators away have better outcomes during their future employees’ tenure.  
How much does a revolving door matter? Using coefficients from our Model 4, we are 
able to calculate the marginal effect of having a revolving door to the USDA (vs. not having 
one). With all explanatory variables held constant at their averages, having a Type 1 revolving 
door to the USDA shaves off around 2.5 days from the regulatory approval time for a GE crop. 
On the other hand, a Type 3 revolving door to the USDA reduces the approval time by around 7 
days. Using Hiatt and Park’s (2013) waiting cost estimate of $2 million/day, it is clear that 
companies stand to benefit from their revolving door practices in an economically significant 
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way: a Type 1 revolving door would save $5 million, and a Type 3 revolving door would save 
$14 million in foregone revenue due to regulatory waiting costs. 
DISCUSSION 
 Despite the relative lack of attention that revolving door ties receive compared to other 
corporate political strategies (such as lobbying or PAC contributions), the results of our study 
demonstrate a clear advantage for firms connected to their regulators via exchanging employees. 
Importantly, the benefits to firms accrue during the revolving regulator’s tenure, whether the 
regulator previously worked for a regulated firm, or moved on to it after their regulatory tenure. 
In fact, the benefits of a faster regulatory outcome only accrue during the regulator’s tenure—
once the regulator transitions to the firm, the firm no longer benefits. Moreover, we find that 
there is a selection bias in the formation of revolving door ties, such that firms that have 
historically fared worse, are more likely to have revolving door ties in the subsequent period.  
Anecdotally, examining the backgrounds of the revolving regulators supports the idea 
that firms use the revolving door as a corporate political strategy. Of the seven revolving 
regulators in our sample, five individuals are lawyers, and none had degrees related to agriculture 
or biotechnology. More importantly, across both directions of the revolving door, six individuals 
held corporate positions that put them in charge of their firm’s external relations, most often with 
government entities (such as Head of Government Relations, VP for Public Policy, and General 
Counsel). Finally, most revolvers were from the higher echelons of the USDA, with just one 
revolver directly in the biotechnology-regulating APHIS. Overall, the revolving regulators in our 
sample have legal rather than technical expertise, come from positions of higher power within 
the USDA, and hold corporate roles in which they may be required to interface with the USDA 
and other governmental entities. As such, the exchange of employees between the USDA and the 
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regulated agribiotechnology firms does not seem to create an exchange of technical expertise 
related to biotechnology products. Instead, the revolving door seems to promote an exchange of 
regulatory process knowledge across the USDA and regulated firms. Moreover, the fact that 
most revolvers hold corporate external relations positions is suggestive of hiring decisions as a 
part of a corporate political strategy. This holds particularly for the government-to-firm 
revolvers, whose regulatory expertise, as well as USDA contacts, makes them excellent 
candidates to manage a firm’s relations with the USDA and other governmental bodies. Future 
research might examine how the characteristics of individual regulators influence their 
propensity to become revolvers, and consequently, to affect regulatory outcomes. 
 Empirically, the evidence for the revolving door as a corporate political strategy is 
threefold. Firstly, firms that perform worse tend to be more likely to form ties, which suggests 
that firms may hire former regulators, or encourage their former employees to transition to 
regulatory jobs, as a way to address previously lengthy regulatory waits. Secondly, benefits 
occur during the regulatory tenure of revolving regulators, which is suggestive of regulators with 
revolving door ties influencing the regulatory outcomes in their former or future employer’s 
favor. Thirdly, there are no benefits to firms hiring former regulators once they are on their staff, 
suggesting that the regulators may not necessarily be hired due to the expertise and social capital 
they bring to the firm. These results, taken together, indicate that firms may strategically use 
revolving door relationships as a means to shaping regulatory outcomes.   
This chapter contributes to the organizational literature in several different ways. First, by 
viewing revolving door personnel movements as instances of strategic tie formation between 
firms and governments, we answer recent calls to investigate the social and organizational 
processes through which corporations mobilize and shape their political environments (Walker 
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and Rea 2014). Second, while past studies on the revolving door have focused on agency- or 
industry-level outcomes such as committee votes, enforcement by the regulator, etc., we focus on 
firm-specific outcomes of ties, allowing us to pinpoint the advantages for the firms adopting this 
strategy, and the consequences for competitors in the industry. Finally, our empirical approach 
allows us to correct for a methodological issues plaguing prior studies (i.e., selection bias), and 
as a result, the chapter provides a clearer resolution to the conflicting evidence regarding 
revolving doors. 
An important feature of our chapter is the empirical context within the agribiotechnology 
and its main regulator, USDA. The agribiotechnology sector is a particularly suitable setting due 
to its heavy regulation. Heavily regulated industries, due to their high dependence on the 
government (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), engage more in corporate political strategies (Lux, 
Crook, and Woehr 2011). However, while choosing a highly regulated industry as the focus of 
our study may have allowed us to observe more corporate political activity, both less and more 
regulated industries have been shown to achieve better performance as a result of their hiring of 
former politicians (Hillman 2005). As such, the choice of a highly regulated industry is not 
expected to bias our results.  
Additionally, the agribiotechnology sector has often come under criticism for the high 
levels of revolving doors. Interestingly, in our sample, we find that of the regulators studied, only 
three percent were, in fact, revolvers. Previous studies have shown the rates of revolving doors to 
be higher, ranging from 11 to 51 percent for government-to-firm (Coates 2012; Eckert 1981), as 
well as 21 percent for firm-to-government revolving door ties (Eckert 1981). However, despite 
the ties’ relatively low prevalence, compared to other agencies, the USDA’s regulatory outcomes 
were significantly affected by the revolving doors. A possible reason for the significance of the 
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relatively small amount of ties may lie in the structure of the industry, which is highly 
consolidated. Thus, although relatively few firms are connected to the USDA via the revolving 
door, those same firms submit most of the applications for approval, and are therefore able to 
extract significant benefits from the revolving doors.   
 It is, however, important to note that exchanging resources for policy or regulatory 
outcomes is illegal in the United States and most developed countries (Lux, Crook, and Woehr 
2011). Given the illegal nature of transacting over policy and the consequent lack of 
contractability in these political exchanges, how do firms ensure that the revolvers will act 
favorably towards the firm after receiving their reward? Moreover, as firms extract most of the 
value from the revolvers while they are still in their regulatory roles, how do government-to-firm 
revolvers ensure that their corporate employers do not terminate their employment at the earliest 
opportunity post-transition? Unlike economic transactions governed by contracts, political 
exchanges may be governed by trust between the parties (Lux, Crook, and Woehr 2011), making 
them more of a social exchange (Blau 1964). Trust is likely to characterize interactions between 
firms and their former employees, as well as the repeated dealings between regulators and 
regulated firms. Future research is needed to fully understand the complexities of these firm-
government interactions on the micro-level.  
 Of course, given the prevalence of the revolving door ties, as well as their potential to 
skew regulatory outcomes, safeguards have been developed in order to ensure a fair regulatory 
process. Federal procedures attempt to limit the potential for conflicts of interest arising due to 
revolving door ties. Political appointees entering the USDA from industry are barred from taking 
official action on matters concerning their former employers. When their job description puts 
them in the position of regulating on such issues, regulators may have to recuse themselves from 
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the process, as well as divest any financial instruments tied to the former employer, and they may 
even be assigned to a different position altogether. Of course, while regulators may not have 
direct decision-making power over their former employers, they may be able to influence their 
colleagues who are able to legally affect regulatory outcomes. Moreover, while regulators who 
leave the USDA for industry have “cooling-off” periods during which their contact with the 
USDA is prohibited, our study indicates that undue influence may occur not after the regulator’s 
transition to the firm, but before. While there are rules prohibiting regulatory decision-making on 
potential future employers, any infractions may be difficult to monitor. Our empirical findings 
suggest that, despite the criminal and regulatory statutes designed to limit the impact of 
revolving doors, differential regulatory outcomes for connected firms persist.     
    However, despite our findings, we caution against taking extreme policy actions, such 
as prohibiting revolving doors altogether. While our results suggest that firms may not benefit 
significantly from having revolving regulators on their staff, it has been suggested that the 
government is able to attract higher quality regulators, due to the regulators’ ability to 
subsequently convert their regulatory experience into lucrative job offers in industry (Brezis 
2012). Moreover, former corporate executives who become regulators, despite possibly 
distorting the regulatory process, may also bring valuable industry knowledge that could improve 
aspects of the process. Although our study cannot adjudicate on whether there are benefits to the 
regulatory process due to the movement of employees, policy decisions regarding the revolving 
door should carefully weigh the pros and the cons of the phenomenon. Thus, there is a critical 
need for future research that might improve our understanding of this complex social 
phenomenon, as well as its implications for individuals, firms, and the government. 
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 In conclusion, our study provides an empirically-supported theoretical model of how 
firm-government revolving doors are used as a corporate political strategy to extract advantages 
in the regulatory process. Firms with historically worse regulatory outcomes are more likely to 
pursue this strategy, and they reap benefits from it while the revolving regulator is at the 
regulatory agency. Despite its impactful economic significance for firms, as well as the 
important implications for the fairness of the regulatory process, firm-government revolving 
doors have been relatively neglected in the management literature. Our study places the 
revolving door in its rightful place in the corporate political strategy repertoire, along with 
lobbying and PAC contributions, and invites scholars to contribute to a better understanding of 












Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21)
(1) outcome (0/1) 0.96 0.20 0 1
(2) regulatory process duration 34.76 19.51 0 452 0.17
(3) total assets (thousands) 12.33 9.73 0.02 73.76 0.01 -0.01
(4) employee number 20.61 19.78 0.061 115.4 -0.01 -0.03 0.95
(5) R&D expenditure (thousands) 0.04 0.17 0 2.25 0.04 -0.01 0.20 0.29
(6) lobbying expenditure (millions) 1.39 1.50 0 3.64 -0.06 0.15 -0.04 0.03 0.23
(7) PAC contribution (thousands) 34.67 22.47 0 484.55 0.00 0.12 0.19 0.21 0.23 0.47
(8) plant patent count 1.73 9.63 0 79 0.03 0.07 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 0.19
(9) utility patent count 222.66 206.21 0 1810 -0.11 0.02 0.24 0.31 0.51 0.17 0.21 -0.05
(10) foreign company 0.11 0.31 0 1 0.00 0.00 0.58 0.64 -0.08 -0.10 0.11 0.51 0.02
(11) acreage 104.85 484.43 0 14400 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.03 -0.02
(12) corn 0.62 0.49 0 1 -0.04 0.08 -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 -0.06 0.01
(13) soybean 0.11 0.31 0 1 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.15 0.25 0.16 -0.03 0.17 -0.07 -0.02 -0.44
(14) cotton 0.08 0.28 0 1 0.03 -0.03 0.20 0.18 -0.06 -0.06 -0.08 0.06 -0.02 0.22 0.07 -0.39 -0.11
(15) PIPS 0.40 0.49 0 1 -0.03 -0.08 0.00 -0.04 -0.12 -0.18 -0.12 0.04 -0.04 0.02 0.05 0.35 -0.18 0.06
(16) variety 1.23 0.61 1 10 -0.19 0.08 0.10 0.14 -0.01 0.21 0.09 -0.01 0.10 0.08 0.03 0.10 -0.01 -0.05 0.25
(17) liberal President 0.17 0.38 0 1 -0.05 -0.08 0.04 0.02 0.11 -0.36 -0.02 -0.08 0.38 -0.06 -0.03 0.00 -0.07 0.00 0.06 -0.12
(18) USDA traffic jam 297.54 156.94 12 1592 0.17 0.33 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.11 -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.05 0.08 0.10 -0.03 0.04 0.17 -0.03 -0.06
(19) reqtype 0.99 0.09 0 1 -0.01 -0.33 -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.13 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 -0.29 -0.03 -0.08
(20) Firm-to-USDA pre-regulation (i.e.Type 1 rev door) (0/1) 0.59 0.49 0 1 0.01 0.05 -0.28 -0.34 -0.28 0.18 -0.06 -0.21 -0.07 -0.42 0.01 0.14 0.06 -0.08 0.07 0.04 -0.54 0.14 0.08
(21) USDA-to-firm pre-regulation (i.e. Type 2 rev. door) (0/1) 0.11 0.31 0 1 0.03 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.18 -0.27 0.08 -0.06 0.42 -0.12 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 0.03 0.01 -0.09 0.77 -0.03 -0.04 -0.42
(22) USDA-to-firm post-regulation (i.e. Type 3 rev. door) (0/1) 0.02 0.15 0 1 0.03 0.04 0.11 0.13 0.34 0.00 0.23 0.79 0.29 0.31 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.19 0.09
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Bayer CropScience 72 1.56
Coors 3 0.07
Delta and Pine Land 1 0.02
Dow AgroSciences 83 1.8
Du Pont 42 0.91
Heinz 1 0.02
International Paper 1 0.02
Monsanto 3,601 78.23
Novartis 54 1.17
Pioneer Hi-Bred International Inc. 155 3.37
R J Reynolds 2 0.04
Scotts 152 3.3
SemBioSys Genetics 1 0.02
Seminis Vegetable Seeds 38 0.83
Syngenta 242 5.26




Table 3. Probit Results 
Probit 1 Probit 2 Probit 3
DV Type 1 revolving door Type 2 revolving door Type 3 revolving door
employee number -0.047*** 0.001 0.005*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
lobbying expenditure (millions) 0.239*** -7.660*** -0.154***
(0.01) (1.29) (0.04)
utility patent count 0.001*** 0.017*** 0.002***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
lagged regulatory process duration 0.025*** 0.063*** 0.061***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
constant -0.318** -7.286*** -4.235***
(0.12) (0.46) (0.19)
N 4982 4982 4982
chi2 1050.414 2368.430 293.836
AIC 5822.076 936.583 840.101
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Independent variables Model 0 Model 1 Model 1b Model 2 Model 2b Model 3 Model 3b Model 4
Firm controls total assets (thousands) -0.007*** -0.007*** 0.007*** -0.006*** 0.002 -0.007*** 0.002 -0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
R&D expenditures (thousands) 0.057 -0.010 -0.271*** -0.010 -0.248*** 0.045 -0.208*** -0.309***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
lobbying expenditures (millions) -0.027*** -0.026*** 0.051*** -0.020*** 0.118*** -0.027*** 0.073*** 0.199***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.04)
PAC contributions (thousands) -0.000 -0.000 -0.002*** 0.000 -0.002*** -0.000 -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
plant patent count -0.001 -0.001 0.004*** -0.001 0.004*** -0.002 0.006*** 0.008***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
foreign firm dummy (0/1) 0.065 0.017 0.002 0.050 0.007 0.072 -0.009 -0.134*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
Crop controls acreage 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
corn (0/1) 0.210*** 0.213*** 0.214*** 0.218*** 0.211*** 0.209*** 0.210*** 0.212***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
soybean (0/1) 0.180*** 0.183*** 0.190*** 0.185*** 0.180*** 0.179*** 0.177*** 0.172***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
cotton (0/1) 0.121*** 0.122*** 0.119*** 0.126*** 0.120*** 0.120*** 0.120*** 0.125***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
PIPs (0/1) -0.131*** -0.127*** -0.143*** -0.133*** -0.144*** -0.130*** -0.145*** -0.141***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
phenotype variety 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.022* 0.031*** 0.017 0.032*** 0.015 0.011
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Regulatory envi. controls liberal President (0/1) -0.123*** -0.181*** 0.108*** -0.209*** 0.065 -0.122*** 0.155*** 0.038
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04)
USDA traffic jam 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
process type (0/1) -0.856*** -0.868*** -0.831*** -0.856*** -0.836*** -0.856*** -0.821*** -0.840***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07)
Revolving door ties Firm-to-USDA pre-regulation (Type 1) (0/1) (H1) -0.080*** -0.051** -0.080***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
USDA-to-firm pre-regulation (Type 2) (0/1) (H2) 0.126*** 0.092* 0.031
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
USDA-to-firm post-regulation (Type 3) (0/1) (H3) 0.073 -0.188** -0.246**
(0.05) (0.07) (0.08)






constant 4.065*** 4.131*** 3.845*** 4.041*** 3.839*** 4.066*** 4.123*** 4.052***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.11) (0.15)
N 7093 7093 4601 7093 4601 7093 4601 4601
chi2                      2103.909      2121.118 965.579        2127.843 971.669        2106.101 982.351        1000.289
AIC                     7945.313 7930.104 3684.312 7923.38 3678.222 7945.121 3667.54 3657.602
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Table A1. Results Using Cox Semi-Parametric Regression 
 
 
Cox semi-parametric regression models the hazard of an observation leaving the risk set, and 
therefore, coefficients here have the opposite interpretation to our main models: positive 















Independent variables Model 0 Model 1 Model 1b Model 2 Model 2b Model 3 Model 3b Model 4
Firm controls total assets (thousands) 0.026*** 0.026*** -0.026*** 0.026*** -0.007 0.026*** -0.007 -0.011
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
R&D expenditures (thousands) 0.020 0.315* 0.595*** 0.159 0.391** 0.022 0.370* 0.704***
(0.11) (0.13) (0.17) (0.12) (0.14) (0.11) (0.15) (0.21)
lobbying expenditures (millions) 0.067*** 0.060*** -0.110*** 0.047*** -0.354*** 0.067*** -0.199*** -0.302*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.02) (0.12)
PAC contributions (thousands) 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.003* 0.004**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
plant patent count -0.002 -0.002 -0.008** -0.002 -0.009*** -0.001 -0.018*** -0.019***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
foreign firm dummy (0/1) -0.991** -0.951** -0.465 -0.943** -0.304 -0.994** -0.185 -0.170
(0.31) (0.34) (0.30) (0.31) (0.34) (0.30) (0.33) (0.36)
Crop controls acreage -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
corn (0/1) -0.528*** -0.533*** -0.665*** -0.541*** -0.648*** -0.527*** -0.646*** -0.652***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
soybean (0/1) -0.420*** -0.416*** -0.511*** -0.428*** -0.479*** -0.418*** -0.474*** -0.474***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
cotton (0/1) -0.304*** -0.302*** -0.353*** -0.321*** -0.355*** -0.305*** -0.340*** -0.344***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
PIPs (0/1) 0.342*** 0.337*** 0.441*** 0.343*** 0.427*** 0.341*** 0.436*** 0.434***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
phenotype variety -0.086*** -0.090*** -0.075* -0.083*** -0.059 -0.085*** -0.059 -0.058
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Regulatory envi. controls liberal President (0/1) 0.352*** 0.523*** -0.139 0.547*** -0.006 0.351*** -0.319*** -0.102
(0.03) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.15) (0.03) (0.05) (0.16)
USDA traffic jam -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
process type (0/1) 1.708*** 1.754*** 1.535*** 1.725*** 1.584*** 1.714*** 1.547*** 1.558***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.19) (0.10) (0.19) (0.10) (0.19) (0.19)
Revolving door ties Firm-to-USDA pre-regulation (Type 1) (0/1) (H1) 0.239*** 0.167* 0.241**
(0.05) (0.07) (0.09)
USDA-to-firm pre-regulation (Type 2) (0/1) (H2) -0.288*** -0.287 0.037
(0.07) (0.17) (0.19)
USDA-to-firm post-regulation (Type 3) (0/1) (H3) -0.108 0.676** 0.678**
(0.12) (0.24) (0.25)






N 7093 7093 4601 7093 4601 7093 4601 4601
chi2                      1781.511 1804.144 816.222 1825.470 806.499 1781.382 817.798 829.581
AIC                     104386.901 104365.714 64694.065 104370.705 64698.551 104388.075 64682.455 64680








Figures A1-A5 present the Cox-Snell residuals for Model 4, run using various semi-parametric 
and parametric models with different distributions. The closer the residuals fall to the 45-degree 
line, the better the fit of the model.  
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 Across three empirical chapters, this dissertation investigates the antecedents and the 
consequences of a very common, and scarcely understood social phenomenon—that of employee 
exchange between regulators, and regulated firms. Chapter II sheds light on regulatory expertise 
and connectedness as determinants of transitions to directly and indirectly regulated firms. 
Chapter III provides insight into the regulatory agencies’ motivations for participating in the 
revolving door, including the need to learn about the regulated industry, and to build support for 
their regulatory initiatives. Finally, Chapter IV demonstrates the benefits to firms of having 
social political capital in the form of revolving doors, such that they receive improved regulatory 
outcomes as a consequence. Overall, the three chapters provide a unique new perspective on this 
specific type of employee mobility. Together, they suggest that the revolving door phenomenon 
may be shaped by both firms and governmental bodies, serving the different strategic purposes 
of these two types of entities alike.    
  While this dissertation is a first step in developing a comprehensive picture of the 
antecedents and consequences of the revolving door, future research is direly needed in the area 
in order to definitely answer several important questions. Firstly, and most importantly, what is 
the overall result of the firm-government revolving door on social welfare? In other words, does 
the strategic hiring of ex-industry revolvers by regulatory commissions produce benefits (in 
terms of higher quality regulations and more effective implementation) in addition to costs (in 
terms of skewed regulatory process favoring some firms over others) due to the firms’ hiring of 
former commissioners? Further, given that the revolving door has been shown to skew regulatory 
outcomes in one regulatory agency, does this effect generalize across different agencies and 
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regulated industries? Moreover, does the use of the revolving door by firms and regulatory 
agencies vary across national settings? Additionally, what are the effects of laws limiting 
revolving doors in terms of improving the fairness of the regulatory process, as well as the 
quality of regulation? Also, do firms utilize their revolving door ties to produce better outcomes 
specifically for themselves, or do they also use them to benefit the entirety of the industry? 
Finally, what is the effect of the firms’ use of revolving doors as a corporate political strategy on 
their reputation? Below, I suggest a future research agenda that may contribute to answering 
these questions.  
 The first question has to do with comparing the benefits and the costs of the revolving 
door. Arguably, while the entry revolving door may create benefits through allowing regulatory 
agencies to craft and implement more effective regulation, the exit revolving door may create 
social costs through unfairly favoring some firms in the regulatory process. As such, in order to 
compare the benefits and costs of the revolving door, it is necessary to measure both. For 
example, one could operationalize regulatory quality as the speed of converting legislation into 
regulation by the IRCs, a task that all IRCs engage in, and then study regulatory quality as a 
feature of entry revolving door occurrence. Another variable that might successfully 
operationalize the performance of an agency may be a count of court cases filed against it, as 
well. Such a study of an agency’s performance might help us confirm the learning and support-
building motivations of the regulatory agencies for participating in the revolving door, and it 
would present a test of the effectiveness of the agencies’ hiring strategy. Moreover, studying the 
benefits of the revolving door may allow us to fully assess the impact of the phenomenon, in 
contrast to previous work, which exclusively focused on potential costs in terms of the skewed 
regulatory process.  
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 Furthermore, future work is needed to demonstrate whether the effects of the revolving 
door on regulatory outcomes extend beyond the USDA and the few other studied agencies. As 
mentioned, previous work has found that the revolving door contributes to both more (Gormley 
1979; Grace and Phillips 2008) and less favorable firm outcomes (Cohen 1986; deHaan, Kedia, 
Koh, and Rajgopal 2011). As such, a comprehensive study of various agencies (including the 17 
IRCs studied in this dissertation) would provide an important perspective on the consequences of 
the revolving door cross-sectorally. However, the difficulty lies in collecting data on regulatory 
outcomes that do not vary significantly in their nature across agencies. I envision two paths 
forward, in order to avoid this issue. One solution would be to focus on a subset of agencies that 
may have similar regulatory functions, such as enforcement actions against regulated firms. 
Another solution would be to adopt an indirect measure of firm regulatory outcomes: firm 
financial performance. This is a measure commonly adopted by non-market strategy scholars 
(e.g. Hillman (2005); Hillman, Zardkoohi, and Bierman (1999)), with the idea that firm financial 
performance may be thought of as a reflection of, among other things, its successful use of 
corporate political strategy. Thus, employing one of these proposed measures may be a helpful 
step in measuring the effects of the revolving doors across agencies and sectors.  
Moreover, previous research has documented the global prevalence of the revolving door 
(Braun and Raddatz 2010; Brezis 2012; Haveman, Jia, Shi and Wang 2014; Horiuchi and 
Shimizu 2001). As such, it is important to think about how the revolving doors may be used 
differently in different national contexts. For example, countries that exhibit high levels of 
corruption and weak governmental institutions may suffer greater costs from the revolving 
door’s role in regulatory capture. Furthermore, the agencies in such countries may also not be 
able to extract benefits from their hiring of ex-industry people—as in different contexts, even the 
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entry direction of the revolving door may be driven by industry. Although global datasets 
containing revolving door data are difficult to compile, Faccio (2006) does provide coverage of 
47 countries in terms of political connections of large, publicly traded firms. Such a dataset 
might allow a preliminary study of global trends in the revolving door.  
Recently, “cooling-off” laws have been introduced in order to limit the possibility of a 
conflict of interest due to the revolving door, at least in the United States (White House 2009). 
Such laws typically ask regulators to recuse themselves from cases where they may have to 
adjudicate on a former employer, and they limit their ability to represent their new, post-tenure 
employers in regulatory matters before agencies for a number of years. The introduction of such 
laws may provide a quasi-natural experimental setting, in which the causal effect of the laws may 
be estimated on the perseverance of the revolving door, the quality of regulation produced, as 
well as firm outcomes. Such a study would provide an opportunity to examine both the 
effectiveness of these laws, and by extension, it would also allow an insight into how the 
revolving door was used prior to the introduction of the “cooling-off” laws.  
In my study of the revolving doors in the agribiotechnology industry, I argue that the 
revolving door is used by firms for their individual benefit. In other words, this is a strategy that 
firms are using to enhance their own competitiveness rather than acting on behalf of the industry. 
Thus, the revolving door may be thought of as yet another example of the fracturing of the 
American corporate elite (Mizruchi 2013). Yet, one could imagine certain larger regulatory 
issues may motivate firms to band together in pursuit of more favorable regulation. Furthermore, 
there may be occasions where influencing regulation in favor of one company may produce 
benefits for the entire industry. As of now, however, it remains an empirical question whether 
firms truly pursue the hiring of former regulators for their individual benefit, or whether they 
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sometimes do so in order to influence industry outcomes. A cross-industry study could answer 
this question by relating industry indicators that could be proxies for industry unity (such as 
industry concentration as a rough measure), to measures of regulatory outcomes on firm and 
industry levels.  
 Finally, while the revolving door may be able to improve regulatory outcomes for firms, 
it may at the same time tarnish firm reputations to be seen as engaging in behavior that has 
potential for regulatory capture of the state (Dal Bó 2006; Stigler 1971). As such, from a non-
market strategy perspective, it would be important to study the effect of the use of this particular 
corporate political strategy on corporate reputations. Using Open Secrets data, one might also 
compare the portfolio of corporate political strategies (including lobbying and political 
donations) in terms of their effects on firms’ reputation. Such a study could also document any 
effects of media attention that might amplify reputation dangers of engageing in corporate 
political strategies.  
 Overall, then, despite the unique theoretical and empirical insights that this dissertation 
offers on the revolving door, much work remains to be done. The agenda presented above 
provides several burning questions that would benefit from future study. Given the important 
theoretical and practical implications of the revolving door, non-market strategy scholars should 
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